Country policy and information note: political affiliation, Nepal, November 2023 (accessible)

Question 1

Executive summary

Accepted Answer

In general, leaders, members and supporters of opposition political parties are not at real risk of persecution or serious harm from state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

Nepal is a federal democratic republic. Political parties are generally free to form and operate. The law provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair elections based on universal and equal suffrage.

Local level elections in May 2022 and national and provincial elections held in November 2022 were judged by domestic and international observers to be generally free, fair and peaceful. Despite changing alliances in the ruling coalition in 2023, the government remains functioning.

Freedom of expression, assembly and association are guaranteed under the constitution and, in general, the government respected these rights. Political violence has declined since 2019 and demonstrations, that are generally peaceful, are common across the country.

Question 2

Assessment

Accepted Answer

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is information in the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

a person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution/serious harm by the state because of their actual or imputed political opinion
a person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
a person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
a claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and
if a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.1.4 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only.

1.1.5 The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only.

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use only.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 Actual or imputed political opinion.

2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their actual or imputed convention reason.

2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk

3.1.1 In general, leaders, members and supporters of opposition political parties are not at real risk of persecution or serious harm from state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

3.1.2 In the Country Guidance (CG) case of KG (Review of current situation) Nepal CG [2006] UKAIT 00076, heard on 14 August 2006 and promulgated on 31 October 2006, the Upper Tribunal (UT), which considered background material relating to the Maoist insurgency between 1996 up to August 2006, found that:

‘1. The fact that conditions in a country are unstable or fluid does not necessarily mean the AIT [Asylum Immigration Tribunal] will avoid producing country guidance decisions relating to risk categories in that country.

‘2. Generally speaking and given recent developments, it would only be in the exceptional case that an appellant could show a continuing risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment contrary to Article 3 by virtue of being perceived by the authorities in Nepal as a Maoist.

‘3. Similarly, it will only be in very limited cases that a person would be able to show he or she faces risk in his or her home area at the hands of the Maoists.

‘4. However, even those able to show a risk (from Maoists) on return to their home area (such as businessmen, industrialists and entrepreneurs), will generally have a viable internal relocation alternative in Kathmandu. Only in an exceptional case would this not be so.

‘5. The following cases should no longer be referred to for country guidance on Nepal: KH (Risk - Maoist) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 03945, IP (Risk - Maoist - Farmer) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 04038, DG (Journalist – Healthcare) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 04284, LG (Maoist – Ex -Military) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 04334, Gurung (Exclusion - Risk – Maoist) Nepal CG* [2002] UKIAT 04870, GC (Relocation - Maoists) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 05241 and RS (Relocation - Maoists) Nepal CG [2002] UKIAT 05407. (Gurung remains starred on the point of law it deals with).’

3.1.3 The UT in KG found:

‘So far as the issue of risk on return to Maoists from the current government is concerned, we consider that the latest background evidence, which includes reference to the dropping of all terrorism charges against Maoist rebels and to a clear commitment from the interim government to include Maoists both in the interim government (at some stage) and in a new regular government following elections, demonstrates that even active members of the CPN [Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)] and members of the PLA [People’s Liberation Army, the military wing of the CPN] would not be at risk on return to Nepal. In our view it would only be in the exceptional case that an appellant could show a continuing risk of persecution or serious harm or treatment contrary to Article 3 by virtue of being, or being perceived as, a Maoist.’ (paragraph 47)

3.1.4 The UT’s findings were made as peace talks were ongoing between the then Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist), led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda). On 21 November 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed by both parties, formally ending the 10-year insurgency and resulting in the decommissioning of the PLA. Nepal is now a functioning democratic state where a diverse range of political parties are generally free to form and operate. Dahal has served as prime minister on 3 occasions, and was sworn in for the third time on 26 December 2022. His party, the CPN (Maoist Centre), forms part of the coalition government (see Overview of political situation and Federal and provincial elections – November 2022.

3.1.5 In KG the UK held that:

‘Whilst we do not seek in this determination to try and specify all the current categories of those who face a risk on return to Nepal, we would accept that such a risk may arise in a person’s home area where he is (or would be perceived as being) a businessman or industrialist or entrepreneur. It would appear that the CPN (at least through its military wing) is continuing to engage in the practice of extortion and/or abduction and for this purpose to target businessmen, industrialists and entrepreneurs – broadly speaking those perceived as having significant wealth. Whether or not it is correct that the Maoists have a viable option of reaching an agreement with the current interim government and with donor agencies in a position to help them pay the salaries of their military wing, it does appear that their inability to raise taxes through any governmental structure means that they are continuing to target businessmen, industrialists and entrepreneurs with a view to obtaining financial resources with which to pay their own soldiers. Thus a person who was able to show that in Nepal he ran a business or was an industrialist or entrepreneur may on the facts of an individual case, be able to show a real risk of persecution/serious harm/treatment contrary to Article 3 in their home area. Whilst we accept that there continue to be raids and attacks on governmental and non-governmental organisations, this does not appear to involve any consistent pattern of targeting of those who are officials in these organisations.’ (paragraph 48)

3.1.6 The evidence considered in KG related to Maoist militants involved in the insurgency between 1996 up to August 2006 (see Overview of political situation). Therefore, KG is no longer representative of the country situation. Current country information no longer supports the UT’s findings that there are even exceptional cases in which there is a risk to Maoists or those perceived as such by the authorities (outlined in headnote 2 and paragraph 47), or that there is a risk from Maoists in general or to the specific groups outlined at headnotes 3, 4 and paragraph 48 of KG. Consequently, there are very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the UT’s findings, in respect of the risk to or from Maoists, at headnotes 2, 3 and 4 in KG. It remains that the country guidance cited at headnote 5 should no longer be followed.

3.1.7 Nepal is a federal democratic republic, established in 2008 after transition from the constitutional monarchy, which ended in 2006. The 2015 constitution established the political system, including the framework for a prime minister as the chief executive, a bicameral parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, and 7 provincial parliaments. A diverse range of political parties exist and are generally free to form and operate. The law provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair elections based on universal and equal suffrage (see Political system).

3.1.8 In May 2022, local level elections took place and were judged to be free, fair and peaceful. Nepali Congress won the most seats (mayor and deputy mayor posts), followed by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML), and CPN (Maoist Centre) (CPM-MC) won the third highest number of seats (see Local elections – May 2022).

3.1.9 On 20 November 2022, Nepal held national and provincial elections that domestic and international observers reported were, in general, well managed, peaceful, free and fair, with few incidents of election-related violence. Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the CPN-MC was sworn in as Prime Minister on 26 December 2022 as the head of a 7 party coalition consisting of CPN-UML, CPN-MC, Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Janata Samajbadi Party, Janamat Party and Nagarik Unmukti Party (see Federal and provincial elections – November 2022 and Political and election-related violence and demonstrations). Despite changing alliances and resignations from the ruling coalition in 2023 (for example, the RSP and RPP left the coalition in early 2023), which affect stability, the government remains functioning (see Post-election political events in 2023).

3.1.10 Freedom of expression, assembly and association are guaranteed under the constitution and, in general, the government respected these rights. Political violence (mostly clashes between protesters and occasional forceful dispersal by police) has declined since 2019. Meanwhile, the number of demonstrations has increased, which are generally peaceful, and are common across the country (see Political and election-related violence and demonstrations).

3.1.11 Information on politically-motivated arrests and detentions was limited amongst the sources consulted by CPIT. Freedom House cited the arrest of the leader for the Alliance for Independent Madhesh (AIM) in 2018 (who was then released in 2019), and noted in its report covering 2022 events that recent incidents of arrests of political opponents are rare. In 2022 the US Department of State found no reports of political prisoners or detainees (see Arrest and detention).

3.1.12 Corruption is endemic in politics and is often unpunished, although according to Freedom House, Nepal’s principal anti-corruption agency, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), has been more active in recent years. Reports of corruption relate mostly to bribery (see Corruption).

3.1.13 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Protection

4.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state they will not, in general, be able to obtain protection from the authorities.

4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 In KG the UT found, in regard to internal relocation, that:

‘It is not necessary to consider the issue of internal relocation in respect of all parts of Nepal. That is because in our view the latest background evidence clearly demonstrates that in Kathmandu, the capital, the situation is stable and there is an effective system of government and law. There is nothing to indicate that in Kathmandu, apart from isolated incidents, Maoists are acting with impunity against residents of that city. In the event that Maoists were to threaten serious harm to an individual or individuals in Kathmandu, we consider the authorities there would be willing and able to protect them against such harm. This observation would generally apply to businessmen, industrialists and entrepreneurs. We emphasise here that we are describing only what we consider to be generally the case. We would not rule out that in an exceptional case it may be possible for a person under real threat from Maoists in their home area (assuming that is somewhere other than Kathmandu) to show that he or she would not have a viable internal relocation alternative in Kathmandu. We emphasise, however, that the case would have to have exceptional features turning very much on the particular circumstances of the individual’s case.

‘It may be that for those who face a real threat from Maoists in their home area there is another part (or other parts) of the country to which they could relocate. But since, as we understand matters, all returns from the UK would be to Kathmandu, it is the issue of internal relocation in this city that would be the normal starting-point for any inquiry as to whether a person could show either or both that he would continue to face a real risk of persecution (or the suffering of serious harm) or that he could not reasonably be expected to stay in that city. The same applies when considering internal relocation in the context of Article 3 ECHR.’ (paragraphs 49 and 50)

5.1.2 The findings in KG, in regard to internal relocation to Kathmandu being a viable internal relocation alternative, do not apply where a person is able to demonstrate on the facts of their case that they are at risk of persecution from the state. Equally, internal relocation elsewhere would not be viable where a person is at risk of persecution from the state.

5.1.3 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Question 3

Country information

Accepted Answer

About the country information

This contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content of this section follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

Section updated: 9 November 2023

7. Map

7.1.1 Map showing Nepal’s 7 provinces – Province No.1, Province No.2, Bagmati, Gandaki, Kamali, Lumbini and Sudurpashchim, and Kalapani territory (under Indian administration, claimed by Nepal), the national capital Kathmandu, and the provincial capitals^{[footnote 1]}.

Section updated: 9 November 2023

8. Political system

8.1 Overview of the political situation

8.1.1 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided a brief overview of Nepal’s recent political history ‘Nepal is a country of approximately 30 million people that has undergone significant political transformation since 2006, when a 10-year armed insurgency by Maoist militants ended after claiming at least 13,000 lives.’^{[footnote 2]} A Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed on 21 November 2006, by the then Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist)^{[footnote 3]}. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), noted that, in 2013, ‘The absorption of former members of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into the Nepalese Army was officially completed…’^{[footnote 4]}

8.1.2 The CRS report stated that:

‘In 2006, Nepal’s king ended direct monarchical rule and reinstated the country’s parliament in response to weeks of protests. After the Maoists’ electoral success in 2008, Nepal declared itself a republic, and a Constituent Assembly (CA) was directed to write a new constitution. A subsequent CA elected in 2013 agreed to a new constitution in 2015. Nepal now has a bicameral legislature with 275 Members in the House of Representatives and 59 Members in the National Assembly, the body’s upper house. The Prime Minister serves as the head of government, and the indirectly-elected President serves a largely ceremonial role. Though the process of democratization has not been smooth, Nepal’s government has brought former insurgents into the political system and conducted peaceful elections.’^{[footnote 5]}

8.1.3 As noted in the Australia Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) Country Information Report on Nepal, dated 1 March 2019, based on a range of sources:

‘Nepal transitioned from a constitutional monarchy to a federal democratic republic in 2008 and operated under an interim constitution until the new Constitution came into force on 20 September 2015… The constitution federated seven provinces based on ethno-linguistic identity and economic viability. The Constitution establishes a bicameral federal parliament consisting of a House of Representatives and a National Assembly, as well as unicameral provincial parliaments. Representation of disadvantaged and or minority groups, including women, Dalits, Madhesi and Muslims, is required in both houses of the national parliament.’^{[footnote 6]}

8.1.4 The Governance Monitoring Centre Nepal (GMC Nepal), a research initiative by the Nepal-based think tank Centre for Social Change (CSC^{[footnote 7]}), explained:

‘The constitution outlines a three-tiered government of a non-hierarchical nature:

‘The Federal level is the largest political unit comprising of the central government in Kathmandu.
‘The Provincial level is the intermediary political entity and is split into seven areas.
‘The Local level made up of 753 sub-units which include 6 Metropolitan cities (Mahanagarpalika), 11 Sub-Metropolitan cities (Upa-Mahanagapalika), 276 Municipalities (Nagarpalika) and 460 Rural Municipalities (Gaupalika).’^{[footnote 8]}

8.1.5 The DFAT report noted ‘The President is the head of state, and has largely ceremonial powers. The President is elected by members of the Federal Parliament and the state assemblies… Nepal’s cabinet is chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with their party and any coalition partners.’^{[footnote 9]}

8.1.6 Though not without conflict, provincial and national elections in 2017 took place largely without major setbacks and were generally considered to be free and fair, according to Bertelsmann Siftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2022 Country Report Nepal, covering the period 1 February 2019 to 31 January 2021. The BTI 2022 Report noted that ‘After over one hundred attacks involving explosions occurred prior to the elections targeting assemblies and leaders, security forces were deployed to pre-empt election-related violence. Outbreaks of violence during the elections themselves remained localized and small.’^{[footnote 10]}

8.1.7 Freedom House noted in its Freedom in the World 2022 report, covering 2021 events, that:

‘Elections were held for 18 National Assembly seats in January 2020. The Nepal Communist Party (NCP), the product of a 2018 merger between the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist [CPN-MC] parties, won 16 seats, while the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJP-N) won the other 2. In late 2020 and in May 2021, former prime minister Oli’s control over his party diminished and he dissolved the parliament in a bid to hold on to power through new elections. In July [2021], the Supreme Court restored the National Assembly, and legitimately elected representatives remained in power… Sher Bahadur Deuba [Nepali Congress] was sworn in as prime minister in July 2021.’^{[footnote 11]}

8.1.8 In March 2021, the Supreme Court found that the NCP had been illegitimately registered in May 2018, as there was already a party with a similar name registered with the Election Commission^{[footnote 12]}. The dissolution of the NCP forced the party back into the CPN-UML and the CPN-MC^{[footnote 13]}. Following the invalidation of the NCP, the CPN-MC aligned with the Nepali Congress^{[footnote 14]}.

8.1.9 The CRS noted that:

‘Shifting alliances among Nepal’s political elite continue to prevent a stable government from taking hold in Nepal. At the close of 2022, Nepal had seen 13 different governments in 16 years. A coalition led by Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (2008-2009, 2016-2017, and 2022-present) of the Communist Party of Nepal Maoist-Centre (CPN MC) replaced former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s (1995-1997, 2001-2002, 2004-2005, 2017-2018, and 2021-2022) Nepali Congress (NC)-led government following elections in November 2022. (Dahal, who led the Maoists during the insurgency, is also known by the nom de guerre Prachanda.) The coalition government included the Communist Party of Nepal Marxist Leninist (CPN UML) led by Party Chairman and former Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli (2015-2016 and 2018-2021)…’^{[footnote 15]}

8.1.10 According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2023 report, covering events in 2022, ‘Since the 2021 constitutional crisis, party politics have remained relatively stable. Nepal has recently experienced party mergers, party splits and the formation of new parties, including the RSP, all suggesting extensive freedom to organize politically.’^{[footnote 16]}

See also Elections 2022: Federal and provincial – November 2022

8.2 Political participation

8.2.1 The Constitution of Nepal provides that every citizen has the freedom to form political parties^{[footnote 17]}. According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2023 report, ‘Political parties are generally free to form and operate’ and ‘Opposition parties have a realistic chance of gaining power through elections and won seats during local elections in May 2022.’^{[footnote 18]} The legal age to contest in local-level elections is 21, and a person must be 25 to contest in federal and provincial elections^{[footnote 19]}.

8.2.2 The US Department of State noted in its human rights report for 2022 (USSD HR Report 2022) ‘The law provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.’^{[footnote 20]} Citizens aged 18 years and older are eligible to vote^{[footnote 21]}. Voting is not compulsory^{[footnote 22]}.

8.2.3 The DFAT report noted that ‘Under the 2015 Constitution seats in the Federal Parliament are reserved for women through quotas, and substantial, proportional allocations made for Madhesis, Dalits, and other minority groups.’^{[footnote 23]}

8.2.4 The DFAT report further noted that:

‘A diverse and competitive array of political parties operates in Nepal, though the system has faced considerable instability in recent years. Unlike the 1990 constitution, the 2015 Constitution has no limitation on parties formed along ethnic lines leading to many ethnic groups to participate formally in political processes, motivated by a belief that they have been excluded from a society that has historically been ruled by dominant ethnic and caste groups.

‘Nepal has enjoyed several years of political stability. A lively political environment provides an opportunity for diverse political parties and views, and an individual’s membership of a political party, along with their ability to be identified as a member and to be politically active, is generally respected.’^{[footnote 24]}

8.2.5 According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2023 report, ‘Indigenous Nepalis and Dalits are underrepresented in politics and in civil service, despite policies meant to bolster their participation. Members of the Chhettri and Hill Brahmin groups, meanwhile, remain relatively overrepresented.’^{[footnote 25]}

Section updated: 9 November 2023

9. Political parties

9.1 Main parties

9.1.1 Main political parties and leaders, as listed by the CIA World Factbook profile on Nepal^{[footnote 26]} (unless indicated otherwise):

Party	Leader (surname in bold)
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) or CPN-MC	Pushpa Kamal Dahal [also known as Prachanda^{[footnote 27]}]
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or CPN-UML	Khadga Prasad (KP) Oli
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist) or CPN-US	Madhav Kumar Nepal
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist-Chand)^{[footnote 28]}	Netra Bikram Chand (also known as Biplav or Biplab^{[footnote 29]})
Federal Socialist Forum, Nepal or FSFN	Upendra Yadav
Janamat Party	Chandra Kant Raut
Loktantrik Samajwadi Party	Mahantha Thakur
Naya Shakti Party, Nepal	Baburam Bhattarai
Nepali Congress or NC	Sher Bahadur Deuba
Nepal Mazdoor Kisan Party (Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party) or NWPP	Narayan Man Bijukchhe
People’s Socialist Party	Upendra Yakav
Rastriya Janamorcha (National People’s Front)	Chitra Bahadur K.C.
Rastriya Janata Party (National People’s Party, Nepal) or RJPN	Mahanta Thakur
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (National Democratic Party) or RPP	Rajendra Prasad Lingden
Rastriya Swatantra Party or RSP	Rabi Lamichhane

9.1.2 Most major political parties have associated organisations, including student, youth and women’s wings^{[footnote 30]}.

9.2 Student wings

9.2.1 According to Online Khabar, reporting in November 2022, ‘… almost all government colleges have units of student unions supporting various political parties. While their roles in academic institutions are often criticised as they are frequently seen demonstrating and protesting in colleges and vandalising property, they become more active during political campaigns of their mother parties.’^{[footnote 31]}

9.2.2 In March 2023 it was reported that the All Nepal National Free Student Union (ANNFSU) affiliated to the CPN-UML won in majority of university campuses at the Free Students Union election^{[footnote 32]}.

9.2.3 Student wings and affiliated parties:

Student wing	Affiliated party
All Nepal National Free Students Union (ANNFSU)^{[footnote 33]} ^{[footnote 34]}	CPN-UML
All Nepal National Free Students Union (ANNFSU)^{[footnote 35]}	CPN (Unified Socialist)
All Nepal National Independent Students Union (Revolutionary) (ANNISU-R)^{[footnote 36]}	CPN (Maoist Centre)
Nepal Student Union^{[footnote 37]}	Nepali Congress

Section updated: 9 November 2023

10. Hindu monarchists

10.1 Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)

10.1.1 In November 2016, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party – Nepal (RPP-N) merged into the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)^{[footnote 38]}. The joining of both parties created the fourth largest party in parliament with a total of 37 seats^{[footnote 39]}. Following the merger, the unified RPP put on hold the demand to reinstate a constitutional monarchy favoured by the RPP-N, as the RPP faction had advocated for republicanism^{[footnote 40]}.

10.1.2 In December 2020, the RPP held pro-monarchy demonstrations in the cities of Hetauda and Jhapa in southern Nepal, and in Kathmandu^{[footnote 41]}. In January 2021, thousands of protesters demanding a return of the monarchy and the reinstatement of a Hindu state clashed with riot police in Nepal^{[footnote 42]} ^{[footnote 43]}. This was reported to be one of a series of protests against Prime Minister Oli’s government organised by a variety of groups, fuelled by Oli’s failure to honour an agreement to split his term with the co-leader of the governing party^{[footnote 44]} ^{[footnote 45]}. During 2021, RPP leaders continued calls for the re-establishment of the country as a Hindu state and pushed for strong legal action against those accused of killing cows^{[footnote 46]}.

10.1.3 In December 2021, Rajendra Lingden defeated Kamal Thapa to become the chair of the RPP^{[footnote 47]}. In February 2022, Kamal Thapa left the RPP to revive the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal (RPP-N)^{[footnote 48]} ^{[footnote 49]}.

10.1.4 In May 2023, the RPP objected to claims made in the US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report that the party was under pressure and influence from India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to revive Nepal as a Hindu state^{[footnote 50]}.

10.1.5 See Elections 2022 for information on the RPP’s participation in local, federal and provincial elections.

Section updated: 9 November 2023

11. Communist parties

11.1 Overview

11.1.1 The communist movement in Nepal has split into factions at various points throughout its history due to, amongst other things, ideological differences^{[footnote 51]} ^{[footnote 52]}.

11.1.2 For a list of mainstream communist parties that participated in the 2022 federal and provincial elections, see Federal and provincial elections – November 2022.

11.2 Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist-Chand)

11.2.1 The CPN (Maoist-Chand), led by Netra Bikram Chand (also known as Biplav or Biplab^{[footnote 53]}) was formed in December 2014, after splitting from the Communist Party of Nepal (Revolutionary Maoist) headed by Mohan Baidya^{[footnote 54]}.

11.2.2 The party was declared a criminal group by the Nepali government in March 2019 for its involvement in politically-motivated violence, including a bomb blast at a telecommunications company which killed a civilian^{[footnote 55]} ^{[footnote 56]} ^{[footnote 57]}. A special task force led by security agencies was created to monitor the groups cadres and leaders^{[footnote 58]}. In February 2021, it was reported that according to Home Ministry officials, more than 2,000 leaders and cadres of the Chand-led party had been arrested and more than 135 were in jail^{[footnote 59]}.

11.2.3 The USSD Country Report on Terrorism 2021, covering events during that year, noted that on 5 March 2021 the Government of Nepal and the CPN (Maoist-Chand) ‘… signed a historic peace agreement committing both sides to peacefully resolve their differences through future political talks. Following the agreement, the Government of Nepal lifted its ban on the group and ceased to investigate and arrest members.’^{[footnote 60]}

11.2.4 In April 2022, Chand removed 2 of the party’s main leaders, Dharmendra Bastola and Hemanta Prakash Oli, who were against Chand’s proposal to take part in the May 2022 local elections^{[footnote 61]}. In May 2022, members of the CPN voted to remove Chand from his position as general secretary and expelled him from the party^{[footnote 62]} ^{[footnote 63]}. In May 2022 it was reported that Dharmendra Bastola formed a separate party, named the CPN (Majority)^{[footnote 64]}.

11.2.5 Reports later in 2022 and into 2023 indicated that Chand continued to hold the post of general secretary of the CPN (Maoist-Chand)^{[footnote 65]} ^{[footnote 66]} ^{[footnote 67]}. Although the party did not contest the parliamentary elections in November 2022, in June 2023, Chand, alongside ruling coalition leftist partners, formed an alliance, called the Socialist Front^{[footnote 68]} ^{[footnote 69]}. (See also Post-election political events in 2023 and Political opponents).

Section updated: 9 November 2023

12. Elections 2022

12.1 National Assembly elections – January 2022

12.1.1 On 26 January 2022, an election was held for 19 National Assembly members to replace retiring members^{[footnote 70]}. Members are elected by an electoral college made up of members of the provincial assembly and chairperson/mayor and vice-chairperson/deputy mayor of local units within the province^{[footnote 71]}. The 5-party ruling alliance led by the Nepali Congress won 18 of the 19 National Assembly seats and one seat was won by a CPN-UML candidate^{[footnote 72]}.

12.2 Local elections – May 2022

12.2.1 Local level elections were held in May 2022^{[footnote 73]}. The USSD HR Report 2022 noted that they were judged to be free, fair and peaceful by national and international observers, with high voter turnout including among youth^{[footnote 74]}.

12.2.2 New Delhi-based think tank, Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), cited an article from The Hindu, noting that:

‘The local body elections were held in all 753 local bodies of Nepal, and 79 political parties contested the polls. Nepali Congress led a five-party alliance and the CPN (Unified Marxist–Leninist) four-party alliance were the major competitors in the local elections. Nepali Congress won the maximum number of seats, with 329 mayor posts and 300 deputy mayor posts. CPN-UML won the second-highest seats with 206 mayor posts and 241 deputy mayor posts. CPN (Maoist Centre) won the third highest seats with 121 mayor posts and 128 deputy mayor posts.’^{[footnote 75]}

12.2.3 According to The Kathmandu Post, the RPP won in 4 units – 3 municipalities and one rural municipality – and in 63 wards^{[footnote 76]}.

12.2.4 See the Nepal Local Election Dashboard by the Global Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies for local election results.

12.3 Federal and provincial elections – November 2022

12.3.1 A decision to hold federal and provincial elections was announced on 4 August 2022^{[footnote 77]} ^{[footnote 78]}, and they were held on 20 November 2022^{[footnote 79]} ^{[footnote 80]}. VIF explained that ‘The election was conducted for the House of Representatives (HoR), with 275 seats, and for the Provincial assemblies of seven Nepali Provinces, with 550 seats. Nepal uses the mixed voting system, with 60 per cent of votes counted through the First Past the Post (FPTP) system and 40 per cent of votes counted through the Proportional Representation (PR) system at both levels of governance.’^{[footnote 81]}

12.3.2 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted that the federal and provincial elections were deemed overall by domestic and international observers to be ‘… well managed, free, and fair, with limited electoral code of conduct violations.’^{[footnote 82]} The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), which monitored the elections, found that the run-up campaign was largely ‘peaceful, participatory, and a massive improvement over previous elections’^{[footnote 83]}, and that election day itself was ‘peaceful and orderly.’^{[footnote 84]}

12.3.3 The USSD HR Report 2022 stated:

‘Exit polling projections from the Election Commission noted the elections saw lower voter turnout than nationwide local elections held in May. Civil society organizations and analysts noted the turnout could have reflected overall voter disenchantment and frustration with the slowness of change in the parties and not presenting fresh-faced candidates. Analysts noted independent candidates captured more attention among youth voters especially in urban areas. The Elections Commission noted close to 18 million voters were registered for the elections…’^{[footnote 85]}

12.3.4 Voter turnout was around 61% (approximately 11.1 million people voted compared to the 18.1 million registered to vote), compared to 79% in the 2013 elections, and 69% in 2017^{[footnote 86]}.

12.3.5 VIF reported that ‘There were two pre-election alliances. The first was the democratic-left alliance, led by Nepali Congress. It comprised of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN-MC), Communist Party of Nepal ([Unified] Socialist), Loktantrik Samajwadi Party, and Rastriya Janamorcha. The second pre-election alliance was led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML). It was joined by Rastriya Prajatantra Party and Janata Samajbadi Party.’^{[footnote 87]}

12.3.6 The table below shows the number of parliamentary seats won by each party/independent candidate^{[footnote 88]} ^{[footnote 89]} ^{[footnote 90]}:

Party	No. of seats
Nepali Congress Party (NCP)	89
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML)	78
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN-MC)	32
Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)	20
Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)	14
Janata Samajbadi Party (JSP)	12
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist) (CPN-US)	10
Janamat Party	6
Loktantrik Samajwadi Party	4
Nagrik Unmukti Party (NUP)	3
Nepal Workers and Peasants Party	1
Rastriya Janamorcha	1
Independent	5

12.3.7 Of the 69 parties that participated in the federal (House of Representatives) election, only 7 – the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, CPN-MC, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP) and Janamat Party – met the threshold of 3% of the total votes cast to be designated a national party by the Election Commission^{[footnote 91]}.

12.3.8 The Global Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (GIIS), an independent research institute based in Kathmandu^{[footnote 92]}, published an interactive map of the federal election results, indicating the winning party by district^{[footnote 93]}:

12.3.9 See the United Nations Nepal provincial maps to view the administrative units of each province, and the Election Commission Nepal for district wise constituency maps.

12.3.10 No party or pre-election alliance were able to secure a majority (of 138 seats), resulting in a hung parliament^{[footnote 94]} ^{[footnote 95]}. VIF noted that:

‘… the Nepali Congress alliance was closer to the majority and was expected to form the government. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) of CPN-MC was determined to become the Prime Minister in the first half of the five-year tenure. However, Nepali Congress wanted their candidate as the Prime Minister on the grounds that the Nepali Congress secured the highest number of seats. Subsequently, Sher Bahadur Deuba [Nepali Congress leader] forwarded his name for the Prime Minister’s post to the President, disregarding Prachanda’s demands.

‘… Prachanda swerved to [CPN-UML leader] KP Sharma Oli’s camp last minute. Other parties like Rashtriya Swatantra Party, Janamat Party, and Nagarik Unmukti Party also decided to join the coalition. This move subsequently led to the CPN-UML alliance acquiring the majority. Prachanda finally secured his position as the Prime Minister. The final ruling coalition consists of seven political parties – CPN-UML, CPN-MC, Rashtriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, Janata Samajbadi Party, Janamat Party, Nagarik Unmukti Party.’^{[footnote 96]}

12.3.11 The USSD HR Report 2022 stated that:

‘Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) was sworn in as Prime Minister by President Bidya Devi Bhandari on December 26 [2022] as the head of a seven-party coalition comprised of 169 out of 275 parliamentary MPs. On December 22, the country’s 275 newly-elected MPs took their oaths of office as the new parliament held its first session. As a reflection of the country’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, 26 MPs took their oaths in at least 14 native languages, in addition to Nepali.’^{[footnote 97]}

12.3.12 For more in-depth information on the federal and provincial election results, see House of Representatives and Provincial Assembly Election Results – 2079, produced by the Nepal in Data (NiD) statistics portal, based on data from the Election Commission Nepal^{[footnote 98]}.

12.3.13 For information on election-related violence, see the section on Political and election-related violence and demonstrations.

12.4 Post-election political events in 2023

12.4.1 On 27 February 2023 it was reported that KP Oli’s CPN-UML quit the CPN-MC Dahal-led government over Dahal’s decision to support a NC candidate for President. The RPP also resigned from the cabinet^{[footnote 99]} ^{[footnote 100]} ^{[footnote 101]}. Earlier in February, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) left the coalition after its leader was stripped of his cabinet position amid a legal dispute over his citizenship. However, the RSP said it still supported the government^{[footnote 102]} ^{[footnote 103]}.

12.4.2 On 9 March 2023, the Nepali Congress candidate, Ram Chandra Paudel, was elected as Nepal’s next president^{[footnote 104]}. On 17 March 2023, Ram Sahay Prasad Yadav of the Janata Samajbadi Party was elected as Nepal’s new Vice President^{[footnote 105]}.

12.4.3 Following the withdrawal of coalition allies from the cabinet, Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal faced a vote of confidence in parliament, which he won on 20 March 2023 after securing support from his own party (CPN-MC), the Nepali Congress party, Rastriya Swatantra Party, Janata Samajbadi Party, CPN (Unified Socialist), Janamat Party, Loktantrik Samajbadi Party, Nagarik Unmukti Party, 3 independents and the Rastriya Janamorcha. Former coalition partners of the Dahal-led government, the CPN-UML and Rastriya Prajatantra Party, voted against Dahal^{[footnote 106]} ^{[footnote 107]}.

12.4.4 On 31 March 2023, Prime Minister Dahal partially expanded his Cabinet following disagreements among coalition partners over allocations of ministries^{[footnote 108]}. A sitting minister, Abdul Khan of the Janamat Party, tendered his resignation after the Ministry of Industry position his party sought was allocated to the Nepali Congress^{[footnote 109]}, leaving the Janamat Party out of the Cabinet^{[footnote 110]}.

12.4.5 In April 2023, by-elections in 3 electoral constituencies took place. In Tanahun-1 and Bara-2 the seats became vacant when the elected MPs in those constituencies were nominated respectively as Nepal’s President and Vice-President. In Chitwan-2, the MP (Rabi Lamichhane of the RSP^{[footnote 111]}) was removed from office by the Supreme Court for violating citizenship laws^{[footnote 112]}. A report on the by-elections by Nepal Monitor, a Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP) initiative, stated that ‘… different phases of election starting from candidature registration, campaign period to polling day and post election activities were well executed upholding democratic norms and practices.’^{[footnote 113]}

12.4.6 The Kathmandu Post reported in June 2023 that leftist parties in the ruling alliance – the CPN (Maoist Centre), the CPN (Unified Socialist), the Janata Samajbadi Party, alongside the Communist Party of Nepal led by Netra Bikram Chand, formed the Socialist Front ‘with a common commitment to political stability along with the aim of party unification.’^{[footnote 114]} ^{[footnote 115]}

12.4.7 As of 24 June 2023, the ruling alliance consisted of the Nepali Congress, CPN (Maoist Centre), CPN (Unified Socialist), Janata Samajbadi, Loktantrik Samajbadi Party and Nagarik Unmukti Party^{[footnote 116]}.

Section updated: 9 November 2023

13. Corruption

13.1.1 Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perception Index gave Nepal a score of 34, up one point from the previous year, where zero indicates highly corrupt and 100 indicates a lack of corruption^{[footnote 117]}. Freedom House noted in its Freedom in the World 2023 report that ‘Corruption is endemic in Nepali politics/government and often goes unpunished.’^{[footnote 118]} The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is Nepal’s principal anti-corruption agency and, according to Freedom House, has been ‘… significantly more active in recent years and has taken on a variety of cases.’^{[footnote 119]}

13.1.2 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted that:

‘The law provides criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. Officials sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity, and there were reports of government corruption…

‘During fiscal year July 2021-July 2022, the Commission for the Investigations of Abuse of Authority filed 114 cases of bribery against 443 individuals.

‘As in previous years, student and labor groups associated with political parties demanded contributions from schools and businesses. Corruption remained problematic within the Police, Armed Police Force, and local governments.’^{[footnote 120]}

13.1.3 A Survey of the Nepali People in 2022 led by Kathmandu University School of Arts in coordination with Interdisciplinary Analysts and The Asia Foundation, conducted in July and August 2022, based on a nationally representative sample of 7,056 Nepalis randomly selected from 588 wards across all 7 provinces, found that ‘Political parties remain the institutions least trusted by the public.’^{[footnote 121]}

Section updated: 9 November 2023

14. Political opponents

14.1 Freedom of expression

14.1.1 According to the USSD HR Report 2022:

‘The constitution and the law provide for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and the government tended to respect this right. Nonetheless, journalists, NGOs, and political activists stated the government restricted media freedom by threatening journalists and news organizations that criticized the government, leading to reports of self-censorship. Human rights lawyers and some journalists stated that both the constitution and law enable the government to restrict freedom of speech and press in ways they considered vague and open to abuse. For example, the constitution lists several circumstances under which laws curtailing freedom of speech and press may be formulated. These include acts that “jeopardize harmonious relations between federal units” and acts that assist a foreign state or organization to jeopardize national security. The constitution prohibits any acts “contrary to public health, decency, and morality” or that “disturb the public law and order situation.”’^{[footnote 122]}

14.1.2 The same report said ‘Citizens generally believed they could express their opinions freely and often expressed critical opinions in print and electronic media without restriction.’^{[footnote 123]}

14.1.3 The BTI 2022 Country Report Nepal noted that ‘As demonstrated by the protests that occurred in late 2020 and early 2021 [against the dissolution of parliament^{[footnote 124]}], free expression is regularly enjoyed by most in Nepal.’^{[footnote 125]}

14.1.4 Freedom House noted that ‘While the freedom to engage in private discussions on sensitive topics has expanded with Nepal’s political stabilization, authorities occasionally crack down on individuals who criticize the government on social media.’^{[footnote 126]}

14.1.5 A social media campaign ‘No Not Again’, emerged in July 2022 prior to the national and provincial elections and urged people not to vote for incumbent and former prime ministers^{[footnote 127]}. In October 2022, the Election Commission warned against the campaign and ordered that its social media posts be removed or the operators could face prosecution^{[footnote 128]}. In November 2022, the online campaign was found by the Supreme Court to be an expression of free speech and the court ordered the Election Commission not to take action against the campaigners^{[footnote 129]} ^{[footnote 130]}.

14.1.6 As well as mentioning the ‘No Not Again’ campaign, Amnesty International noted in its report on the human rights situation in 2022 that, ‘Also in November, the [Election] Commission demanded that an online portal – Setopati.com – remove a news story about an electoral candidate. The Commission later retracted the demand after widespread criticism.’^{[footnote 131]}

14.2 Arrest and detention

14.2.1 Freedom House noted in its Freedom in the World 2022 report that ‘Opposition figures do sometimes face arrest. Alliance for Independent Madhesh (AIM) leader CK Raut was arrested in 2018 on charges of disturbing law and order and voicing views against the state but was released in 2019 after agreeing to refrain from supporting an independent Madhesi state. The AIM – renamed the Janamat (Mandate) Party – endorsed Raut’s agreement.’^{[footnote 132]} In its 2023 report, Freedom House stated ‘In the past opposition figures have faced arrest, though recent incidents are rare. Despite the elections held in 2022, there were few arrests and incidents of political violence.’^{[footnote 133]}

See also Political and election-related violence and demonstrations.

14.2.2 The USSD HR Report 2022 stated ‘There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.’^{[footnote 134]}

14.2.3 Nepal’s human rights portal, Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), reported on 15 June 2023 on the arrest of 13 activists of CPN (Maoist-Chand) as they protested in front of the district court in Kathmandu. A police spokesperson stated that the activists were released after 2 hours^{[footnote 135]}.

14.2.4 In their annual reports for 2022, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International reported allegations of torture and ill-treatment in custody and pre-trial detention, though did not refer to detainees’ political affiliation^{[footnote 136]} ^{[footnote 137]}.

14.2.5 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted ‘According to human rights activists and legal experts, police resorted to severe abuse, primarily beatings, to force confessions from suspects’, however ‘police increasingly complied with the courts’ demand for preliminary medical checks of detainees.’^{[footnote 138]} The same report noted that ‘In June Advocacy Forum reported that 4 percent of the 1,024 detainees the NGO interviewed said they received some form of torture or ill treatment, a significant decrease from 19 percent in 2021.’^{[footnote 139]}

14.3 Political and election-related violence and demonstrations

14.3.1 The BTI 2022 Country Report Nepal stated:

‘Freedom of association and assembly is guaranteed under Article 17 of the new 2015 constitution. Individuals in Nepal are free to join political and civil society groups, and many people possess multiple affiliations. That said, the constitution allows for “reasonable restrictions” to be imposed by ordinary laws in an extensive range of circumstances. During the protests in the Terai, from August 2015 to February 2016, and again in 2017, the government imposed several curfews and established several “prohibited zones.” There have been no similar crackdowns since that time, however. In general, groups operate freely, and mass rallies and activities are common, both in urban centers and far-flung district headquarters.’^{[footnote 140]}

14.3.2 The USSD HR Report 2022 noted that ‘Government permits are required to hold large public events. The law authorizes chief district officers to impose curfews when there is a possibility that demonstrations or riots could disturb the peace.’^{[footnote 141]}

14.3.3 According to the Freedom House 2022 report ‘… student unions affiliated with major political parties sometimes clash violently, and police occasionally use force to disperse them.’^{[footnote 142]} However, in its 2023 report, Freedom House noted that ‘Neither professors nor students face repercussions for political speech, and peaceful campus protests are tolerated. Student groups were involved in relatively peaceful protests related to former prime minister Oli’s dissolution of the parliament.’^{[footnote 143]}

14.3.4 Also in its 2023 report, Freedom House noted that:

‘In the past, Nepalis’ political choices have been limited by sporadic outbursts of political violence and crackdowns on political demonstrations by security agents. However, political violence has declined over the last few years, and the number of peaceful protests has risen. Vote buying has been reported in past elections, but there was little evidence of this behavior during local elections in May 2022. Isolated incidents of violence were reported during the national and provincial elections in November 2022, but were neither organized nor large-scale.’^{[footnote 144]}

14.3.5 A joint report dated May 2022 by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP) and the Centre for Social Change (CSC), which examined political violence and demonstration trends in Nepal from 2018 to April 2022, found that:

‘While overall political violence^{[footnote 145]} in Nepal has declined since 2019, demonstration activity has increased year-on-year since 2018, with the highest number of demonstration events recorded in 2021… ACLED records a more than 16% increase in demonstration events in 2021 compared to the year prior, and an increase of nearly 100% compared to 2018…

‘The increase in demonstration events in 2021 was largely a result of demonstrations concerning the dissolution of parliament, a shift towards mobilizing for demonstrations by the Netra Bikram Chand-led Maoist group, and demonstrations surrounding the ratification of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC^{[footnote 146]}) Nepal Compact.’^{[footnote 147]}

14.3.6 Freedom House noted that the protests held over former prime minister Oli’s dissolution of parliament in 2021 were ‘almost exclusively nonviolent.’^{[footnote 148]}

14.3.7 There were nationwide demonstrations held in opposition to the US-backed Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) during 2020, 2021 and 2022. MCC-related demonstrations increased in August 2021 following the reinstatement of parliament, and peaked in February 2022 as Nepal’s parliament ratified the MCC compact. The ratification led to widespread and sometimes violent demonstrations by political parties, including the Chand-led party, in all provinces^{[footnote 149]} ^{[footnote 150]}.

14.3.8 On 6 November 2022, the Chand-led Communist Party of Nepal, the Rishi Kattel-led Nepal Communist Party, and Scientific Socialist Communist Party Nepal led by Ahuti, announced protest programs against the elections to be held on 20 November 2022^{[footnote 151]}.

14.3.9 According to a November 2022 report in the South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), there were no election-related violent incidents between the announcement of the elections on 4 August 2022 and the 19 November 2022, a day before the elections^{[footnote 152]}. The SAIR noted that on the day of the elections, there were 6 reported incidents:

‘One person was shot dead at a polling station in Nateshwari Basic School of Tribeni Municipality in Bajura District in Province No. 7. The 24-year-old man was shot dead by the Police following a dispute after the voting was over.
‘Three persons were injured in firing during a clash between CPN-UML and NC cadres during the voting in Triveni Municipality-7.
‘An assistant polling officer, identified as Prem Bhandari, and an army officer, Arjun Uparkoti, were injured in a clash at the Devkota Basic School Unapani polling station of Sarkegad Rural Municipality-3 in Humla District (Province No. 6). The Police fired 17 rounds to control the situation at the polling station.
‘One Policeman was injured when the Police fired 15 rounds to control the situation that erupted over a dispute between the CPN-UML and ruling coalition cadres in Tamakoshi in Dolakha District (Province No. 3).
‘A bomb exploded in the Khairapur polling station of Gularia municipality-2 in Bardiya in Province No. 5.
‘Police fired after a group of 15 to 20 cadres of the Netra Bikram Chand-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand) tried to disrupt the elections and burn the ballot box in Chitwan District in Province No. 3.’^{[footnote 153]}

See also Federal and provincial elections – November 2022.

14.3.10 In February 2023, The Kathmandu Post reported that the frequency of protests had significantly increased after the formation of the new government following the November 2022 general elections. There had been protests in Kathmandu against corruption, the Kathmandu Metropolitan City’s demolition of illegal private structures, attempted evictions of landless squatters, bans against street vendors, and protests seeking justice for victims of rape and other sexual violence^{[footnote 154]}.

Question 4

Research methodology

Accepted Answer

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

All the COI included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date(s). Any event taking place or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
the currency and detail of information
whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared and contrasted to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Question 5

Terms of Reference

Accepted Answer

A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The Home Office uses some standardised ToR, depending on the subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.

For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

Political system
- Overview of political situation
- Participation
Parties
Elections 2022
Political events 2023
Corruption
Political opponents
- Freedom of expression
- Arrests and detention
- Violence and protests

Question 6

Bibliography

Accepted Answer

Sources cited

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Khabarhub,

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myRepublica,

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Sources consulted but not cited

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The Diplomat, ‘Pushpa Kamal Dahal Heads New Government in Nepal’, 27 December 2022. Last accessed: 6 July 2023

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘Nepal: Instances of kidnapping and extortion by Maoist groups and affiliated student groups, including targeting of the Nepal Congress (NC) party and pro-monarchists; instances of land capture by Maoist groups; availability and effectiveness of state protection to victims (January 2015-November 2015)’, 26 November 2015. Last accessed: 7 November 2023

Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), ‘Nepal Human Rights Year Book 2023’, 19 February 2023. Last accessed: 6 July 2023

International Crisis Group (ICG), Tracking Conflict Worldwide: Nepal, various dates. Last accessed: 21 July 2023

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) ‘Democracy in Asia and the Pacific Outlook 2023’, 9 February 2023. Last accessed: 21 July 2023

International Labour Organization, ‘The role of the social partners in the Nepal peace process’, June 2019. Last accessed: 7 November 2023

The Kathmandu Post, ‘Free student union election today after a violent lead-up’, 19 March 2023. Last accessed: 13 September 2023

United States Institute of Peace (USIP), ‘In Nepal, Post-Election Politicking Takes Precedence Over Governance’, 8 February 2023. Last accessed: 6 July 2023

Question 7

Version control and feedback

Accepted Answer

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

version 1.0
valid from 22 November 2023

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

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Executive summary

Assessment

About the assessment

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.2 Exclusion

2. Convention reason(s)

3. Risk

4. Protection

5. Internal relocation

6. Certification

Country information

About the country information

7. Map

8. Political system

8.1 Overview of the political situation

8.2 Political participation

9. Political parties

9.1 Main parties

9.2 Student wings

10. Hindu monarchists

10.1 Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)

11. Communist parties

11.1 Overview

11.2 Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist-Chand)

12. Elections 2022

12.1 National Assembly elections – January 2022

12.2 Local elections – May 2022

12.3 Federal and provincial elections – November 2022

12.4 Post-election political events in 2023

13. Corruption

14. Political opponents

14.1 Freedom of expression

14.2 Arrest and detention

14.3 Political and election-related violence and demonstrations

Research methodology

Terms of Reference

Bibliography

Sources cited

Al Jazeera,

The Diplomat,

Freedom House,

Global Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies (GIIS),

Himalayan Times,

The Kathmandu Post,

Khabarhub,

myRepublica,

Nepal Live Today,

Nepal Monitor,

Online Khabar,

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),

US Department of State (USSD),

Sources consulted but not cited

Version control and feedback

Clearance

Changes from last version of this note

Feedback to the Home Office

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

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