Policy paper

SAGE Guidance (HTML)

Published 17 December 2024

Acronyms

The table below provides a list of the acronyms used in this guidance.

Acronym	Explanation
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
CRR	Community Risk Register
CSA	Chief Scientific Adviser
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
DA	Devolved Administration
DV	Developed Vetting
ECOSA	Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice
FAQs	Frequently Asked Questions
FOI	Freedom of Information
GCS	Government Communications Service
GCSA	Government Chief Scientific Adviser
LGD	Lead Government Department
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
NICCMA	Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements
NRR	National Risk Register
NSRA	National Security Risk Assessment
RCG	Recovery Coordinating Group
ResCG	Response Coordinating Group
SAG / SAC	Scientific Advisory Group / Committee
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCG	Strategic Coordination Group
Sitrep	Situation Report
SGoRR	Scottish Government Resilience Room
SPI	Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group
STAC	Science and Technical Advice Cell
S&T	Scientific and Technical

Introduction

1. Effective emergency management and informed decision making relies upon Ministers having access to the best available advice in a timely fashion. To ensure the full range of issues are considered, advice needs to come from a range of disciplines, including the scientific, technical, economic and legal. This guidance focuses on the coordination of scientific and technical advice to inform strategic UK cross-government decision making during the emergency response and recovery phases.

2. The UK’s emergency management framework includes structures for coordinating scientific and technical advice during emergency response and recovery. At the UK level the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is responsible for coordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to inform decision making. At the local level Science and Technical Advisory Cells (STACs) provide advice to local Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) and/or Recovery Coordinating Groups (RCGs) which respond to the local consequences and manage local recovery efforts.

3. Since the development of the SAGE and STAC concepts, both have been activated in real emergencies and tested via exercises. SAGE has been activated for a wide range of events including the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2018 Salisbury attack, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident, the 2010 volcanic ash disruptions, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. These activations and exercises have highlighted both good practice and identified lessons for the future. In addition, a number of lessons on the coordination and use of scientific and technical advice have been identified in tier one (UK cross-government) emergency exercises. This guidance draws on this experience and is designed to enhance the overarching UK framework for emergency management and should be read in conjunction with guidance on the UK’s emergency management arrangements, local STAC guidance and guidance on crisis management arrangements in the Devolved Administrations (DA).

Aims and objectives

4. Specifically, this guidance aims to:

• clarify what is meant by evidence-based decision making and scientific and technical advice;
• clarify when the provision of coordinated scientific and technical advice may be appropriate;
• set out how scientific and technical advice will be coordinated and provided from the outset of emergencies to recovery;
• further clarify activation, organisation, funding and deactivation arrangements for SAGE;
• identify the potential anticipated outputs and products from SAGE;
• clarify the handover and transition arrangements between SAGE and other scientific advisory groups during activation and deactivation;
• clarify the principles of interaction between SAGE and STACs and other scientific and technical advice arrangements, including those used in the DAs, as appropriate;
• reflect on lessons identified and highlight good practice; and
• be both flexible and scalable so it can be applied to all emergencies (as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004).^{[footnote 1]}

Intended audience

5. This guidance is primarily designed to be used by the key customers and providers of strategic scientific and technical advice at the UK cross-government level.

Providers of advice:

• government advisory and regulatory agencies;
• external experts (including academics, industry and international experts);
• existing advisory groups (including departmental and DA led groups, cross-government scientific advisory groups (SAGs); and external advisory groups and networks).

Customers of advice:

• The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) mechanism - which comprises of Ministers and government departments (COBR may seek advice on emergencies in the UK or on emergencies that have occurred overseas that have an impact on UK interests, or emergencies that may occur.)
• DAs;
• local decision makers; and
• STACs (if active).

Using this guidance

6. This guidance is designed to be applicable for all emergencies as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act. It is not intended to be prescriptive and it should instead be applied flexibly to fit the specific circumstances. Throughout this guidance the phrase: ‘scientific’ and ‘technical advice’ is used to encompass a whole spectrum of advice including both the natural and social sciences. ‘Advice’ is taken to comprise a combination of analysis, assessments, evaluation and/or expert opinion. A detailed definition of the advice and decision-making process which underpins this guidance can be found at Annex A.

7. This guidance does not cover the coordination, provision or use of other types of advice during emergencies, such as economic assessments and information from the intelligence agencies. Economic advice in emergencies, for example, remains the separate responsibility of HM Treasury, working in partnership with relevant government departments and external experts. Nor does it cover arrangements for STACs as this is already covered in detail by other guidance (STACs are the responsibility of local emergency planners and they should factor arrangements for this capability into their emergency preparations).

8. It is also important to note that this guidance covers one element of a much wider process of harnessing scientific and technical advice during emergency management (i.e., this guidance covers only the response and recovery phases of emergency management and only UK level coordination). Table 1 provides an overview of the coordination of scientific and technical advice during all phases of emergency management and at the different tiers of co-ordination

9. It is good practice for all scientific and technical advice to be continuously reviewed to reflect the latest evidence and lessons learnt. Where possible, advice provided during an emergency should build upon advice, evidence and research formulated during the risk assessment, planning and preparation phases and should be reviewed and incorporated into plans and guidance following the emergency. This evaluation process should be documented and archived. Generic principles for emergency management, which underpin this guidance, can be found at Annex B.

10. To ensure flexibility and continuity, advice mechanisms operating at all stages of emergency management (i.e. risk assessment, planning, response and recovery) and at all decision making levels (e.g. local, departmental/DA and the national) should be both complementary and interoperable. Advice mechanisms at each decision making level will sometimes operate in parallel with mechanisms operating at other levels and may need to be scaled or adapted to fit circumstances.  For this reason, although this guidance is focused on SAGE, it will be useful for those planning and organising scientific and technical advisory groups at different decision making levels and stages of emergency management.

11. The document is structured as follows:

• part one - provides an overview to arrangements for coordinating scientific and technical advice during emergencies, illustrating how SAGE fits into wider COBR structures;
• part two – clarifies the role of SAGE and its governance arrangements;
• part three – outlines arrangements for activating and deactivating SAGE;
• part four – outlines ways in which the SAGE secretariat can ensure SAGE fulfils its aims and objectives;
• part five – clarifies how SAGE and STACs interact;
• part six – clarifies how SAGE interacts with scientific and technical advice mechanisms in the DAs for emergency response and recovery; and
• part seven – clarifies how requests for assistance and concerns regarding the coordination of scientific and technical advice during emergencies can be managed.

Table 1: The role of scientific and technical advice in emergency management

Emergency management phase / level of decision making	UK Cross Government	Devolved Administration only and LGD	Local[footnote 2]
Risk identification and assessment	Coordinated by: Resilience Directorate in Cabinet Office Informed by: SAGs and external experts	Coordinated by: Government departments and Devolved Administrations. Lead departments to identify and establish a network of scientific and technical contacts for particular emergencies. Informed by: Scientific Advisory Groups (SAGs) and external experts, as appropriate.	Coordinated by:  Local Resilience coordination mechanisms Informed by: The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), the National Risk Register (NRR) and local experts and responders.
Contingency planning	Coordinated by: Departmental led planning programmes coordinate cross-government planning. Lead government departments to identify and establish a network of scientific and technical contacts for particular emergencies. Informed by: SAGs and external experts.	Coordinated by: Government departments and Devolved Administrations. Lead departments to identify and establish a network of scientific and technical contacts for particular emergencies. Informed by: Scientific Advisory Groups (SAGs) and external experts, as appropriate.	Coordinated by: Local Resilience coordination mechanisms Informed by: Local risk assessments
Response and recovery	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) or advice from individual experts, as appropriate.	Coordinated by: Government departments and Devolved Administrations. Lead departments to identify and establish a network of scientific and technical contacts for particular emergencies. Informed by: Scientific Advisory Groups (SAGs) and external experts, as appropriate.	Science and Technical Advice Cells (STACs) or advice from individual experts, as appropriate.

Development of this guidance

12. This guidance was originally developed in collaboration with the key customers of SAGE advice and Government advice providers.

Part One: Scientific and technical advice during emergencies

Local level

13. Most emergencies do not require central government assistance. Emergency responders (as defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004)^{[footnote 3]} and multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) are responsible for coordinating emergency response and recovery locally. Recovery Coordinating Groups (RCGs) are responsible for managing local recovery efforts. During an emergency SCGs and RCGs can draw on advice from individual agency and responder experts, or if considered appropriate, activate a Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) to coordinate advice. Guidance on the interactions between SAGE and STACs can be found in part five.

The Lead Government Department concept

14. Designated Lead Government Departments (LGD) are responsible for leading work to identify and assess serious risks and ensuring that the right planning, response and recovery arrangements are in place. The UK Government publishes a document which sets out the types of risks which the UK faces and confirms which UK government department, devolved government or other public body has been designated as the lead for each phase of the emergency management cycle.^{[footnote 4]}

15. The LGD does not take sole responsibility for any given risk. Any emergency that requires a central government response will require involvement from multiple departments, as well as other national and local bodies. The LGD is responsible for identifying those other departments, ensuring that there are clear roles and responsibilities, and coordinating work across all phases of emergency management.

16. In rare cases, an emergency may occur where it is unclear which department should take the overall lead (e.g. because the emergency affects a number of sectors equally). It is then the responsibility of the Cabinet Office to advise the Prime Minister on which is the most appropriate LGD. If this happens, the Cabinet Office will coordinate the central government response, leading where necessary until an LGD is confirmed.

17. The LGD will lead the response to the emergency in accordance with their own emergency management arrangements (set out in departmental response plans), which should include provisions for the coordination of scientific and technical advice from both within and outside of government.

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms

18. Most emergencies requiring central government involvement can be led and coordinated by the LGD through its own emergency management structures. However, for the most severe or complex situations, a decision may be taken to activate UK government’s central crisis management arrangements – Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) – to coordinate the central government response. The decision to activate COBR would be taken by the Prime Minister’s Office, in consultation with Cabinet Office and the LGD.

19. COBR is the primary organisational structure for agreeing the central government response to major emergencies. COBR facilitates urgent collective decision making, providing timely, co-ordinated advice to ministers and senior officials during emergencies. SAGE can be activated to provide coordinated science and technical advice into COBR, drawing on diverse expertise from within and outside of government.

Overseas emergencies with UK impacts

20. COBR, where activated, may seek advice on emergencies that have occurred overseas which have an impact on UK interests, e.g. risk to British nationals overseas and any domestic impacts. The mechanism for coordinating scientific and technical advice through SAGE will follow the same processes and triggers as for national emergencies, and where relevant, link to international alert mechanisms. The additional processes for gathering scientific and technical advice from international sources to inform decision making in COBR, will need to be considered early in the response.

21. Where appropriate and with necessary approvals, SAGE may share UK science assessments with international partners to help inform other national responses.^{[footnote 5]}

Part Two: The Role and Governance of SAGE

SAGE aims and objectives

22. SAGE aims to ensure that coordinated, timely scientific and/or technical advice is made available to decision makers to support UK cross-government decisions in COBR.

23. Like COBR, SAGE is designed to be both flexible and scalable. It is likely that its precise role will evolve as the emergency develops (or even before the emergency develops) and vary by the nature of the incident (e.g. its role may evolve with the transition from response to recovery). See paragraph 45 for details on pre-cautionary SAGE. To achieve its aim SAGE can:

• analyse, review or model existing data;
• assess, review and/or validate existing research; and/or
• where previous research is limited or non-existent, commission new research.[^6]

24. It is likely that SAGE advice will be required on:

• the scientific and technical concepts and processes that are key to understanding the evolving situation and potential impacts;
• how the emergency might develop and the potential long-term implications of this (i.e. what factors will affect how the situation develops? What are the potential scenarios? How likely are these scenarios? What are their impacts?);
• possible ways to improve monitoring, forecasting and assessment in the short to medium term;
• potential scientific and/or technical solutions that can remove or mitigate the risks and/or manage the impacts, and the pros and cons of these. Advice on potential solutions should outline any logistical issues or limitations (e.g. timing, the expertise and resources required) and the associated costs of these proposed solutions;
• the scientific and/or technical pros and cons of policy options identified by others;
• the degree of consensus (e.g. all, the majority, most, some or few experts agree);
• differences in opinion (i.e. are there differences in scientific / technical opinion and what are the sources of disagreements?); and
• the degree and cause of uncertainty (e.g. confidence levels, margins of error and the reasons for not being more certain).

[4] To ensure quality advice that can be provided in a timely fashion, the aim should be to avoid this situation by the LGD formulating scientific and technical advice during the planning phase. The commissioning of new research by SAGE will need to be considered and authorised by the relevant department which will take into account the provision of funds.

25. Part four provides further guidance on the potential tools which SAGE can use. Principles for providing scientific advice to government can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advice-to-government-principles.

Governance of SAGE

26. To enable SAGE to both review and validate research and undertake new assessments, analysis and modelling, it may be necessary to create sub-groups.  The effective use of sub-groups can also help ensure that discussion groups within SAGE are of a manageable size. Figure 1 provides a model governance structure for SAGE which should be applied flexibly, according to the situation.

27. If activated, SAGE would report to, and be activated by, COBR which can meet at Ministerial (M) or Official (O) level. COBR(M) is where collective UK cross-government decisions are made during emergencies and this is supported by COBR(O) which, amongst other responsibilities, ensures that ministers have access to the best available evidence and advice.

28. One or more SAGE representatives will attend COBR(M/O) to explain scientific and technical issues. This SAGE representative should be able to present and explain the full range of SAGE views, including from specialities that are not their own. At ministerial meetings the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) would usually be the SAGE representative.

Figure 1: SAGE Governance structures

SAGE committee structure

29. SAGE will provide direction, coordinate advice, and validate and review the work of its sub-groups. To ensure consistency it would also liaise with other scientific and technical advisory groups, as appropriate.  This would include liaison with STACs (see part five) and could include departmental or scientific and/or technical advisory groups in the DAs (see part six).

30. SAGE would usually be chaired by the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) or a departmental CSA, as appropriate. In emergencies featuring a significant public health dimension, it may be appropriate for the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to co-chair SAGE.

SAGE sub-groups

31. SAGE sub-groups should be established where discrete pieces of work are necessary. They will provide timely reports to SAGE. A chair for each sub-group should be appointed, with the responsibility of coordinating the discrete work.

32. To facilitate two-way communication between the SAGE committee and its sub-groups at least one participant of each sub-group should attend relevant SAGE meetings. This person could be the sub-group chair or another individual.

33. In attending both meetings this liaison person would be responsible for reporting back to the SAGE committee on sub-group progress, noting any actions for their sub-group and communicating this back and updating their sub-group on committee discussions.

The SAGE secretariat

34. The role of the SAGE secretariat is to support SAGE and its sub-groups in coordinating and providing scientific advice that will help support ministers in making evidence-based decisions.  This role will include:

• Convening SAGE meetings;
• Ensuring that SAGE draws upon an appropriate range of expertise and on the best advice available;
• providing a bridge between the SAGE committee and other elements of COBR;
• ensuring transparency;
• identifying, coordinating and managing the SAGE work programme – ensuring that SAGE is focused on policy and decision-making needs;
• supporting SAGE participants; and
• facilitating information flows between SAGE and other advisory groups.

Part four provides guidance on how the SAGE secretariat can fulfil these functions.

35. The default arrangement is for Government Office for Science to provide the SAGE secretariat, with support from the Lead Government Department and/or Cabinet Office, as required. Cabinet Office would be responsible for ensuring that SAGE had a UK cross-government focus and considered multi-department interests.

Assurance

36. It is expected that each scientific advice provider takes responsibility for ensuring that the advice that they provide is based on the best available evidence and of a high quality. Where there is limited evidence to draw on, advice may rely, to a greater extent, on the judgement of SAGE participants who are able to extrapolate from what they know and what they are less certain about. Ideally scientific and technical advice during emergencies should be based upon pre-formulated advice which has been subject to peer review and scientific and technical scrutiny, and which will be updated as the emergency develops.

37. Normally pre-formulated advice needs reviewing and revising as a result of the specific emergency circumstances or where new advice is needed because of unforeseen circumstances. There will also be circumstances where it is known that large uncertainties surround pre-existing advice. In filling these knowledge gaps, as far as it is possible, the SAGE committee should peer review the work of its sub-groups, to provide assurance. The best available evidence at the time of the emergency is what the advice provided should be based upon. If necessary and where time allows external scientific and technical scrutiny should be sought.

Flexible structure

38. In some emergencies the chair of SAGE may change as the emergency develops. A change in chair could occur if the usual chair was absent for a variety of reasons (e.g. for general resilience, a sustained incident, sickness, a change in focus and/or because of a transition from response to recovery). The LGD may change due to a change in focus or due to the transition from response to recovery.

39. Where the LGD and/or chair changes, it is the responsibility of the outgoing chair / LGD to consider the needs of the incoming chair/LGD and to make appropriate handover arrangements.

Part Three: SAGE activation and de-activation

Activating SAGE

40. SAGE can only be activated by COBR in support of collective cross-government responses to and/or recoveries from major emergencies. Whether SAGE is needed should be considered when COBR is first activated and reviewed throughout the emergency. SAGE will not be required for every emergency. For some emergencies it is possible that scientific and technical advice will be required in some but not all phases of response and recovery.

41. The triggers for SAGE activation are a need for:

• scientific and technical advice to help inform UK cross-government decision making;
• the coordination of science and technical advice at UK Government level;
• the cross-government coordination of scientific and technical advice for the collective government response to major emergencies affecting the DAs;
• focusing scientific and/or technical advice on the specific circumstances of the emergency; and

42. Once the decision to activate SAGE has been taken, a SAGE secretariat should be formed to make practical arrangements (see part two).

43. SAGE meetings may be held virtually or in-person.

44. A “precautionary SAGE” may be called by the GCSA if an early consideration of science questions is required for an escalating or imminent risk that has not yet required a COBR. Precautionary SAGE meetings can benefit the early phase of the response if the risk does lead to a crisis requiring COBR and SAGE.

Defining SAGE participants

45. For known risks, the Lead Government Department and GO-Science should consider the likely participants attending SAGE as part of their emergency planning during the preparation phase. Having departmental led Scientific Advisory Groups or equivalent groups in the DAs during the planning phase is considered good practice as this helps speed the SAGE activation process and ensures continuity. Where this is the case, this pre-defined list should form the starting point for defining SAGE participants. It may need to be supplemented and/or adapted according to the specific circumstances of the emergency and participant lists will need to be kept under review throughout the emergency.

46. For unforeseen emergencies which require the activation of COBR, the SAGE secretariat will need to identify SAGE participants. In both cases, the LGD has a responsibility, in terms of contingency building and planning to identify and establish a network of scientific and technical contacts for particular emergencies that can be drawn upon for advice in emergencies.

47. The following principles should be applied when defining and reviewing SAGE participation:

• Existing advisory groups and networks should be utilised (this includes both Government and external networks including industry experts).
• SAGE should not seek to replace or duplicate other advisory groups. Its role is to coordinate advice from a number of sources and to ensure advice is targeted at decision-makers and focused on the specific circumstances of the emergency.
• SAGE should include the most appropriate, rather than the most accessible experts (i.e. those experts that are best placed to provide high quality, trusted, well-respected strategic advice rather than those that are the easiest to contact). The selection of experts should match the nature and timescales of the issues requiring advice.
• SAGE should be diverse and include representatives from a wide range of appropriate scientific and technical specialities, to ensure its advice is well-rounded. This should include both Government and external experts.
• SAGE should not overly rely on specific experts - some flexibility is required in case experts are not available,^{[footnote 7]} and consideration should be given to avoiding the overburdening of particular experts during any prolonged SAGE activations.

48. Where SAGE participant lists are drawn up in advance, during the preparation or response/recovery phase, departmental and DA Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) and departmental heads of analysis/ research (and their equivalents in the DAs) should be consulted. If relevant, Chief Medical Officers (CMOs) and/or Chief Veterinary Officers (CVOs) should also be consulted.

49. Departmental, DA and non-departmental government body CSAs (and CMOs and CVOs if relevant) are likely to form the initial core participants of any SAGE. Other potential participants include:

• experts analysts from Government departments and their Arms Length and Bodies, the DAs and Non-Government Department Public Bodies (e.g. from their expert advisory groups, such as Science Advisory Councils, Science Advisory Committees and Science Advisory Groups and/or internal research programmes or analysis units);
• experts and analysts from externally commissioned research programmes;
• other external UK experts which may be identified via research and funding councils, National academies, professional institutions and other learned societies, universities and private and voluntary sector research organisations;

50. Consideration should be given to:

• whether communication experts should be included to help SAGE communicate potential complex concepts and key messages to the general public, media and policy and decision makers;
• the size of SAGE – SAGE needs to contain a diverse range of experts from a range of specialities. This needs to be balanced against a need to avoid an overly large SAGE. An effective use of SAGE sub-groups may help with this issue.

Defining the governance structure of SAGE

51. Figure 1 provides a model governance structure. Existing advisory groups (i.e. Government agencies and/or department led advisory groups (and the equivalents in the DAs) or external groups), can in an emergency:

• become SAGE – where they are able to provide advice on all issues required and where they contain a full range of appropriate experts (see below);
• form a sub-group of SAGE – where they are able to provide advice on a sub-set of the issues required and where they contain a full range of appropriate experts on this/these issues; and/or
• regularly communicate with SAGE – where maintaining the independence of the group is considered essential or beneficial.

For all three options outlined above, existing groups can be supplemented by other experts drawn from other agencies or networks, including external groups, as appropriate.

Handover arrangements from pre-existing groups to SAGE

52. Where existing advisory groups become SAGE or part of it, a transfer of knowledge should naturally occur, as some of the personnel will overlap to provide continuity. Where advisory groups plan to operate in parallel to SAGE, specific liaison and handover arrangements will be required. In these circumstances the SAGE chair is responsible for ensuring that this happens and for determining the best way of doing this. In practice, the chair will usually delegate handover arrangements to the SAGE secretariat.

53. Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA) is the immediate provision and co-ordination of joint scientific advice to support the response to incidents or emergencies involving unknown or non-regulated contaminants that have exposed, or risk exposing, the public to biological agents, chemicals, or radiation. The Home Office owns the policy and the operations are delivered by the UK Health Security Agency. ECOSA provides scientific advice before a STAC and/or SAGE has been established.

Deactivating of SAGE

54. As with other emergency management arrangements, the deactivation of SAGE should be clearly signalled and there should be an exit strategy. SAGE would normally deactivate once there was no longer a need for UK cross-government decisions on emergency response or recovery.

55. In practice, defining the end of an emergency is often not clear-cut.  In circumstances when there are difficulties in defining the end of an emergency or where continuing advice may be required to inform ongoing recovery and regeneration activities, after COBR has been deactivated, a cautious, phased approach to SAGE deactivation is usually taken to enable quick response and full reactivation, if events unexpectedly change. During this period of de-escalation, it may not be necessary for SAGE and COBR to meet. Instead participants will be kept on alert in case of the situation rapidly changing.

56. During these periods there may be some benefit in using the SAGE mechanism to evaluate the science or risk assessments to inform both future planning and any possible imminent developments. In these circumstances the funding and resource implications will need careful consideration as the removal of urgency can mean that resources and funding are more difficult to quickly obtain as it will be more difficult to justify spending.

57. When SAGE is deactivated, an evaluation process is triggered to review its performance and identify lessons and good practice. As part of this process, actions and those responsible for delivering them should be identified. In addition, because it is possible that emergency management continues in some nations, areas, or sectors after COBR is stood down, it is important that when SAGE deactivates it considers specific liaison and handover arrangements with any SCGs, RCGs, departments and/or DAs.

Part Four: Organising SAGE

Ensuring transparency and protecting sensitive information

58. Transparency is an important element of democratic decision making and the evidence used to inform decisions should be published. In accordance with this, SAGE papers and products should be published in accordance with the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act.^{[footnote 8]} In certain circumstances the Government Office for Science may be required to establish and chair a separate SAGE sub-group of security cleared individuals where the outcome is not published.

Publishing minutes and SAGE advice

59. The SAGE secretariat should ensure that minutes are recorded for SAGE meetings and that there is an appropriate record of any sub-group meetings. Minutes should be prepared in accordance with standard practice for a scientific advisory committee. These should be cleared by the chair(s) of SAGE for technical accuracy. The SAGE secretariat should also act as the information manager for all SAGE products: storing and circulating them, and publishing them as and when appropriate – recognising that transparency is important to public trust and confidence in the government’s response to emergencies. It is likely that the policy development, national security and/or personal information FOI exemptions may apply, and this may mean that some information needs to be redacted or omitted before publication.

60. Most emergencies attract significant media interest and experts are likely to want to talk about their work. The SAGE secretariat should provide SAGE participants with clear guidance on: confidentiality in relation to SAGE meeting content; avoiding the appearance that they are speaking on behalf of SAGE (unless authorised to); avoiding taking public positions on policy matters; what can and cannot be said for security reasons; and the requirement to take account of relevant legislation including the FOI Act. The guidance should also make clear, however, that participants from outside government are independent and have the right to speak freely on other matters. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the GCSA and/or CMO to provide background briefings to journalists in order to promote media and public understanding of the scientific issues and uncertainties in play during an emergency.

Using SAGE experts to communicate scientific and technical information

61. The Covid-19 and 2009 H1N1 pandemics illustrated the value of using experts to communicate key scientific and technical issues. During the planning, response, and recovery phases, consideration should be given to the benefit of using SAGE experts to communicate messages. The external communication of scientific advice from SAGE and STACs should be coordinated to ensure all communications are informed by scientific and technical advice, and that consistent messages are communicated during complex emergencies in a way that minimises the risk of misinterpretation. SAGE and STACs should also regularly communicate with each other internally, to share knowledge to ensure there is a commonly recognised understanding of the scientific and technical advice (see Part Five for more detail).

62. In some emergencies and for some risks it may be appropriate to create a SAGE communications strategy which should be aligned to the overall external strategic communications strategy set by Ministers through COBR and overseen by the Government Communications Service (GCS). This would set out a strategy for SAGE communications with the public, media, and decision-makers.

Contributing to situational awareness

63. The situation cell within COBR is responsible for ensuring that there is a single, up-to-date, overview of the current situation as it evolves.  To help achieve this, it coordinates information from a number of sources, via situation reports, to produce a Commonly Recognised Information Picture (CRIP). This CRIP is disseminated to decision makers and their supporting officials, including SAGE, to ensure they all have access to the same information.

64. In coordinating the CRIP, the situation cell may need to draw upon scientific and technical advice.  Where SAGE is activated, the SAGE secretariat will be responsible for ensuring that the situation cell has access to the latest scientific and technical advice, by sending situation reports as appropriate. This will involve working to the CRIP production timescales which will be determined by the nature of the emergency and communicated to contributors by the situation cell.

65. In more complex emergencies, SAGE will need to coordinate advice from a number of sources to coordinate a UK-wide Scientific and Technical Situation Report (S&T SitRep).  The key steps in collating a S&T sitrep are outlined below:

• the SAGE secretariat collating emerging advice on commonly understood elements from a range of sources (including STACs, if active), as appropriate to the situation and uncertain or less understood elements from the SAGE committee and its sub-groups and any expert groups operating in parallel to it;
• the SAGE chair or co-chair signing off the S&T sitrep;
• the SAGE secretariat disseminating the S&T sitrep to the situation cell in COBR to inform the CRIP, in the same way that sitreps from other sources do; and the scientific and technical advice community engaged in the emergency response/recovery effort to enable a common understanding of scientific and technical elements.

66. As with other sitreps, the S&T sitrep can be prepared on an exceptional or regular basis, as appropriate to circumstances. A standard and flexible S&T template should be used, with new information in each iteration clearly indicated (usually in red).  Given the need to communicate with the scientific and technical advice community engaged in the emergency response/recovery effort, at least one version of it should be suitable for wider circulation.

Ensuring that policy decisions are informed by scientific and technical advice

67. Policy Cell is responsible for coordinating policy advice for decision-making at COBR. This includes advice on possible policy options and their pros and cons. Where appropriate this will need to include scientific and technical advice. To facilitate this, it may be appropriate for SAGE to produce its own option and scenario papers for consideration by decision makers. These papers are likely to take two key forms:

• Option papers - In many emergencies it may be appropriate for SAGE to submit option papers which outline potential scientific and technical solutions and their pros and cons; and/or the scientific and technical pros and cons of options suggested by others.
• Response scenario papers - Where emergencies are long lasting and/or events develop in an unexpected way or are unforeseen, it may be helpful for SAGE to develop some plausible response scenarios, assessing their likelihood and potential impacts, to help shape and inform preparations. During both the 2010 volcanic ash disruptions and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic SAGE produced response scenario or planning assumption papers.

68. The production of SAGE papers must be coordinated within or between sub-groups and cleared by the SAGE Chair. This process may need to be supported by the SAGE secretariat in liaison with the DAs.

Ensuring communications are informed by scientific and technical advice

69. The GCS is responsible for ensuring that consistent messages are communicated during complex emergencies. GCS also ensures that these messages are communicated in a way that minimises the risk of misinterpretation.

70. In emergencies with a scientific or technical dimension there will be a need to draw on expertise to explain key concepts and issues. In some emergencies it may be appropriate for SAGE to produce or contribute to a briefing pack, frequently asked questions (FAQs) document and/or a communications strategy (see below).

Briefing pack and FAQs

71. An understanding of the key scientific and technical issues is often critical to understanding how best to manage an emergency and explaining policy decisions.  Where the scientific issues are particularly technical or complex or concepts are commonly misunderstood there may be benefit in SAGE contributing to a briefing pack and/or FAQ, targeted at the media, public and/or decision makers and their supporting officials.^{[footnote 9]}

72. Although it is anticipated that both a briefing pack and a FAQs document could be useful, careful consideration is needed to ensure that there are no unnecessary duplication and that both products are fit for purpose.

73. For a briefing pack or FAQ to be useful, they need to clearly and concisely explain the concepts and issues. Consideration should be given on the best way to draw on communication expertise. This should ensure that the key scientific or technical messages are not lost or misinterpreted. The options for drawing on communication expertise are:

• embedding a communications expert in SAGE;
• embedding a SAGE expert in the communications functions of COBR; or
• two-way liaison between the COBR communications functions and SAGE.

Drawing on other types of advice

74. The legal, logistics and intelligence cells, if activated, coordinate advice on these issues.  As such these cells perform a similar function to SAGE and it will be the role of the policy cell to coordinate the advice from these bodies to form a consolidated overview of policy options and their pros and cons and to ensure that ministers receive coherent and rounded advice from a range of relevant sources. Even where issues are outside their statutory competence, liaison with the DAs will still be required on legal and consequence management matters. This should be channelled through the individual DA crisis management structures and where appropriate the DA representative on SAGE.

75. Information coordinated by the intelligence cell is likely to be useful for informing and framing scientific advice and may need to feed into SAGE or to scientific experts where SAGE is not active. For classification reasons, only individuals with the appropriate clearance would be able to receive these intelligence feeds and secure communication lines may be required. In an emergency scenario there will however be aspects of this information that can be shared with “trusted experts” to enable them to provide advice which will inform emergency response policy decisions.

76. To facilitate the information flow between the intelligence cell and SAGE (or experts) it is critical that those preparing for emergencies that might need intelligence feeds, plan to include at least some security vetted SAGE participants including Developed Vetting (DV) and consider the need for secure communication links. The GCSA and some potential participants from Government agencies and departments may have DV clearance. It is not however necessary that all potential SAGE participants are DV cleared (see Figure 2). The SAGE secretariat, working with DV cleared SAGE participants, will need to work closely with the intelligence cell to agree what information needs to be shared more widely and how this might be achieved.

Figure 2: Managing information flows between the intelligence cell and SAGE

• Intelligence Cell
  • Information sharing, agreeing what can be shared and how
• DV Cleared SAGE participants / Secretariat
  • Sharing agreed information to allow SAGE to use the information to generate advice
• Remaining SAGE participants / experts

Funding SAGE activities

77. Given SAGE relies largely upon the good-will of many experts; provisions should be made to cover appropriate personal expenses quickly and efficiently. However, given the need to ensure that SAGE remains focused on supporting UK cross-government decision making other costs should be considered on a business case basis in consultation with relevant government departments.

Flexible approach

78. The activities described above are not an exhaustive list or intended to be prescriptive. Once activated, SAGE should consider how it can best achieve its aims and objectives given the specific circumstances and consider whether the tools listed above, or any others are required. The resource implications of using any tool should be considered to ensure that the use of any tools is not detrimental to SAGE fulfilling its aims and objectives.

Part Five:  Interactions between SAGE and STACs

Circumstances where SAGE and STACs might operate at the same time

79. In most circumstances SAGE and STACs will not operate at the same time. This is because:

• in most emergencies UK cross-government decisions or coordination are not required; and
• where UK cross-government decisions or coordination are required, scientific and technical advice is not always required at both the UK and local level;

80. However, both SAGE and STAC(s) may operate at the same time if: - scientific and technical advice is needed to inform both strategic UK cross-government and local decisions;

• coordination of this advice is required at both UK and local levels (as determined by COBR and SCGs/ResCGs respectively); and
• strategic scientific and/or technical advice needs to be interpreted locally to inform local decisions (e.g. for more specific and/or detailed advice).

81. For instance, both SAGE and STAC(s) may be required for: - CBRN (terrorist and accidental hazards) emergencies with distinct situational variations;

• multi-risk emergencies with different consequences in different areas; and
• emergencies that cross national borders and have significant local operational issues that require scientific and/or technical advice.

Timescales for SAGE and STAC activation

82. In scenarios where both SAGE and STAC(s) are activated, STAC(s) will normally activate first.  This is partly due to difficulties in quickly assembling the eminent experts that will make-up SAGE, but also because the need for UK-wide decision making will not always be apparent in the early stages of an emergency.

Principles for SAGE / STAC interaction

83. Where both SAGE and STAC(s) exist at the same time, the following principles should be applied:

• SAGE and STACs should formulate advice to meet the needs of decision makers. STACs should support local decision making, whilst the focus of SAGE should be to support UK cross-government strategic decision making;
• Unnecessary duplications or conflicts between the advice of SAGE and STACs should be avoided. If duplications are significant, or there are differences in the advice being provided at local, DA and the UK level this should be managed;
• SAGE and STAC(s) should regularly communicate with each other to share information and knowledge to ensure that there is a commonly recognised understanding of the scientific and technical advice. The coordination of communication between SAGE, and STACs and in particular multiple STACs are integral to the response, particularly in facilitating an understanding of any differences that may intentionally be being advised between geographical areas. For example, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, geographical hotspots of the influenza were advised to adopt a different response approach from that of the overall UK position.
• Despite the close working and information sharing between SAGE and STACs, STACs always remain accountable to SCGs, and SAGE remains accountable to COBR. A STAC does not in any circumstance become a sub-committee of SAGE, but remains accountable to the SCG and focused on the advice requirements at the local level.

Defining SAGE and STAC interactions

84. SAGE and STAC(s) interaction arrangements should be defined by the Government Office for Science and UK Health Security Agency. In doing this the following issues should be considered:

• Resources - Providers of advice may receive requests for advice from a number of advisory groups operating at different levels (e.g. local, departmental/DA, and from COBR). In these instances, some or all advice providers will experience difficulties in meeting these competing demands, resulting in the “most appropriate experts” being unable to attend all groups on which they are required. This would lead to a dilution in the quality of advice provided and/or a reduction in the range of specialism’s represented on each group. Where resources are stretched there may be a need to marshal or pool resources through a ResCG. In most instances, this will be preferable to the establishment of multiple STACs to support individual SCGs. It is the responsibility of government agencies and advice providers to raise resourcing concerns that relate to the staffing of SAGE. These concerns should be raised to the relevant Lead Government Department, DA, the Government Office for Science or the Cabinet Office, as appropriate.
• Timeliness – During emergencies there will usually be a demand for scientific and technical advice within a short timeframe. It can be difficult to meet these scientific and technical advice demands because of: overly complex and confusing information flows; challenges in bringing together eminent scientists as well as practical issues.  The timeliness of advice provision is particularly critical at the local level where delays in operational advice can affect the ability to save lives.

85. Once agreed, SAGE and STAC interaction arrangements should be clearly communicated as appropriate, via the usual COBR information flow mechanisms.

Multiple STAC interaction

86. In most emergencies, there will only be one STAC, advising SCGs at a local level or regional level through ResCGs. However, it is possible that multiple STACs may be required to operate during an incident. Where there are multiple STACs in operation during an incident it is sensible for STACs to communicate with each other, regardless of whether SAGE is active or not. For instance, sharing data, knowledge and/or advice will help minimise duplication across multiple advisory groups and reduce the potential for conflicting advice arising across multiple response areas. STAC chairs should agree communication and liaison arrangements, as appropriate to the circumstances, liaising with SAGE (if activated) to ensure the advice provided at all levels is coordinated, consistent and meets both local and where required DA and UK-wide needs.

Part Six: The Interaction between SAGE and DA advice groups

87. Each of the DAs has its own crisis management arrangements which include mechanisms for coordinating scientific and technical advice (see below for details on each nation).^{[footnote 10]} These arrangements are consistent with UK-wide arrangements.

The interaction between DA advice groups and SAGE (if active)

88. Many major emergencies will involve a mixture of excepted, reserved and transferred issues. For excepted and most reserved matters the UK Government’s Lead Government Department will lead the response in respect to these matters, working closely with any DAs that are affected. For devolved matters the respective nations affected by the emergency will work together to respond to devolved aspects.

89. Where SAGE is active, the DAs may also decide to set up their own scientific groups to inform strategic decisions within their area and statutory competence. Where this is the case the DA groups will be invited onto SAGE - should such representation not be feasible, liaison arrangements will be put in place to ensure there is close engagement between the two. The mechanisms for coordinating scientific and technical advice in the DAs are set out below.

90. Where both DA advice groups and SAGE exist in parallel, SAGE will focus on providing advice to support UK cross-government decision making, whilst DA advisory groups will focus on supporting decision making by Ministers in the DAs on devolved matters.

Requesting assistance and dealing with these requests

91. If COBR is active, the DAs can request assistance for securing or sourcing scientific and technical advice to help inform decision making in the DAs on issues within their statutory competence, via COBR. Where SAGE is active, COBR will commission SAGE to provide assistance. Where SAGE is not already active, requests may trigger SAGE activation (if the criteria in Section 3 are met) or the requests may be dealt with by the Government Office for Science, the Cabinet Office, or LGD as appropriate.

92. Where COBR is inactive, the DAs can request assistance for sourcing and securing scientific and technical advice via the Cabinet Office, the Government Office for Science, LGDs or territorial departments, as appropriate. Depending on the characteristics of the situation, these requests could result in the activation of the COBR and SAGE. If the emergency doesn’t require the activation of COBR, these requests may be dealt with separately.

93. Assistance may include: information on how to source scientific and technical advice; support for securing advice and/or assistance in assessing advice.

Scientific coordination arrangements in Scotland

94. In Scotland, SCGs have STAC arrangements in place, for use if required. These will normally include representatives from, or have direct links with, relevant local organisations and DA bodies at both Scottish and UK levels, including for example SEPA and Public Health Scotland.

95. If an SCG or STAC requires additional support in securing authoritative advice, for example where expertise may be difficult to secure or where there are conflicts in the advice that is available, SCG(s) would normally approach the Scottish Government for assistance.  The Scottish Government would consult with its own professional advisers (the offices of the CSA, CMO and CVO) and networks as required. If wider advice or agreement needed to be secured Scottish Government would liaise with the UK Government, via the Cabinet Office which will liaise with the Government Office for Science, and through normal department contacts.

96. In circumstances where multiple STACs in Scotland are required, Scottish Government will liaise with active SCGs/STACs, to ensure that robust information co-ordination arrangements are in place. Subject to circumstances this could involve identifying a Lead STAC or establishing a Scottish-level scientific or technical advisory group within the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR). The Scottish Government would, where necessary, request the activation of and/or the support of SAGE via the Cabinet Office.

Scientific coordination arrangements in Wales

97. In Wales, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) also have STAC arrangements.  Where scientific and technical advice is required by more than one SCG in Wales, a single STAC working under the direction of the SCG or SCGs, may be established to provide scientific and technical advice to a number of SCGs.

98. The STAC will advise and respond to questions raised by the SCG or any of its subgroups and will support the SCG in establishing its strategic objectives. During the recovery phase the SCG Recovery Co-ordinating Group may activate a STAC to seek advice, whether or not it has already been established by the SCG during the response.

99. Where the requirement for scientific and technical advice is wider than the expertise available to the SCG, the Welsh Government may be asked to identify other sources of scientific advice from across Wales or further afield to support the local response. If necessary, the Welsh Government will consult with their own professional advisers (e.g. CSA, CMO, CVO) and/or seek support from the UK Government via Cabinet Office, which will liaise with the Government Office for Science, in identifying appropriate expertise.

100. If necessary, the Welsh Government may also ask COBR to activate and co-ordinate SAGE in order that UK scientific and technical advice is available to the Welsh Government and, through that process, is also available to inform the Strategic Co-ordinating Groups.

Scientific coordination arrangements in Northern Ireland

101. Given the relatively small size of Northern Ireland, the number of internal sources of scientific and technical advice may be limited, particularly in emergencies which have unusual or rare causes or impacts.  The limited number of experts available in Northern Ireland also restricts the opportunity for multiple layers of scientific advice.

102. The Northern Ireland Central Crisis Management Arrangements (NICCMA) would likely only be activated for emergencies requiring national level co-ordination. Under NICCMA there is a facility to convene a scientific and technical advisory cell to provide specialist analysis and advice when required.  The remit of this group would be to give professional advice to the strategic co-ordination and decision making group within NICCMA in order to facilitate informed decision making.  The group would be made up of professional and technical experts relevant to the particular emergency scenario.  Initially, these would be experts from within the public sector, but they would be augmented with experts from other sources in Northern Ireland as appropriate.  If wider advice or agreement needed to be secured the Northern Ireland Executive would liaise with the UK Government, via the Cabinet Office which would liaise with other government departments as necessary.

103. In additional to formal liaison through the Cabinet Office, the members of the NI scientific and technical advisory group would liaise with experts in England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland in relation to common aspects of an emergency affecting more than one country or to obtain additional advice. Where a SAGE group is operating as part of the COBR machinery, the scientific and technical advisory group in Northern Ireland would interact with SAGE as set out in paragraphs 102 to 103.

104. Most emergencies that require the involvement of the Northern Ireland Executive do not require the activation of NICCMA and the LGD will provide the strategic coordination of the response.  In these circumstances the Northern Ireland Lead Department would source and coordinate appropriate scientific and technical advice making use of:

• its own expertise and that of its agencies and Non-Departmental Public Bodies;
• existing Northern Ireland departmental scientific and technical advisory groups;
• experts within Northern Ireland, for example in academic institutions and industry;
• experts from outside Northern Ireland, through the appropriate government department(s) in England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.

105. In addition to the arrangements above, in very localised emergencies in Northern Ireland, or where the direct response to a more widespread emergency has local aspects, the lead emergency service or government agency may establish its own sources of scientific and technical advice to provide guidance for the operational response.

Part Seven: Dealing with requests for assistance and concerns

Reasons for requests for assistance and concerns

106. There are a number of potential reasons for SCGs or others to seek assistance in either securing or coordinating the necessary advice during an emergency. These can include:

• difficulties in identifying and/or securing the “best available” and “appropriate” advice / expertise, particularly for highly complex or widespread events;
• difficulties in accessing information, particularly where it is sensitive or may be restricted;
• Potential disagreements between advice providers and/or concerns with the advice available; and
• not having the resources to coordinate scientific and/or technical advice, for instance when resources are stretched to deal with the consequences of a major and/or fast moving event and additional capacity may be needed to coordinate scientific advice and/or other relevant advice.

Principles for dealing with requests and concerns

107. Drawing on the subsidiarity principle (see Annex B), advice, support, and assistance (whether requested or required) should be found at the lowest possible level and be as light-touch as possible. Assistance requests and concerns should be escalated and de- escalated as necessary (see below). Guidance on dealing with requests for assistance from the DAs is covered in Part 5.

Principles for asking for assistance or raising concerns

108. Given the above, the most appropriate first point of call for SCGs seeking assistance or raising concerns would be MHCLG (if in England) or the appropriate DA or LGD. COBR (if active) and Cabinet Office and/or the Government Office for Science would be the next port of call.

Options for providing assistance in situations where COBR is active

109. There are separate options for dealing with calls for assistance relating to the coordination of scientific advice.  These are:

• commissioning SAGE (if active) to provide support;
• activating SAGE and commissioning it to provide support (see Part Three for the criteria for SAGE activation);
• providing advice, assistance, or support, outside of the COBR mechanism (see below); or
• de-escalating the request or requirement if it is deemed unnecessary.

Options for providing assistance in situations where COBR is not active

110. Similar options exist in circumstances where COBR is not already active. These are:

• The sub-national tier in England, LGD, DA or the Cabinet Office and the Government Office for Science provide advice, assistance, or support, outside of the COBR mechanism (see below); or
• de-escalating the request or requirement if it is deemed unnecessary.
• A “precautionary SAGE” may be called by the GCSA (see paragraph 45 for full details).

Providing support and assistance outside of the COBR mechanism

111. Assistance and support for the coordination and provision of scientific and technical advice outside of the COBR mechanism could include facilitating bilateral arrangements, mutual assistance and/or using existing mechanisms. Whichever approach is adopted the principles for SAGE outlined in this guidance should be followed as it is possible that informal arrangements could become SAGE.

Annex A: Underpinning definitions

Definitions for each of the key stages in evidence-based decision making process are provided below.

The evidence-based decision-making process

Evidence

Evidence in its broadest sense includes anything that is helpful for forming a conclusion or judgement. For it to be helpful, it needs to be observable or measurable. It can include economic measures or indicators, legal documents, technological information and numerical data.

Research

Research in its broadest sense refers to the process of gathering evidence. Evidence can be acquired via new research and/or by reviewing, evaluating, correcting and integrating previous knowledge from existing research. 

Analysis, Assessment and Evaluation

Analysis, assessment and evaluation are processes for making sense of the evidence gathered.

Opinion, judgement and uncertainty

Analysis, assessment, evaluation and research all aim to be as objective as possible. However, expert opinion shapes the design of these processes. Experts formulate ideas and plausible explanations for phenomena to develop research questions. These questions will inform the research processes and analysis, assessment and evaluation techniques used.

Research, analysis, assessment, and evaluation are rarely able to provide definitive answers because of the unknown effect of known and unknown variables (or factors). This knowledge gap invariably means that expert judgment is required to interpret results. In doing this, experts will make a statement on the extent and sources of uncertainty. It will not always be possible for experts to reach a consensus in opinion, especially when issues are complex, the available data or evidence is limited and/or there are significant gaps in existing knowledge.

Advice

In providing advice, experts or advisory groups aim to help those that they are advising to make sense of the available evidence. They may do this by using research, analysis, assessments, evaluations and their expert judgement or a combination of these.

Enabling decision makers to make sense of complex evidence is critical for ensuring that decisions are informed rather than dictated by evidence.  Where there are differences in expert opinion, these should be highlighted and explained to ensure decision makers are given well-rounded, balanced advice.

Scientific and technical advice

This guidance uses the term scientific and technical advice to refer to a wide spectrum of advice on a range of scientific and technical topics. Scientific and technical advice encompasses a wide range of disciplines including the natural sciences (e.g. chemistry, physics and biology), mathematics and statistics, operational research, clinical specialities and the social sciences (such as psychology, geography and sociology).

Scientific and technical advice will draw on a range of research, analysis, assessment, and evaluation techniques, including scientific, social and operational research and both quantitative (numeric, e.g. statistics) and qualitative (non-numeric) analysis techniques.

Decision making

In crisis management decisions are made at a number of different levels (e.g. collective, departmental, DA, and local). Additionally, decisions are made at national strategic, local strategic, tactical, and operational levels of the response. At each level there is a need to ensure that decisions are evidence based, and to consider decisions made and constraints that apply at other levels. For further details of the levels of command, control and co-ordination that apply at national and local levels please refer to wider guidance on the UK’s emergency management framework.

Decision makers will make decisions on the basis of their assessment of the range of advice and evidence presented to them, combined with their own experience and judgement.  It is good practice that no single strand of advice or evidence will, on its own, be the sole basis for a decision. Where decisions are collective, as is typical at the strategic level in crisis management, decision-makers should also consider and factor in the judgements and opinions of other participants and stakeholders.

Annex B: Overarching principles

Guiding principles for ensuring effective emergency management are outlined within documentation setting out the UK’s emergency management framework. These can be applied to all aspects of emergency management, including the coordination and provision of scientific and technical advice to support all levels and types of decision making. The role of scientific and technical advice at each stage of emergency management and the key principles for all stages of this process are summarised below. 

The emergency management approach

In the UK a robust, proportionate, flexible approach to emergency management is achieved by:

• identifying and assessing the risks we face in the medium term (the next five years);
• using this assessment to identify generic capabilities requirements; and
• identify high impact risks, such as pandemic flu that require some specific planning; and
• maintaining readiness by anticipating and assessing emerging risks that could occur over the next 6-12 months, exercising response plan arrangements, training key staff; and
• continuously reviewing and revising arrangements to reflect lessons learnt and good practice.

Anticipation

Identifying risks, assessing their likelihood and impacts (both direct and indirect) is important for maintaining UK readiness. At the UK level the Cabinet Office coordinates both medium and short term (2-5 years and 6-12 months) assessments. It works closely the with Government Office for Science to ensure that expert advice is drawn upon and with government departments and agencies to ensure these assessments are informed by scientific and technical advice.

For each identified and agreed risk there is a designated Lead Government Department, who is responsible for ensuring that the risk assessment is informed by scientific and technical advice, drawing from both internal expertise and external bodies. The Cabinet Office provides the lead for newly identified or emerging risks that do not yet have a departmental lead. 

The medium-term UK coordinated risk assessment (National Security Risk Assessment) is used to prioritise risks, identify the generic capabilities (or National Resilience Planning Assumptions) needed to ensure UK resilience and those risks that require specific planning. This process underpins departmental and DA preparations for emergencies (see below).

The National Risk Register, an unclassified version of the National Security Risk Assessment is published, and the National Resilience Planning Assumptions to help inform local risk assessments and planning. Local responders have a duty to maintain local risk assessments and to coordinate a multi-agency assessment, or Community Risk Register (CRR).

Preparation

A capabilities assessment, which considers how prepared the government is across generic risk agnostic capabilities to respond to emergencies against planning assumptions, is conducted every few years.

Lead Government Departments and the DAs use their own Science Advisory Groups (SAGs) to commission new research and draw on a range of experts to ensure their planning is informed by science.^{[footnote 11]} To help ensure readiness, planning arrangements are regularly tested via exercises and training.

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires local responders to plan and prepare for emergencies and sets out a framework for proportionate risk-based assessments and generic consequences-based planning. Local plans and preparations should be informed by their risk assessments (see above) and scientific and technical advice, where appropriate.

At all levels (UK, departmental, DAs and local), emergency preparations should include the consideration of:

• which scientific and technical disciplines can add value
• potential advice providers (see Annex C);
• information, surveillance and analysis strategies;
• whether any generic scientific and/or technical briefing can be prepared in advance;
• the most likely configuration of SAGE / SAC / STAC structures, e.g. which sub groups are likely to be required (see Part Four);
• how SAGE / SAC / STAC will be resourced and funded;
• security clearance levels and secure means of communication, if appropriate;
• the links between the various scientific and technical advisory groups;
• the preparatory work of others in regard to the coordination and provision of scientific and technical advice - interdependencies are likely and a collaborative approach may prove more efficient; and
• the need for arrangements to be flexible and scalable and resilient - over reliance on any individual expert should be avoided as they may not be available in the event of an emergency.

Together, these preparations for the provision and coordination of scientific and technical advice for foreseen emergencies will, given their flexibility, provide a useful starting point for unforeseen emergencies. During emergency pre-prepared arrangements should be reviewed to keep pace with the evolving situation and deal with unforeseen developments.

Continuity

If SAGE is activated, expert groups already working on the issues as part of their normal duties can form SAGE subgroups to ensure continuity and coordination of science advice. For example, the Scientific Pandemic Influenza group on Modelling subgroup (SPI-M) was a subgroup of SAGE during the Covid-19 pandemic and continues to run with DHSC outside of an emergency.

Subsidiarity

Decision making during emergencies occurs at different levels (e.g. local, departmental, devolved and collective). Decisions should be taken at the lowest possible level. In practice, the highest level at which decision making is required will be determined in part by the scale, spread, complexity and potentially the severity of an emergency.

Coordination however, should occur at the highest level appropriate and add value. Value can be added by:

• ensuring the best available expertise is accessed;
• providing leadership;
• minimising duplication;
• identifying interdependencies;
• identifying gaps; and
• prioritisation.

Similarly, scientific and technical advice to support decision making should be provided at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest level necessary. 

Therefore, local experts will normally be used to provide scientific and technical advice to SCGs and responders and SCGs will be responsible for making arrangements to coordinate this advice, via a STAC if required. For some emergencies, the geographical scale, complexity and potentially the severity of the issues requiring scientific and technical advice and/or a limited number of experts will mean that departmental, DAs or UK cross-government coordination of advice may be required.

Direction

Clarity of purpose is essential for the coordination and provision of scientific and technical advice. Aims and objectives should be clearly communicated for any advisory group.

SAGE should be clear that its core purpose is to support UK cross-government strategic decision making, while a STAC’s core purpose is to support local decision making.

The chair of each advisory group and of SAGE itself should take responsibility for ensuring that the Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees (SAC)^{[footnote 12]} is adhered to and that its aims and objectives are met, as far is practicable (SAGE is not a fully-fledged SAC since it does not have a formal membership). The Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees includes guidance on indemnity for experts providing science advice.

Coordination

For many emergencies the coordination of advice from multiple advice providers and advisory groups will be required. Effective coordination relies upon cooperation, integration, and effective communication (see below).

Cooperation

Cooperation between providers and advisory groups or positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding is essential for ensuring transparency and consequently consistency, within and between groups.  

Integration

Scientific and technical advisory groups should ensure that they avoid:

• having overlapping aims to other advisory groups operating in parallel - this can cause confusion and unnecessary duplication; and
• overly complex information flows and layers of reporting - this can create delays and confusion.

Communication

Information flows between scientific advisory groups and policy makers at all levels should be both clearly defined and followed. Some potential tools that can help ensure effective communication within and between groups can be found at part four.

Annex C: Advice Providers

Type of advice	England	Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland
All	The Government Chief Scientific Adviser and/or departmental Chief Scientific Advisers	The Government Chief Scientific Adviser and/or departmental Chief Scientific Advisors	The Government Chief Scientific Adviser and/or departmental Chief Scientific Advisers	Departmental Scientific Advisers
Site Specific Information	Site operators; Regulators	Site operators; Regulators	Site operators; Regulators	Site operators; Regulators
Specialist Public Health Advice	CMO – England:  UK Health Security Agency; Department for Health and Social Care	CMO – Wales; Public Health Wales	CMO – Scotland Public Health Scotland	CMO – Northern Ireland Department of Health
Direction of NHS Resources	Department of Health and Social Care	Welsh Government	Health and Social Care Directorates - Scottish Government	Department of Health
Health and Safety of workers	Employer; Health and Safety Executive; Health and Safety Laboratory	Employer; Health and Safety Executive; Health and Safety Laboratory	Employer; Health and Safety Executive; Health and Safety Laboratory	Employer; Health and Safety Executive, NI; Health and Safety Laboratory
Health and Safety of Responders[footnote 13]	Employer	Employer	Employer	Employer
Food Safety	Food Standards Agency	Food Standards Agency	Food Standards Scotland	Food Standards Agency
Environmental Protection	Environment Agency; Natural England; Defra	Natural Resources Wales	Scottish Environmental Protection Agency	Northern Ireland Environment Agency, NI Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA)
Flooding	Environment Agency; Met Office; Defra	Natural Resources Wales; Met Office; Defra	Scottish Environmental Protection Agency,	NI Department for Infrastructure; Northern Ireland Rivers Agency; Met Office
Public Water Supply	Water Companies; Defra; Drinking Water Inspectorate	Water Companies; Welsh Government; Drinking Water Inspectorate	Scottish Water; Scottish Government	NI Water; Northern Ireland Environment Agency
Meteorological Information	Met Office	Met Office	Met Office	Met Office
Animal health and Welfare	Defra; Animal and Plant Health Agency; CVO – England and/or CVO UK	Animal and Plant Health Agency; Welsh Government CVO – Wales and/or CVO UK	Animal and Plant Health Agency; Scottish Government CVO – Scotland and/or CVO UK	Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs CVO Northern Ireland
Maritime emergencies	Maritime and Coastguard Agency; Marine Management Organisation; Joint Maritime Security Centre	Maritime and Coastguard Agency; Marine Management Organisation; Joint Maritime Security Centre	Maritime and Coastguard Agency; Joint Maritime Security Centre	Maritime and Coastguard Agency; Joint Maritime Security Centre
CBRN[footnote 14] (Hazardous release and CT)	Radiological Response and Emergency Management System; MOD - Nuclear Specialists; AWE; Defence Science and Technology Laboratory; Office for Nuclear Regulation; Met Office; UK Health Security Agency; Environment Agency; Defra; FSA	Radiological Response and Emergency Management System; MOD - Nuclear Specialists; AWE; Defence Science and Technology Laboratory; Met Office; Office for Nuclear Regulation; Natural Resources Wales; Public Health Wales	Radiological Response and Emergency Management System; MOD - Nuclear Specialists; AWE; Defence Science and Technology Laboratory; Met Office; Office for Nuclear Regulation; Scottish Environment Protection Agency; Public Health Scotland; FSA	Radiological Response and Emergency Management System; MOD - Nuclear Specialists; AWE; Defence Science and Technology Laboratory; Office for Nuclear Regulation; Met Office, Northern Ireland Environment Agency; FSA; and Department of Health
Decontamination advice	Defra CBRN Emergencies	Defra CBRN Emergencies	Defra CBRN Emergencies	Defra CBRN Emergencies

Annex D: Guidance on producing a funding issues paper

An effective SAGE funding issues paper would ideally need to cover the following topics in the following suggested order:

• Issue - Briefly outline the issue highlighting what and how much funding is required and why it is critical to the emergency response or recovery (if the paper covers the funding of more than one item or activity, a breakdown of costs by item/activity should be provided):^{[footnote 16]}
• Timing - Highlight any timing issues, for instance the date that funding is required by and why it is required by this date and/or the implications of delaying.
• Recommendation(s) – Clearly outline what the paper is asking Ministers to do. This may be approving a particular recommendation(s) or considering a list of decision questions or options. Alongside each recommendation or decision point a brief supporting argument or the key pros and cons should be summarised.
• Background – A more detailed but concise discussion of:
  • the reasons why funding is required, highlighting the benefits of the activity / items requiring funding (i.e. the business case);
  • an outline of funding solutions investigated and their pros and cons - this may include timeliness considerations or a statement that funds are currently unavailable via these sources; and
  • a note of any funding that has been secured; and
  • if appropriate, further details on any timeliness issues.

1. Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ↩

2. In England and Wales, LRFs are the principal mechanism for coordinating emergency preparations. In Scotland, Strategic Coordinating groups fulfil this function and in Northern Ireland different arrangements apply. ↩

3. See Civil Contingencies Act 2004 ↩

4. See  UK National Leadership for Risk Identification, Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PDF, 294KB) ↩

5. Expert scientific groups may also be convened to examine government plans and preparedness for international humanitarian emergencies. For more information, please see ‘The Use of Science Advice in Humanitarian Emergencies and Disasters’ ↩

6. This could be for a number of reasons, e.g. sickness and other commitments that cannot be rescheduled. ↩

7. The need to do this was highlighted in both the independent review by Dame Deirdre Hine Review of the Government’s response to the 2009 Influenza Pandemic and in the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee’s report on its inquiry into Scientific Advice and Evidence in emergencies.   ↩

8. A briefing document uses a standard prose format, and an FAQ uses a question and answer format. ↩

9. These arrangements are outlined in the UK government’s emergency management framework and their own respective contingency plans. Northern Ireland ↩

10. These groups are not always called SAGs. In the context of this guidance the term SAG is used to refer to all departmental or national led scientific or technical advisory groups focused on or used to inform emergency management (preparations, response and recovery). ↩

11. Scientific and engineering advice: guidelines for policy makers ↩

12. Responder health and safety rests with each employer. HSE would investigate instances where responders have been injured or killed. ↩

13. There is a strong link between CBRN advice and meteorological information which can help estimate plume distribution, health and environmental impact monitoring and site-specific advice. ↩

14. Where this is an extensive list of items/activities is covered it would be more appropriate to put this breakdown of costs in an annex. This would prevent the key issues of the paper being lost in the detail of the breakdowns. ↩