United Kingdom Food Security Report 2021: Theme 1: Global Food Availability

Question 1

Indicator 1.1.1 Global output per capita

Accepted Answer

Headline

The rate of increase in global food production output per capita now outpaces global food demand. This means that the global food sources that the UK accesses are secure and expected to remain so in the coming years. However, substantial amounts of food are lost or wasted across the global supply chain. Global food production is unevenly distributed across regions. In addition, growth in obesity and malnutrition may indicate that global production is not meeting nutritional needs.

Context and Rationale

Global production of food relative to global population size is a fundamental indicator of global food security. Demographic and demand increases, availability of suitable land, water resources, bio-fuel production, climate change, and other factors play an important role in determining the levels of global food production and availability.

A secure global food supply is essential to guaranteeing the availability and affordability of food in the UK in the long term. Any deterioration in global availability, or associated increases in prices, will also impact the UK’s food security.

While evidence suggests that, at the global level, agricultural production can be increased enough to satisfy the additional demand projected to 2050, fair resource distribution across all countries will remain a challenge, as outlined further in Indicator 1.2.2. Moreover, there are indications that food prices can be volatile. Economic shocks such as the financial crisis, disease outbreaks, and extreme weather events can adversely impact production and consumption costs leading to spikes in food prices. This volatility could lead to a call for a more sustainable use of food and inputs needed to grow food. This is discussed in more depth in Indicators 1.1.7, 1.1.8, and 1.1.9.

Food waste in medium and high-income countries occurs largely at the consumption stage, arising from consumer behaviour. In lower-income countries, food is lost mainly within the food supply chain before it reaches the consumer. These losses are due to financial, managerial, and technical limitations in harvesting techniques, as well as poor storage and cooling facilities in difficult climatic conditions. Inadequate infrastructure, transportation, packaging, and marketing systems also contribute.^{[footnote 2]}

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Calories and world agricultural production per person; global food loss and waste

Source: FAO; UNEP Food Waste Index Report 2021; Fefac; Alltech

Figure 1.1.1a: World food production per capita 1961-2019

(See appendix for an explanation of index numbers.)

Food production per capita has risen since the 1960s. The rate of increase in the production of food now outpaces the increase in calorie demand per capita. The food production index includes seed and feed, which is not intended for human consumption and therefore slightly skews the real availability of food for humans. The use of animal feed has also increased significantly since 2012 by 149 million tonnes per annum to 1,103 million tonnes in 2019 as is shown in figure 1.1.1d.

Figure 1.1.1b: Food waste at food service, household, and retail level per region, kg/capita/year from UNEP 2021 Food Index

The quality of data on food waste varies significantly by region. Drawing any definite conclusions on regional variation is therefore problematic. From available data, food waste per capita appears relatively constant globally. Household food waste accounts for the largest proportion of food waste.

Figure 1.1.1c: Percentage of food loss by region, 2016

Food loss, as shown in figure 1.1.1c, is highest in Central and Southern Asia at 20.7%, followed by Europe and Northern America at 15.7% and Sub-Saharan Africa at 14%. All these regions exceeded the world average percentage of food loss of 13.8%. Australia and New Zealand have the lowest food waste percentage globally at 5.8%.

Figure 1.1.1d: Animal Feed consumption at global level, million tonnes 2012-2018

Trends

Global food production output has been on a permanent upward trend, with enough calories being produced to feed the growing world population now and in future years. Therefore, the UK’s ability to meet its import demands from global food production is in a good state. Risks concerning global food production levels are discussed in more detail in Indicators 1.1.2, 1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.1.7.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations projects that global agricultural production will increase by 1.4% per annum over the next ten years if most COVID-19 measures are lifted by the end of 2021. This is a slightly slower growth rate compared to the last decade, which saw an increase of 1.7% per annum. Most of the agricultural production growth will likely take place in low-income countries. These increases will be driven by productivity-increasing investments in agricultural infrastructure and research and development, wider access to agricultural inputs and improved management skills. High-income countries will contribute less to production growth, mainly due to constraints imposed by environmental policies.^{[footnote 3]}

Although calories per capita are rising globally, distribution is unequal. The UN estimates that between 720 and 811 million people were undernourished in 2020. This constitutes an increase from 650 million in 2019 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.^{[footnote 4]} Moreover, the type of food that makes up the consumed calories also plays an important role in determining whether the world population can meet their nutritional requirements. Some regions still suffer from undernourishment, while others are dealing with increasing obesity levels.

Question 2

Indicator 1.1.2 Cereal yield growth rates by region

Accepted Answer

Headline

Growth in cereal yields is keeping pace with overall global food demand, although has been slower in the last decade compared to earlier periods. Some of the main risks for cereal production in the future will be climate variability and change, and the effects these will have on the growth rates in different regions.

Context and Rationale

Yield growth rates are an important measure to assess the world’s supply of food. Yields measure the harvested production per unit of harvested area, and yield growth denotes an increase in harvested production within a unit of area. Historically, yield growth has been a key factor in food production increases. It is expected that most of the increase in production over the next 40 years will also come from improved yields and less so from expansions in agricultural land.^{[footnote 5]}

The agricultural sector is both affected by and the cause of some risks. Changing climate, pests and diseases, harvest losses, inefficient use of inputs, and underinvestment can all hamper yields and yield growth. Some of these risks are further outlined below. Efficient applications of fertiliser and water usage are key factors in yield growth. However, yield growth driven by applying greater quantities of fertiliser and water can be environmentally damaging. Fertilisers and water resources are covered in more depth within Indicators 1.1.8, 1.1.9, and Theme 2 in this report.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Cereals yields and yield growth rates

Source: FAO

(See appendix for further information on OECD and an explanation of index numbers.)

Figure 1.1.2a: Cereal yield growth rates by region 1970-2019

Note: 2010 is designated as the base year for this graph to measure the growth rate against.

Figure 1.1.2b: Cereal yields and yield growth rates by region

	Yields(tonnes)	Growth of Yields
Area	1970	1999	2009	2019	1999-2009	2009-2019
MENA	1.1	3.2	4.7	5.4	47.8	14.6
OECD & EU	2.5	4.3	4.9	5.6	14.6	14.0
South & East Asia	2.0	3.1	3.7	4.2	21.7	14.0
South America	1.6	3.0	3.6	4.7	19.5	32.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.5	3.7	8.1
World	1.6	2.7	3.3	3.8	22.4	16.9

Cereal yields have increased dramatically since the 1970s. Since 2011, however, growth of yields has significantly slowed. This can be seen in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which had a 14.76% growth between 2009 and 2019 compared with a 47.98% growth between 1999 and 2009. This represents a greater volatility in the yield in the last decade than previously seen. South America saw the largest acceleration in growth in yield at 32.2% over the last decade.

Trends

Data from the FAO suggests that the increase in improvements in yields in the last two decades can mostly be attributed to increased use of irrigation, pesticides and fertilisers, better farming practices, and the use of high yield crops. Increased growth rates, therefore, are largely due to improved technologies rather than expansions of cultivated areas.^{[footnote 6]}

Although yield growth rates have been slowing down in recent years, this should not be taken as cause for concern given that overall food production, as outlined in indicator 1.1.1, has been increasing and is projected to continue to do so. Falling real commodity prices have reduced some of the incentives to improve yield growth at the same pace as in the late 20^th^ century.

The FAO estimates that global crop production will grow by 18% over the next ten years. 88% of this growth is expected to come from yield improvements. The additional output is projected to mainly originate in the Asian and Pacific region. Lower-income countries will improve their yields through better adapted seeds and improved crop management. In high-income countries, yield increases will come mainly from improvements in cultivated varieties and the adoption of precision farming technology to optimise the application of inputs.^{[footnote 7]}

Despite the current positive status and projections for cereal yields, there are concerns about how climate variability and change will impact future yield growth rates. These risks, and how they could impact the UK’s food supply chains, are discussed in further detail below.

Risk: Global dimensions of climate variability and change

The UK’s food security is dependent on growing conditions in other parts of the world. Not only does the UK import 45% of the food it consumes, large parts of animal feed for the UK’s domestic production are also imported. Climate variability presents a risk to the availability and stability of these supplies. The likelihood of yield reductions is expected to increase due to more frequent adverse weather conditions such as droughts, floods, and hurricanes, or due to food production being pushed out of its safe climatic space. Beyond primary production, changing climate variability may also affect the way food is processed, stored, and transported, which could impact on food quality, quantity, and prices.

Around 80% to 85% of wheat milled in the UK is home-grown, with 1 to 2 million tonnes per year imported, half of which comes from France, Germany, and Canada.^{[footnote 8]} While typical year-to-year UK wheat yield variations are not highly correlated with those in France, Germany or Canada, simultaneous yield reductions can occur because of large-scale weather patterns that result in droughts and floods. Climate change is projected to increase the occurrence of adverse conditions including droughts and floods, and is, therefore, expected to increase the likelihood of yield shocks.

The United States and China combined provide 60% of the world’s maize and are, therefore, crucial to global food security. Severe water stress is known to be a risk factor for maize production, with climate models showing up to a 6% chance per decade that these conditions could occur simultaneously in the United States and China. These conditions are also expected to occur more frequently in the future as the climate continues to warm, increasing the likelihood of experiencing large reductions in global maize availability. While most of the 1 to 3 million tonnes of maize imported by the UK each year come from Europe, maize yield shocks in the United States and China could affect global markets and UK access to maize. Domestic production of maize is increasing, in part because of a warming climate, which may partly offset increased risk of international production shocks.

The UK typically requires 2.5 to 3 million tonnes of soybean products every year, used primarily for animal feed, human consumption, and pharmaceutical or industrial purposes. Virtually all soybean requirements are currently met by imports, the vast majority of which come from Argentina, Brazil, and the USA – the world’s largest soybean producers and exporters. The high concentration of soybean production in the Americas means that global soybean supplies are vulnerable to adverse weather conditions, such as droughts and floods, which are expected to become more frequent in a warmer climate. In addition, China is the world’s largest importer of soybean products, primarily for animal feed. China’s increasing demand for consuming meat products fed on soybean may therefore affect the UK’s access to soybeans.

Question 3

Case Study 1.1 Plant diseases and pests

Accepted Answer

Overview

Plant diseases and pests have the potential to have significant impacts on global food availability. The FAO estimates that 20% to 40% of global crop production is lost annually due to plant diseases and pests. Climate change may alter the range or increase frequency of plant diseases and pest incidence. Impacts of wheat rust and Panama Disease on the world’s wheat and banana production are of note for the UK’s food security.

Background

More than half of the world’s calories come from a limited number of varieties of three ‘mega-crops’: rice, wheat, and maize.^{[footnote 9]} Plant diseases and pests affect global food availability and food security in that they can cause significant food losses, with impacts being especially severe if they affect staple food production. The FAO counts locusts, armyworm, and fruit flies among the most destructive plant pests, and banana disease, cassava disease, and wheat rust among the most harmful plant diseases. Climate change, trade, passenger movement, and reduced resilience in production systems due to agricultural intensification all risk increasing the spread of these diseases and pests.^{[footnote 10]}

Discussion

The FAO estimates that 20% to 40% of global crop production could be lost because of plant and pest diseases each year.^{[footnote 11]} A recent scientific review undertaken by the International Plant Protection Convention, which is overseen by the FAO, has concluded that climate change will likely alter or increase the risks of plant diseases and pests. These risks include range expansion or retreat of certain diseases and pests, increased risks of disease or pest introduction, as well as increased pest population growth rates. Although the overall risk trend for plant and pest diseases to occur is expected to increase due to climate change, there are some regional variations. For instance, some studies^{[footnote 12]} show that the risk for diseases affecting rice in the Philippines may reduce. In general, most pests, weeds, and diseases tend to favour higher temperatures up to a certain threshold, which means that climate change might increase risks within a type-specific temperature range.^{[footnote 13]}

Most recently, outbreaks of desert locust in Eastern Africa, Southwest Asia, and the Red Sea area in 2020 and 2021 caused significant impacts on crops and pasturelands. This upsurge in desert locust was caused by favourable climatic conditions. While there are various locust species, the desert locust is considered the most important species and the most destructive migratory pest in the world. Large swarms can pose serious food security risks, either locally or at a wider scale, depending on the affected region. A single square kilometre of locust swarm can contain up to 80 million adults, with the capacity to consume the same amount of food in one day as 35,000 people. Food security impacts due to desert locust in Eastern Africa have mainly been contained to the region.^{[footnote 14]}

With wheat being a key global source for food and feed, it is worth noting the impacts that various strands of wheat rust, a disease caused by fungal pathogens, can have on global food production levels. Wheat rust diseases are counted amongst the most serious biotic (meaning resulting from living organisms) risks to wheat productivity levels. The most common wheat rusts include stem rust, stripe rust, and leaf rust. While these diseases can threaten the production in any wheat-growing region, the areas currently affected or at most risk include North and East Africa, the Near East, Central Asia, and some Asian countries.^{[footnote 15]} The FAO estimates that around 30% of global wheat production stemming from the previously mentioned regions are at risk of being impacted by wheat rust diseases. Rust diseases are also among the major concerns in more developed wheat producing countries. Due to improved technology, capacity, and awareness, however, the implementation of management strategies is easier and has reduced some risks.^{[footnote 16]}

The FAO counts the banana as the most important fruit in the world. In the UK, too, bananas make up large parts of a person’s total fruit consumption based on Kantar data. Four races of the Panama Diseases, which pose a risk to different banana varieties, have been identified to date. Due to race one of the Panama Disease, banana producers had to shift from the Gros Michel banana variety in the 1950s to the Cavendish variety used today. Race four, a more recent strain of the disease, however, can infect the Cavendish variety. With the Cavendish banana being the only traded variety, and no existing disease control available yet, this disease poses a serious risk to global fruit consumption.^{[footnote 17]}

Question 4

Indicator 1.1.3 Real agricultural commodity prices

Accepted Answer

Headline

Agricultural commodity prices reflect the results of global supply and demand for particular commodities. They are relevant both to the availability of foodstuffs and to the prices consumers pay for food. The financial crisis caused a significant price spike, followed by a gradual decline. The COVID-19 pandemic led to new price spikes, albeit not as severe as ten years ago. The FAO projects that real prices will return to a general downward trend once COVID-19 measures have been lifted.

Context and Rationale

This indicator reflects the global availability of agricultural commodities as it is driven by the fundamental market forces of supply and demand and exchange rate dynamics. Higher prices signal relative shortages, whilst falling prices signal improved supply or even oversupply. Higher prices give an incentive for producers to increase supplies and for consumers to reduce demand. It is partly an outcome indicator of any underlying supply issues, and a leading indicator of potential price changes to consumers.

Many factors can affect commodity prices, including favourable or poor harvests, production costs, market structure, and external factors, such as economic sanctions. The food supply chain includes the transformation of goods and the incorporation of services along the chain. Its characteristics mean that price shocks are at times absorbed by producers or passed on to consumers. In general, prices of agricultural commodities have been following long-term downward trends.^{[footnote 18]} This has been the result of productivity improvements in agriculture and related industries, which has lowered the marginal production costs of the main food commodities. Deviations from the general trend, such as price peaks during 2007 to 2014, were temporary and did not alter the long-term declining trend.

Commodity prices send the appropriate signals when the global market is over or undersupplied. In the medium to longer-term, supply and demand of agricultural commodities would ideally be in balance and be reflected in relatively affordable prices.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Global real prices for selected agricultural commodities

Source: UNCTAD; OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook

Figure 1.1.3a: Commodity prices for palm oil, rice, soybeans, wheat January 1995-April 2021

Figure 1.1.3b: Commodity prices for beef January 1995-April 2021

Figure 1.1.3c: Commodity prices for sugar January 1995-April 2021

Figure 1.1.3d: Commodity prices for fish 1990-2020

There was a sharp spike in commodity prices during the financial crisis. Prices started to rise again in late 2010 and early 2011 and remained at inflated levels until early 2016. This was much longer than has been seen in previous commodity price spikes.^{[footnote 19]} Palm oil and sugar were particularly badly affected. There have also been price spikes in sugar and beef which are not part of this general trend. The beef price has shown strong growth since the turn of the century whilst still being affected by the same variation in price as previously described. This is likely to be due to rising demand for red meat in emerging economies such as Brazil. Fish prices have risen steadily in the last decade, with a greater increase in price rises from aquaculture than from capture.

After an initial drop in the first quarter of 2020, there have been sharp commodity price rises during the COVID-19 pandemic. Beef, palm oil, soybeans and sugar have been particularly strongly affected, showing strong rises in 2021. The sugar price drop was fuelled by a slump in the crude oil price which led to a lower demand for sugar cane for ethanol production.

Trends

Global events can have a significant impact on supply and demand, which in turn affects global commodity prices. This was the case for 2020, where many of the price highs not seen since the mid-2010s experienced in commodities such as wheat, rice, soybeans, and palm oil have been attributed by the FAO to the COVID-19 pandemic. While the current situation for real commodity prices (Real prices denote the value of a commodity after adjusting for inflation expressed in constant dollars, which reflects buying power relative to a base year) means that prices are above the general downward trend, the FAO expects real prices for most commodities to decline over the next ten years. Any future events either at the global level or in agriculturally significant regions may, however, lead to unexpected price spikes.

Real wheat prices are expected to decline in the coming years based on large supplies being produced in the Black Sea region and slow growing global food demand. Assuming a return to normal growing and logistical conditions, export prices for rice, that may impact on prices in the UK, are expected to decrease to trend level by 2023, with declines thereafter promoted by ample global availabilities and intensifying competition for markets amongst exporters.

Real soybean and palm oil prices are expected to return to trend levels in the early 2000s, reflecting an increase in global supply. This is based on average production prospects in major producing countries, and the gradual elimination of COVID-19 related logistics constraints. After this correction, the declining price trend is expected to slow. This price trend will be subject to multiple uncertainties, such as weather variations in major producing countries and shifts in demand preferences. China’s demand for soybean imports in their effort to rebuild their pork production following the African Swine Fever outbreak (see African Swine Fever case study) will also play a crucial role in determining market outcomes in the coming years.

Meat prices are anticipated to rebound from COVID-19 induced lows in 2020 and to rise moderately over the medium term as demand recovers due to the reopening of the hospitality sector. Thanks to ongoing feed productivity gains within the meat sector, feed price increases will have less of an impact on meat prices.

Real sugar prices are projected to resume their long-term decline due to productivity gains from better yields. Overall, real prices should fall below the average level of the last twenty years, when prices were under upward pressure due to competition for the land from growing biofuel crops. Some domestic policies and the dominance of few exporters, however, may result in some price variability of international sugar prices over the next ten years.^{[footnote 20]}

Real fish prices are expected to decline slightly over the next decade, though remaining relatively high. There may be some price volatility for individual fish species due to supply and demand fluctuations. In addition, as aquaculture is expected to represent a higher share of world fish supply, prices for fish from aquaculture could have a stronger impact on overall fish price formation in international markets.^{[footnote 21]}

Question 5

Indicator 1.1.4 Stock to consumption ratios

Accepted Answer

Headline

Stored stocks of agricultural commodities serve as an important buffer against poor harvests and demand shocks. The world’s stock to consumption levels fluctuate, with good harvests leading to higher stocks. Current stocks are healthy with the exception of soybeans. Poor soybean harvests or other supply disruptions could cause price fluctuations and present a risk to imported soy-based animal feed, an important input into UK meat production.

Context and Rationale

Stock to consumption ratios are an indicator of global resilience to food shortages and price stability. Food stocks can serve as buffers to supply or demand shocks. If stocks are low, markets become more sensitive to any potential shocks and the probability of price spikes increases.^{[footnote 22]} Therefore, observing stock to consumption ratios can serve as an early warning for possible shortages and price spikes, and enable an early response to potential food security risks. Especially for crops, supply shocks are a regular feature of the market, which is why this indicator focuses on cereals.

Sufficient stock levels provide the market with some resilience to supply or demand shocks. It is, however, difficult to establish an ideal stock ratio as high stock levels could also indicate a structural oversupply of markets. Any changes in the stock ratio also require careful interpretation to fully understand the root causes and possible effects.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Global stock to consumption ratios

Source: USDA

Figure 1.1.4a: Stocks to consumption ratio: barley, soybean, rice, maize, sunflower seed, wheat April 2006-April 2021

Since 2016, there has been a significant increase in stock of wheat, peaking in 2019 at 57.9%. This fell sharply in 2020 to 30.9% and fell again in 2021 to 27.4%, remaining, however, above the 2016 stock level of 20.3%. A similar pattern can be seen in milled rice, although that showed a sharp rebound in 2021, rising by 17.3% to 33.6%. Maize also follows a similar pattern as it has risen by 18.2% to 34.6%. There has been a sharp rebound in the stock to consumption ratio, rising by 22.5% from 12.2%.

Trends

Most stock to consumption ratios are either at or below the early 2010 levels, with rice and wheat having experienced some peaks in the years since then. Given that the record global harvest in 2008 to 2009 drastically increased stock levels at the time, slight drops in the ratio for commodities such as barley, soybean, and sunflower seeds are not of concern currently. Overall, stock to consumption ratios are at a comfortable level for most commodities, with the FAO expressing some concern for soybeans.

Overall, the stock to consumption ratio for soybean remains low compared to the past two decades, which implies that harvest failures could quickly lead to market shortages. Such a scenario could have impacts on UK farmers and their costs where soybean is used for animal feed, as almost all requirements are met through imports. Although substitutes are available, soybeans remain one of most effective animal feeds.^{[footnote 23]}

Question 6

Indicator 1.1.5 Global livestock and dairy production

Accepted Answer

Headline

Global meat production has grown significantly since 2010 and is projected to increase over the coming years. Consumption increases are likely to vary, with high-income countries potentially having reached peak meat consumption per capita, and lower and middle-income countries expected to see more increases in consumption rates. Milk production is also set to continue to increase, mainly driven by improvements in efficiency rather than increases in herd size. Animal disease outbreaks in the late 2010s have substantially reduced pig herd numbers, particularly in China.

Context and Rationale

Meat makes up an important source of nutrition for many people. Global demand for meat has grown over the last 50 years, leading to a trebling of meat production over that period. In that same time span, there has also been a geographical switch in the leading meat production sites. Asia now accounts for 40% to 45% of total global meat production, having overtaken Europe and North America as the dominant producers.

While pig meat is the most popular source of meat at the global level, the production percentage of poultry meat has seen the highest increases in the last 50 years compared to other types of meat. In the UK, poultry meat is the most popular type of meat, followed by pork and then beef.^{[footnote 24]}

The UK is not exposed to a significant degree to changes in global availability of milk and dairy products due to a high supply-to-demand ratio for milk and only some reliance on cheese imports from the EU.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Livestock production by region; global dairy production.

Source: FAO

Figure 1.1.5a: Animals Slaughtered for meat by region, beef 1961-2019

Correction: The y-axis should read Animals slaughtered not a Million tonnes.

Beef cattle production has shown growth in Sub-Saharan Africa at 22.8%, as well as in South and East Asia at 11.8%. OECD and EU countries also show a large growth in beef production, but that is due to a sharp spike in 2020 caused by a change in the way beef production is recorded. Otherwise, there has been a gradual decline between 2010 and 2019. Beef cattle production between 2010 and 2020 fell in South America by -6.9% and the Middle East and North Africa by -8.4%.

Figure 1.1.5b: Animals Slaughtered for meat by region, lamb 1961-2019

Correction: The y-axis should read Animals slaughtered not a Million tonnes.

Lamb production has risen in the Middle East and North Africa by 13.6%, in Sub-Saharan Africa by 20.1%, and in South and East Asia by 29%. The dramatic rise in South and East Asia is driven by the rapid expansion of sheep farming in China. Sheep production in OECD and EU countries has grown slightly by 1.9% and fallen in South America by 13.4%. South America, it should be noted, has never been a large producer of sheep, which means that the drop in production will not be of meaningful significance.

Figure 1.1.5c: Animals Slaughtered for meat by region, pig 1961-2019

Correction: The y-axis should read Animals slaughtered not a Million tonnes.

Pig production has risen in OECD and EU countries by 6.8%, in South America by 32.7%, and in Sub-Saharan Africa by 50.4%. In South and East Asia there was a sharp drop in production in 2019 by 12.9% due to the spread of African Swine Fever into China and South East Asia. The impacts of African Swine Fever on the global pig production are covered in more detail in the case study on African Swine Fever below. The Middle East and North Africa also fell by 4.4%, but the region is not a major producer of pigs.

Figure 1.1.5d: 1000 head of Birds Slaughtered for meat by region, poultry 1961-2019

Correction: The y-axis should read Animals slaughtered not a Million tonnes.

All regions have shown a rise in poultry production. The largest producer was South and East Asia, which also had the largest percentage rise in production at 42.7%. The next biggest producers were OECD and EU countries, which had a 14.3% rise between 2010 and 2019. The percentage rises of the other regions are 28.2% for the Middle East and North Africa, 12.9% for South America, and 12.0% for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 1.1.5e: Animals Slaughtered for meat global 1961-2019

Correction: The y-axis should read Animals slaughtered-1000 head poultry slaughtered not a Million tonnes.

Pigs have highest production of any animal globally by a significant margin despite recent loss of production due to African Swine Fever.

Figure 1.1.5f: Milk produced per capita by region 1961-2019

(See appendix for an explanation of index numbers.)

Milk production per capita has consistently risen since 2000 in all regions until 2015. Between 2010 and 2019, milk production in South America has fallen 6.45% to 91.1. Production in the Middle East and North Africa has fallen by 9.9% to 92.2, and Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 15% to 93.5. There has been a rise in OECD countries by 9.7% to 105.1 as well as in South and East Asia by 4.4% to 100.4.

Trends

While COVID-19 impacted global meat production temporarily due to logistical hurdles, reduced food services and household spend, the FAO expects global meat production to increase by 13% over the next ten years, due to increases in the number of animals and higher output per animal.

Poultry meat is projected to make up more than half of the growth in meat production levels in the next decade, with China, Brazil, and the US accounting for large parts of this growth. Following behind poultry, increases in pig meat production levels will make up a third of total meat production growth. Large parts of this increase are expected to come from the production recovery in Asian countries by 2023, particularly China and Vietnam, from African Swine Fever. Beef and sheep meat production is expected to increase the least, contributing 9% and 6% respectively to overall growth.

With global consumption patterns moving towards including more meat in diets, there is also an expected increase in the quantities of crops being used as feed. The current 1.7 billion tonnes of cereals, protein meals, and processing by-products used between 2018 and 2020 for animal feed are forecast by the FAO to increase to two billion tonnes by 2030. Overall growth rate in future is likely to be slower than in the last ten years. This reflects efforts by large meat producers to lower the protein meal share in feed. There are also some climate risks associated with the projected amount of animal feed to be produced by 2030. Maize yields, which is one of the most important commodities used as feed, alongside protein meal, are particularly vulnerable to volatility in terms of supply, price, and extreme weather events.

High-income countries already have the highest meat consumption levels. The FAO expects changes in those consumption levels to be low over the coming ten years, with some regions, such as the US and the European Union, having likely reached the saturation point in their meat consumption levels. Moreover, due to health and environmental concerns, consumers are expected to increasingly replace red meat with poultry meat and dairy products. Meat consumption increases are projected to mainly take place in developing regions due to high population levels and growth rates. Especially Africa and Asia are expected to have high growth rates in the coming years.

Question 7

Risk: Impact of animal disease on meat production

Accepted Answer

Animal diseases carry a potential threat to the supply of meat and livestock related foods. Several animal diseases result in either the animal’s death as a direct result of the disease, or the animal being culled for the purpose of disease control. Moreover, animal diseases carry additional risks in terms of zoonotic diseases which have the potential to transmit to the human population. There is also the risk that animal disease outbreaks could have a negative impact on consumer confidence in animal-sourced foods.

While disease outbreaks can have a marked impact on the animal population of individual countries, the UK has not experienced significant impacts on its meat supply in recent years.

Source: FAO, OIE

Figure 1.1.5g: Percentage of disease related deaths in livestock population: World 2005-2019

Figure 1.1.5h: Disease Deaths as a percentage of animal population: World 2005-2019

Figure 1.1.5i: Disease Deaths as a percentage of animal population: EU 2005-2019

Figure 1.1.5j: Disease Deaths as a percentage of animal population: EU 2015-2019

Some of the notable animal disease outbreaks in recent years outlined in figures 1.1.5 g to j include the Avian Influenza outbreak in 2016 to 2017 in the EU and UK, which led to the culling of many birds across Europe. Most recently, the UK had to declare to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in November 2020 that the UK was no longer free from notifiable Avian Influenza following an outbreak of H5N8, highly pathogenic Avian Influenza. The Chief Veterinary Officers for England, Scotland, and Wales also agreed to impose a housing order for all birdkeepers in Great Britain from December 2020 to March 2021. Risk to public health was assessed to be low by Public Health England.^{[footnote 25]}

The peak in pig deaths in Europe in 2011 was due to a Classical Swine Fever outbreak in Russia and the Baltic States as well as an outbreak of Aujesky’s Disease. The African Swine Fever outbreak in China in 2018 had large impacts on China’s domestic meat production and is discussed in more detail in the case study on African Swine Fever. The steep rise in pig deaths after 2017 is due the incursion of African Swine Fever into Eastern Europe. An outbreak of brucella melitensis in North Macedonia contributed to the particularly high mortality in sheep and goats before 2008 in Europe.

Pests, pathogens, and invasive non-native species (INNS) pose a significant threat to agriculture. Estimates of the economic costs of INNS are in the region of £1.3 billion per year in England.^{[footnote 26]} Climate Change will likely increase these costs. For example, Bluetongue virus outbreaks in livestock may happen every year in the UK by 2070 due to milder winters.^{[footnote 27]}

Question 8

Case Study 1.2 African Swine Fever

Accepted Answer

Overview

African swine fever (ASF) is a viral disease that can be spread by live or dead pigs as well as pork products. It is not, however, a risk to human health. China has seen one of the largest ASF outbreaks, which started in 2018 and has led to 1.2 million pigs having to be culled since then. With China needing to fill domestic production shortfalls via imports, global exports to China grew drastically and led to an increase in global pig prices. This effect has started to reverse, with China restocking its pig herds, having a knock-on effect on global prices again. The UK is currently ASF-free. However, due to the geographic proximity of ASF cases in Eastern Europe and some EU countries, the risk has been at medium level since 2018 due to the possibility of the disease being imported via pork products.

Background

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious haemorrhagic viral disease of domestic and wild pigs, which is responsible for serious economic and production losses. This transboundary animal disease can be spread by live or dead pigs, domestic or wild/feral pigs, and pork products. ASF can survive for months to years in smoked, dried, cured, and frozen meat from affected pigs or wild boar. Transmission can also occur via contaminated feed and fomites (non-living objects) such as shoes, clothes, vehicles, knives, equipment, and others, due to the high environmental resistance of the ASF virus. ASF is, however, not a risk to human health.

Currently there is no approved vaccine for ASF. Prevention in countries free of the disease depends on implementation of appropriate import policies and biosecurity measures, ensuring that neither infected live pigs nor pork products are introduced into areas free of ASF. As observed in Europe and in some regions of Asia, the transmission of ASF seems to depend largely on the wild boar population density and wild boars’ interaction with low-biosecurity pig production systems.

Discussion

The most notable outbreak of ASF in recent years started in China in 2018. Since then, the disease has spread across many South East Asian countries, including Mongolia, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, and others. Based on FAO reports, more than 1.2 million pigs had to be culled between 2018 and 2021 in China alone. Outside of Asia and Oceania, there are also ongoing cases of ASF in wild boars and domestic pigs in Eastern Europe as well as Belgium and Germany.

The risk level to the UK was raised to medium in August 2018 and has remained at that level to-date as a result of the number of outbreaks of ASF being reported in Eastern Europe, and subsequent detection of ASF in wild boar in Belgium in September 2018. Although case numbers were higher in Asia and Oceania, the geographical distance to those outbreak sites meant that these outbreaks did not add to the risk level in the UK.

Illegal importation of infected pork meat from affected parts of Asia and Oceania, however, presents a significant route of entry of ASF virus into the UK. While it is legal to import pork products from unaffected areas of the EU, personal imports from affected countries also poses a risk as the subsequent food waste could be discarded in areas where wild boar, feral pigs, or domestic pigs could access it. Some of the risks of passengers bringing back pork products to the UK from affected countries was reduced when COVID-19 movement restrictions were in place.

At the time of publication, no ASF cases have been detected in the UK. To prevent an outbreak of ASF in the UK, the UK government has raised awareness of ASF amongst travellers via various information campaigns. In addition, the government has worked with the pig sector to ensure all the relevant biosecurity measures are being followed.

ASF occurred in the Chinese pig sector in 2018 and has had significant impact on its ability to supply China’s domestic market. The volume of pigs exported to China from third countries, including the UK, increased dramatically over the period between 2018 and 2020. This increased pig prices generally.

Question 9

Indicator 1.1.6 Global fish stocks

Accepted Answer

Headline

Despite some regional improvements in sustainable fishing, the over-exploitation of world fishery stocks remains a major issue. These unsustainable practices will have significant impacts on the medium- to long- term global fishing stock availability.

Context and Rationale

Over the last few decades, overall fish consumption at the global level has seen a steady increase. While the nutritional composition of fish varies between species, fish constitutes a valuable source of protein, accounting for about 17% of total animal protein consumed globally in 2017.^{[footnote 28]} Production has increased thanks to technological improvements in the way fish is caught, processed, stored, and distributed. Demand for fish has also increased in correlation with rising incomes and awareness amongst consumers of its health benefits.

International markets and aquaculture have had significant impacts on the availability and consumption of fish. They have reduced the importance of geographical location, broadened the markets for many species, and offered wider choices to consumers, often at cheaper prices.

Threats to fish production include over-exploitation of fish stocks, water pollution, and climate change. Rising water temperatures and acidification impact marine biodiversity and affect both the productivity and the distribution of marine fish stocks.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Share of marine fish stocks under or moderately exploited

Source: UN Sustainable Development Goal 14, 2020

Figure 1.1.6a: Percentage of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels, Atlantic Ocean, 2004 to 2017

Figure 1.1.6b: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels, Indian Ocean, 2004 and 2017, percentage

Figure 1.1.6c: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels, Mediterranean and Black Sea, 2004 to 2017, percentage

Figure 1.1.6d: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels, Pacific Ocean, 2004 to 2017, percentage

Figure 1.1.6e: Percentage of global fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels, 1974-2017

In 2013, 68% of global fish stocks were within biologically sustainable levels. This fell to 66.7% in 2015, and 65.9% in 2017 as seen in figure 1.1.6e. Between 2015 and 2017, the share of stocks fished sustainably fell at a slower rate than for the period between 2013 to 2015. Improved regulations on fishing, along with monitoring and surveillance, have proved effective in some regions. Uptake of these measures remains slow, however, particularly in developing countries, and remains a medium-term risk of collapse in stocks. Therefore, the level of sustainable fisheries varies significantly by region.

Between 2011 and 2017 there were reductions in the share of stocks fished sustainably in some regions, with large declines in the Eastern Indian Ocean of 21.1%, Pacific Southeast 18.2%, Pacific Northwest 13.6% and Northwest Atlantic 16.2%. Improvement was noted in the South-western Pacific at 0.6% - it rose 9.9% between 2015 and 2017; and in the South-eastern Atlantic of 17.7%, South-western Atlantic 1.67% and Eastern Central Atlantic 4.8%

As of 2017, marine fishing regions with the lowest share of stocks fished sustainably were the South-western Atlantic at 46.7%, South-eastern Pacific at 45.5%, and Mediterranean and Black Sea at 37.5%.

Trends

Despite regional improvements in sustainable fishing practices, the over-exploitation of world fishery stocks remains a major concern for this indicator. Over-exploitation not only creates negative ecological consequences, but also reduces fish production in the long-term. The FAO estimates that 33.1% of fish stocks were being fished at biologically unsustainable levels in 2015. These levels can differ greatly between individual fish species. The UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 14.4 aims to restore fish stocks in the shortest time possible. While the trend of overfished stocks is still moving upwards, some regions, such as the US and Australia, have managed to increase the proportion of stocks fished within biologically sustainable levels.

The FAO’s ten-year outlook foresees that global fish production will continue to grow, albeit more slowly than in the last ten years. This future growth in fish production will mainly stem from increased aquaculture production. Intensification, expansion into new spaces, and innovative technologies for land-based and offshore farms are expected to be the main drivers of growth. However, many factors have the potential to limit this growth, such as reduced availability of land and water, disease outbreaks, feed, and genetic resources.

Most of this growth is expected to occur in Asia, which is set to become the main producing region by 2030, with 88% of global aquaculture production and 71% of global fish production. America, Europe, and Oceania are all expected to experience growth rates under 1% per annum by 2030. These lower growth rates reflect modest growth in capture fisheries production and the lower contribution of aquaculture to total fish production in these continents.^{[footnote 29]}

The UK is a net importer of seafood, with key species purchased at retail and out of home satisfied by imports, alongside domestic production in the case of salmon. Key species for out of home seafood consumption include cod, tuna and salmon, and prawns. In 2019, based on imported value, the top 5 imported species, accounting for around 70% of imports, were salmon, prawns (warm water and cold water), cod, tuna, and haddock.

Imported salmon and warm water prawns mainly stem from aquaculture, and their sustainability is therefore not assessed in this indicator as its focus lies on wild caught fish and seafood. Most cold-water prawns sold in the UK come from wild capture fisheries in the North Atlantic, and future supply is likely to remain stable. Most imports of cod are caught in the Atlantic, with fishing assessed by the Sea Fish Industry Authority, a UK public body, to be below maximum sustainable yield and stock biomass at full reproductive capacity. Tuna imports mainly come from the Pacific and Indian Ocean. While there are some concerns over illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing for continued sustainability, overfishing for tuna from the Indian Ocean is assessed to be a low risk by the FAO’s Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Haddock imports largely come from the Arctic, which is not covered by the data in this indicator, and the North Atlantic. Fish stocks from both oceans is assessed to be in good condition.

Risk: Rising temperatures and ocean acidification

Projections of a 1 to 2-degree Celsius increase over a 40-year period in ocean temperatures, alongside reductions in oxygen content, foresee a decline in body size for several globally important fish species. Algal blooms, which can become toxic to fish, and an increased risk of disease outbreak, pose a further threat both to the fishing and aquaculture industry. Higher ocean temperatures also produce shifts in the distribution of aquatic species so that species can keep to their thermal or related ecological preferences. Recent evidence reviewed by the FAO indicates that poleward expansion will result in a net local increase in species richness in most places, except in tropical regions, where strong decreases in richness are expected.^{[footnote 30]}

Ocean acidification is also a risk to fish and shellfish production. Ocean acidification occurs when the pH level of the ocean is reduced. Due to the rising carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, more carbon dioxide is being sequestered in the oceans, leading to a more acidic pH level. Acidification particularly affects shellfish, such as oysters and clams, in that it makes building and maintaining shells more difficult. It also impacts other species vital to the marine ecosystem, such as reef-building corals that provide a habitat to some fish species.

Question 10

Indicator 1.1.7 Global land use change

Accepted Answer

Headlines

Although the changes in global land use have been minimal over the last decade, even small changes in the way land is used can have significant impacts on biodiversity levels and ecosystems. Any losses in these areas could lead to negative consequences for global agricultural production.

Context and Rationale

Global agricultural production can not only be increased by improved yields (as outlined in indicator 1.1.2), but also by converting more land to farmland. Over the last twenty years, however, there has been very little change globally in the share between agricultural, forest, and other land. Given that total agricultural production has been increasing over the same period, this indicates that food is being produced more efficiently, requiring less land resources.

Land use has become one of the central environmental concerns. Agricultural production, while fundamental for human well-being, also has significant impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems, and climate change. The challenges of reversing biodiversity declines, preventing further outbreaks of zoonotic diseases, and mitigating climate change, while producing sufficient food to ensure zero hunger, must be resolved together.

Biodiversity plays a vital role in food production. For instance, more than 75% of the leading types of global food crops rely to some extent on animal pollination for yields and / or quality. Therefore, making land use systems sustainable is central to securing continued global food availability.

Question 11

Data and Assessment

Accepted Answer

Indicator: Global land use change

Source: FAO

Figure 1.1.7a: Agricultural land-use change 1961-2019

Figure 1.1.7b: Crop land-use change 1961-2019

Figure 1.1.7c: Land used for pasture change 2002-2019

Figure 1.1.7d: Forestland-use change 1990-2019

The amount of global agricultural land has remained relatively constant, with relevantly little decline in forest and permanent pastures over the last couple of decades. There has been an increase in cropland and land under irrigation in this period. However, the majority of the increase in food production is down to increased yields rather than increased land area used for agricultural production.

In OECD and EU countries, there has been a marked decline in the amount of land used for agriculture from 39.9% in 1961 to 35% in 2019. Since 2010, the percentage for the Middle East and North Africa has risen by 0.1% to 33.2%, in Sub-Saharan Africa it has fallen by 1% to 42.1%, in South and East Asia it has risen by 0.5% to 49.8%, and in South America it has fallen by 0.8% to 29.8%. The change in South America is the most significant change in agricultural land use since 2010.

In OECD and EU countries, cropland has fallen by 1% since 1961 to 11.4% in 2019, and risen by 0.1% since 2010. Since 2010, the percentage for Sub-Saharan Africa has risen by 0.7% to 10.2%, in South and East Asia it has risen by 0.6% to 23.5%, in South America it has decreased by 0.1% to 7.5%, and in the Middle East and North Africa it has risen by 0.1% to 5.6%. The increase in the Sub-Saharan Africa is the most significant change in cropland use since 2010.

In OECD and EU countries, pastureland has fallen by 0.4% since 2010 to 12% 2019. Since 2010, the percentage for the Middle East and North Africa has risen 0.1% to 15.3%, in Sub-Saharan Africa it has fallen by 0.8% to 16.3.%, in South and East Asia it has risen by 0.1% to 13.5%, and in South America it has fallen by 0.4% to 12%. The decrease in Sub Saharan Africa is the most significant change in pastureland use since 2010.

In OECD and EU countries, forestland has risen by 0.2% since 2010 to 32.7% 2019. Since 2010, the percentage for the Middle East and North Africa has risen 0.1% to 2.1%, in South and East Asia it has risen by 0.4% to 29.3%, in South America it has fallen by 1.3% to 48.2%. and in Sub-Saharan Africa it has fallen by 1.6% to 26.6%. The decreases in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa are the most significant changes in forestland use since 2010.

Trends

Although land use change has been relatively stable in the last few decades, there has still been an overall decline in forest land between 2000 and 2018 of 89 million ha, or expressed in percentages, a drop from 32.2% of forest land to 31.2%.^{[footnote 31]} While not indicated in the data, forest land is of ecological significance for a variety of reasons, including biodiversity. The Dasgupta review from 2021 points out how intrinsically linked human wellbeing is to nature’s diversity, but acknowledges how difficult it is to measure the ‘worth’ of nature as a whole due to people’s failure to understand some of the hidden benefits nature is providing to humanity. Therefore, even slight declines in forest land should be of concern due to the known and unknown consequences they will have for the world.

The FAO expects that agricultural land use will remain at current levels during the coming decade as an increase in cropland offsets a decrease in pastureland. Most regions will see a decline in overall agricultural land, except for Latin America, which will see the most substantial increase, followed by the Near East and North Africa with a minor growth in land use. Out of the Latin American countries, Brazil will see the highest increase in crop land, while at the same time, its forest land is projected to decrease by about 4%. This is likely linked to increased meat production in Brazil.

Expansion of cropland is projected to account for 6% of total growth in crop production over the next decade. Cropland expansion will continue to be less important for overall food production levels as the transition to more intensive production systems is foreseen to persist. The largest expansion of cropland is likely going to take place in Latin America, where profitable large-scale farms are expected to attract investments for cultivation of new land.

The largest decline in pastureland is projected for Asia and the Pacific region due to the expected substitution from ruminant to non-ruminant production. There is an expected switch to pig meat, following the recovery from African Swine Fever, and poultry, which require less pastureland.^{[footnote 32]}

Risk: Land degradation and biodiversity loss

Agricultural expansion is the most widespread form of land-use change. Currently, over one third of the terrestrial land surface is used for cropping or animal husbandry.^{[footnote 33]}

The UN Environment Programme lists land use change as the most important direct driver of land degradation and loss of biodiversity on land, as well as the most important driver impacting freshwaters.

Agricultural expansion through clearing or conversion of forest, shrub land, savannah, and grassland has been responsible for substantial CO₂ emissions, including from the loss of carbon sinks, and is associated with negative effects on biodiversity.

Agriculture relies on biodiversity for the provision of essential ‘ecosystem services’. These services are vital to human well-being and include crop pollination, water purification, flood protection, and carbon sequestration. Globally, these ‘services’ are worth an estimated $125 to 140 trillion per year, more than one and a half times the size of the global GDP.^{[footnote 34]}

Different agricultural practices have both advantages and drawbacks. Less intensive forms of agriculture can promote biodiversity within the farming system but require more land for an equivalent food output. Conversely, more intensive forms of agriculture require greater inputs of energy, fertilisers, and feeds, but can provide significant yield benefits per unit of land. They are inherently biodiversity-poor, as increased use of fertilisers and pesticides, specialisation, and rationalisation can contribute to a loss of both semi-natural habitats and species abundance. As these agricultural practices require less land, however, they can contribute to habitat creation elsewhere.

Source: UN Sustainable Development Goal 15

Figure 1.1.7e: Best estimates of the proportions of species threatened with extinction in the Red List Index, by species group, 2021

The UN reports that human activities are causing biodiversity to decline faster than at any other time in human history. Countries participating in the UN Sustainable Development Goals have fallen short on their 2020 targets to halt biodiversity loss. The Red List Index of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, as shown in figure 1.1.7e, monitors the overall extinction risk for various species. The figure shows an overall % decline since 1993 of 10%. Among 134,400 species assessed, 28% (more than 37,400 species) are threatened with extinction, including 41% of amphibians, 34% of conifers, 33% of reef-building corals, 26% of mammals and 14% of birds. The main drivers of species loss are agricultural and urban development, unsustainable harvesting through hunting, fishing, trapping, and logging, and invasive alien species.^{[footnote 35]}

Question 12

Indicator 1.1.8 Phosphate rock reserves

Accepted Answer

Headline

Phosphate rock is the only large-scale source of phosphorus, an essential element for plant growth and an important chemical fertiliser. The UK has no phosphate reserves and relies on imports; Exploitable reserves of phosphate rock have increased since 1995. At the same time, some regions, including the UK, have reduced their use of phosphate rock as a fertiliser while increasing agricultural production. Many countries are also in the process of making more efficient use of phosphate rock, which could reduce the demand for this type of fertiliser.

Context and Rationale

Phosphorus is an essential element for life, second only to nitrogen as the most limiting element for plant growth. Food production everywhere is dependent on the availability of phosphorus for plant uptake in an available form. Over the past century phosphate rock has been one of the main sources of phosphorus for agriculture but is limited to certain geological deposits, which makes this both a finite and important resource globally. It is conventionally added to the soil in preparation for plant uptake and can take many years to increase or decrease soil reserves. A deficiency of phosphate lowers crop yield and quality, a surplus of phosphate can lead to environmental pollution.

Phosphorus cannot be produced, unlike nitrogen or potassium, the two other main fertilisers. In addition, phosphate rock is a geologically finite resource and is also a geopolitical issue due to the location of phosphate rock deposits. The UK solely relies on imports of phosphate rock to meet its demands. It is desirable in the medium to long term to transition away from consuming finite resources and instead focus on more sustainable ways of providing phosphorus for the food chain, such as the increased use of manure. More details are provided on the sustainability aspect in a UK context in Theme 2.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Phosphate rock reserves relative to production

Source: US Geological Survey ^{[footnote 36]}

Figure 1.1.8a: Phosphate Rock Production and reserves from US Geological Survey (USGS)

	Production			Reserve Base			Global share
	1995	2019	Change	1995	2019	Change	Production	Reserves
	Mt	Mt	%	Mt	Mt	%	%	%
World	131	227	73	34,000	71,000	109
USA	44	23	-48	4,400	1,000	-77	10.1	1.4
Algeria		1			2,200		0.4	3.1
Australia		3			1,100		1.3	1.5
Brazil	4	5		370	1,600		2.2	2.3
China	21	95	352	210	3,200	1424	41.9	4.5
Egypt		5			2,800		2.2	3.9
Finland		1			1,000		0.4	1.4
Israel	4	3		180	57		1.3	0.1
Jordan	5	9		570	800		4.0	1.1
Morocco / W Sahara	20	36	80	21,000	50,000	138	15.9	70.4
Russia	9	13	44	1,000	600	-40	5.7	0.8
S Africa	3	2		2,500	1,400		0.9	2.0
Saudi Arabia		7			1,400		3.1	2.0
Tunisia	7	4		270	100		1.8	0.1
R of W	14	20	43	3,500	3,743	7	8.8	5.3

Mt= million tonnes

Source: FAO, World fertiliser trends and outlook to 2022, (2019)

Figure 1.1.8b: Anticipated world balance of nitrogen (N), phosphate (P₂O₅), and potassium (K₂O) for 2022, Europe

Figure 1.1.8c: Anticipated world balance of nitrogen (N), phosphate (P₂O₅), and potassium (K₂O) for 2022, Americas

World reserves have increased on average and this means that the risk of running out of phosphate rock resources is low.

Volatility in the global supply of rock phosphate is likely to be affected more by global supply chain risks such as financial crashes, geopolitical decision making, or environmental regulations than by the reserve base itself.

From the USGS estimated figures in figure 1.1.8a, there was a 73% increase in production and a 109% increase in the reserve base from 1995 to 2019. This suggests that there is no significant risk in the short to medium term supply of phosphate rock from global reserves.

The location of key reserves remains in a selection of key countries, namely Morocco, China, the US, and to some extent Russia and South Africa.

In areas with historically high phosphate use such as the UK, soil reserves are high and food production continues to increase despite decreasing use of inorganic phosphate fertilisers from phosphate rock. This is further illustrated in figure 1.1.8b, which shows the differences of phosphate use between different global regions.

More efficient use of phosphate fertiliser, increased use and availability of recycled phosphate from organic materials, such as anaerobic digestate, animal manures, and sewage sludge, will mean a higher percentage of phosphate requirements in certain countries could be replaced by organic sources.

Trends

With world reserves of phosphate rock having increased, as well as the fact that some regions have managed to increase food production while decreasing phosphate rock use, the current and future status for this indicator is positive. In addition, the UK and other countries are also working toward making better use of phosphate fertiliser, which could further extend the availability of phosphate reserves.

According to the USGS, the rated capacity of global phosphate rock mines is projected to increase to 261 million tons in 2024 from 238 million tons in 2020, including production of marketable phosphate rock in China of between 80 million and 85 million tons per year. Most of the increases in production capacity are planned for Africa and the Middle East, where major expansion projects are in progress in Algeria, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Morocco, Senegal, and Togo.

World consumption of phosphate rock is projected to increase to 49 million tons in 2024 from 47 million tons in 2020. Asia and South America are expected to be the leading regions of growth.^{[footnote 37]}

Question 13

Indicator 1.1.9 Water withdrawn for agriculture

Accepted Answer

Headline

Water is essential to food production. Agriculture accounts for around 70% of fresh water withdrawn (from rivers, reservoirs, or groundwater extraction) globally. Water withdrawals for irrigation have increased globally, most significantly in OECD and EU countries, but have declined in the Middle East and North Africa. Climate change is likely to increase the importance of irrigation relative to rainfed agriculture and increase pressures on water withdrawals.

Context and Rationale

The principal sources of water resources for agriculture are rainfall and ‘stored’ sources, mainly surface water (rivers and lakes) and groundwater (shallow and deep aquifers). Rainfed agriculture relies on precipitation water that does not run over the surface in the form of streams (and subsequently rivers and lakes) or soak down to enter groundwater reservoirs. Irrigated agriculture relies on drawing freshwater from surface water or groundwater sources in competition with other sectors and human activities.

Rainfed agriculture is facing the greatest challenges from changing weather patterns resulting from climate change. These challenges include droughts, floods, and extreme rainfall and weather events. Precipitation anomalies on grazing lands are also a threat to livestock production.

A majority of world agriculture currently relies on rainfall rather than irrigation. However, irrigated agriculture plays a crucial role in global food supply. Low-income and lower-middle income countries as well as landlocked developing countries heavily rely on water withdrawals for agriculture compared to other sectors, such as industries and municipalities. Irrigation leads to a fall in the overall volatility of agricultural output, raises cropping intensity and encourages the cultivation of high-value crops. Irrigation is an important source of global agricultural output growth. Agriculture is by far the largest user of freshwater, accounting for more than 70% of global withdrawals of water, which are continuing to increase. In the past two decades, industrial withdrawals have declined, while municipal withdrawals have increased only marginally since 2010. Agricultural withdrawals have continued to grow at a faster pace, although more slowly since 1980, and the share of agricultural withdrawals has increased slightly since 2000.

Demand for water resources does not only come from agriculture, but also from other industry sectors and a human need for water to meet drinking and sanitation needs. There is increasing concern about how these various demands will be met going forward alongside threats from climate change that could diminish water availability and increase demand in some sectors and regions. Therefore, this indicator considers one aspect of this wider issue, the amount of water withdrawn for agriculture. Water challenges, in the form of physical lack of freshwater and inadequate infrastructure or shortages through inadequate rainfall, affect different regions to greater or lesser extents.

There has been a strong trend towards the use of more water efficient crops and better water management practices. Higher water efficiency can also be gained by using nitrogen-based fertilisers.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Agricultural water withdrawal

Source: World Resources Institute (WRI); FAO Statistics

Figure 1.1.9a: Agricultural water withdrawal, by region m³/year

Figure 1.1.9b: Percentage change of irrigated land area by region

Figure 1.1.9c: Water withdrawal for use by agriculture as a percentage of total internal renewable water resources

Water extracted for agriculture has risen in all regions except the Middle East and North Africa, which has seen a small fall of 3.5% between 2007 and 2017 as seen in figure 1.1.9a. Note that each region has been plotted on different scale for clarity.

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the largest rise in water extraction since 2007 with a 50.5% rise in usage, followed by South America with 16.6% and OECD and EU countries with 4.4%.

Since 2010, the percentage of land area irrigated has remained relatively constant with small rises in the Middle East and North Africa (0.8%), South and East Asia (0.4%), South America (0.1%), and OECD and EU countries (0.08%). Sub-Saharan Africa saw a small drop of 0.003%, which is due to an increase in land area. However, in some cases these increases represent quite a large change in the amount of land irrigated. For instance, South America currently has 1.4% of agricultural land irrigated, South and East Asia 9.7%, the Middle East and North Africa 4.8%, Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6%, and OECD and EU countries 4%.

Figure 1.1.9c shows that between 2007 and 2017, the percentage of water withdrawn for agriculture has risen in all regions except the Middle East and North Africa, which fell by 1.4% to 84.7%. The Middle East and North Africa, however, remains the region with the highest proportion of water extracted for agriculture.

OECD and EU countries had the largest rise in water extracted for agriculture of 5.2%, to 47.5%. However, this is still significantly below the other regions, reflecting the proportion of industrialised economies within OECD and EU countries. South America at 2.2% and Sub-Saharan Africa at 4.3% have had small rises in the proportion of water extracted for agriculture. The Middle East and North Africa has recorded a small fall of 1.4% in the proportion of water extracted for agriculture, but this is still the highest proportion of any region at 84.7%.

Aquastat only has a representative sample of countries from South and East Asia since 2012. The complete dataset has only been collected for two years, so it’s not possible to draw any firm conclusion of trends about water extraction. However, water extraction for agriculture appears to be stable.

Overall, this data shows that agriculture is placing more stress on water resources than other sectors.

Trends

The levels of water efficiency in crops vary between regions. High-income countries in Europe and Northern America have a capital-intensive and efficient agriculture sector as well as a high rate of public expenditure on agricultural research and development. Such countries have a greater capacity to address the water efficiency and scarcity challenges. By contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where countries have lower levels of agricultural capital intensity and expenditure on research and development, farmers have difficulty in accessing irrigation equipment, modern inputs and technologies, including technologies to optimize the efficiency of water use in rainfed agriculture. Conversely, countries in Southern Asia irrigate and employ modern inputs on about half of the region’s cropland, while most irrigated areas are highly water stressed.

As outlined in the risk section of indicator 1.1.2, climate variability and change will increase the likelihood of extreme weather events, such as droughts and changes in rain patterns. This will further increase reliance on withdrawn water rather than on rainwater. More than 62 million hectares of crop and pasture land already experience both very high water stress and drought frequency, with 15 times that area suffering from either one or the other. Global temperature rises on the way to 2^o will cause a steep increase in exposure to water scarcity from reduced precipitation, particularly in Northern and Eastern Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and Southern Asia. River flow will also drop, increasing water scarcity in regions including the Mediterranean, Near East and large parts of Northern and Southern America. The scale of the impact is highly uncertain however, with a range of models producing different results. Drought frequency and severity will also increase, with particular impacts in parts of Southern America, Western and Central Europe, Central Africa, and Australia. Direct climate impacts on heavily irrigated regions could see 20 to 60 million hectares of irrigated land reverting to dependency on rainfall.^{[footnote 38]}

Question 14

Indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural labour force capacity

Accepted Answer

Headline

Productivity increases and mechanisation have meant the number of people employed as agricultural labour has decreased globally since 2010. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has highlighted how the sector’s reliance on seasonal workers for critical harvesting periods can be a potential risk to production if there are factors that reduce the availability of these workers.

Context and Rationale

The availability of agricultural workers plays an important factor in global food production and the impacts this has on global food supply. Besides permanent agricultural workers, there is also a great need for seasonal workers to meet the fluctuating seasonal labour needs across the world. The COVID-19 pandemic has particularly shown the contributions internal and international seasonal workers make towards ensuring food supply when travel restrictions hindered their ability to work within the agri-food system.

Lower-income countries tend to have a higher percentage of people employed in the agriculture sector compared to high-income countries. The economic importance of the agriculture sector, and with it the number of employees, decreases the richer a country becomes. At the same time, agricultural workers in high-income countries add more value to the gross domestic product than in lower-income countries. This likely means that thanks to technological advances, more efficient farming practices, and other factors, fewer agricultural workers are needed in high-income countries than in low-income ones.

Over the last twenty years, there has been a decline in the number of people working in the agriculture sector due to productivity increases, requiring fewer workers. Despite that, agriculture is still the second largest source of employment in the world after the service sector, with China and India accounting for almost half of the global agricultural labour force.

This indicator tracks the employment figures within the agriculture sector at the global level. The data needs to be carefully interpreted given that any changes in the global agricultural labour force could be a sign of productivity gains, meaning technological improvements have reduced the need for large numbers of workers, or of emerging issues within the sector.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Number of employees in the agriculture sector by region

Source: FAO; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs International Migration

Figure 1.2.1a: Number of total agricultural employees by region

Figure 1.2.1b: International migrant workers as a percentage of total local population by region

Figure 1.2.1c: Total population of each region, in millions

Assessment

The number of agricultural employees globally continues to decline, most likely due to increased mechanisation in Asia and the Pacific Region, which employ 572,488,000 workers. Sub-Saharan Africa, employing 209,392,000 workers. These continue to have the highest number of agricultural employees and show an increase in the number of agricultural employees of 29,757,000 workers, since 2010. The Arab States are the only other region to show an increase of 231,000 workers. In developed countries, agricultural labour constitutes a lower proportion of the workforce.

Europe (11%), North America (16%), and Oceania (21.2%) have a particularly high availability of migrant labour compared to Africa (2.03%), Asia (1.82%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8%). The proportion of migrant stock has risen faster in these regions: in Europe by 1.4%, North America by 1.15%, and Oceania by 1.9% compared to Africa at 0.32%, Asia at 0.25%, Latin America and Caribbean at 0.4%. All regions, however, are seeing a higher proportion of migrants today than in 2010.

Trends

In 2020, COVID-19 movement restrictions impacted on the availability of seasonal workers, especially in high-income countries. Many governments enacted policies to counteract such shortfalls by extending the stay of seasonal workers already present in the country, incentivising the domestic population to work in the agriculture sector, or facilitating limited entry of seasonal workers under strict health protocols.^{[footnote 39]} Despite the success of some of these policies in mitigating against the worst predicted labour shortages, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the vulnerability the agriculture sector faces regarding its reliance on seasonal workers during critical harvest periods. The data above suggests both that the global agricultural workforce is declining over time and that the reliance on migrant labour in increasing. Although both trends are very gradual at the global level, stronger trends are seen at a country-by-country and region-by-region basis.

Whether this represents an increased vulnerability in relation to the global food system will depend upon which food product is being considered and its individual reliance on labour, whether domestic or migrant.

Question 15

Indicator 1.2.2 Components of global food demand growth

Accepted Answer

Headline

Population growth will play the most significant role in food demand growth over the coming years. As outlined in indicator 1.1.1, global food production is projected to outpace global food demand. While increasing incomes in low and middle-income countries will lead to increased calorie consumption and meat consumption, other factors, such as health and environmental concerns, will be more relevant in determining consumers’ food preferences in high-income countries.

Context and Rationale

Global demand growth for food is closely linked to the issues outlined in indicator 1.1.1 regarding the capacity of global agriculture to increase food supply to meet demand. It is, therefore, essential to understand the underlying factors that will drive global food demand growth over the coming decades to predict whether food supply can meet demand. The factors that have the most influence on global food demand are population growth, increasing calorie consumption, and changing consumption patterns:

Population growth is expected to be the main driver of demand growth for most agricultural commodities.
The average dietary energy supply, measured as calories per capita per day, indicates whether people can meet their daily calorific needs. In 2019, the average global energy supply stood at 2950 calories per person, indicating that there is, theoretically, enough food produced globally to meet people’s calorie requirements.^{[footnote 40]} These calories, however, are not evenly distributed across regions, with high-income countries consuming more calories than low-income ones. The calories also do not reflect the quality of people’s diet and whether they enable people to meet their nutritional requirements.
Changing consumption patterns will also have an impact on overall demand growth. These patterns are determined by populations’ food preferences and available income to realise them.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Components of global food demand

Source: FAO

Figure 1.2.2a: Change in demand for food products in calorie consumption per capita per day by region, 1961 – 2018

Figure 1.2.2b: Change in demand for food products in calorie consumption per capita per day by region, 2010 – 2018

OECD-FAO Outlook 2020-2030 Shows demand for all food products type is rising across all regions. Expect for Fish which forecast to fall in Europe and Central Asia, Staples which forecast to fall in the Near East and North Africa and North America and Sweeteners which demand is forecast to fall in Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and Caribbean.

The OECD and EU countries have consistently had the highest calorie intake across different food products except for staples, which is led by the Middle East and North Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa and South and East Asia typically have the lowest calorie intake except for staples, South America has the lowest calorie intake of staples.

Since 1961, the amount of animal products, fats and staples consumed has slowly increased, Consumption of other products has remained reasonably stable, and the consumption of sweeteners has been quite volatile.

Since 2010, global demand has risen for all product types other than fats which have fallen slightly (0.4 kcals per capita). Regionally, the picture is slightly more complicated. OECD and EU countries have seen a rise in per capita consumption of all products except sweeteners which have fallen by 16.1 kcals/capita/day to 207.4 kcals/capita/day.

MENA per capita consumption has fallen for all products except staples that has risen 0.5 kcals kcals/capita/day to 151.3 kcals/capita/day.

Sub Saharan Africa per capita consumption has fallen for all products except other products that has risen 1.1 kcals kcals/capita/day to 11.5 kcals/capita/day.

South and East Asia per capita consumption has risen for all products except other products that has fallen 3.4 kcals kcals/capita/day to 127.3 kcals/capita/day.

South America per capita consumption has risen for all products except other products and sweeteners that have fallen 0.1 kcals kcals/capita/day to 11.5 kcals/capita/day and 26.2 kcals kcals/capita/day to 152.3 kcals/capita/day.

Trends

The FAO expects an annual growth rate of 0.9% for the global population size over the next ten years to 8.5 billion people in 2030. Population growth will be mainly concentrated in developing regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and India. This is an important figure to observe to determine how changes in food demand will impact the UK’s food supply as agricultural demand growth will mainly be driven by population growth and less so by per capita demand growth.

Global demand for agricultural commodities, including for non-food uses, is projected to grow at 1.2% per annum over the coming decade. This is well below the growth experienced over the last decade, which amounted to 2.2% per annum. This is mainly due to an expected slowdown in demand growth in China and other emerging economies, and lower global demand for biofuels.

While it is estimated that demand will rise for all agricultural commodities, a larger increase will likely be seen in high-value products such as vegetable oils, livestock products, and fish. In high-income countries, per capita availability of animal protein is expected to grow slowly over the coming decade. The increase in poultry meat availability is projected to account for over half of additional animal protein availability over the coming decade. Demand for poultry meat is projected to grow steadily as consumers see it as a healthier and more environmentally sustainable product than beef and pig meat. Poultry is also more affordable than other meat types, which will also contribute to growing poultry demand in middle and low-income countries. By contrast, beef, pig meat and sheep meat consumption levels are expected to remain stable. Weakening demand for beef in high-income countries is due to several factors, including concerns about the climate impact of cattle production, and dietary recommendations by governments, which in several countries, advise limiting weekly intakes of red meat. In the UK it is advised to limit your intake to under 70g per day.

There are some uncertainties when creating projections for consumption patterns. Consumers’ purchasing decisions are increasingly driven by factors beyond prices and taste, such as health and environmental concerns. One expression of such environmental concerns is the increase in vegetarian and vegan lifestyles in high-income countries.^{[footnote 41]}

Looking at the average dietary energy supply, the FAO has produced different predictions for high, low, and middle-income countries based on different future scenarios. Depending on the level of change towards more sustainable practices, high-income countries would reach a daily calorie consumption between 3,271 and 3,408 calories by 2030, while low and middle-income countries could achieve between 2,724 and 2,923 calories per day. Throughout all of these scenarios, animal products make up a larger number of calories in high-income countries than in low and middle-income countries. The food group providing the most calories in low and middle-income countries are cereals.^{[footnote 42]}

Question 16

Indicator 1.2.3 Share of global production internationally traded

Accepted Answer

Headline

The proportion of agricultural products traded has increased since the 2000s. A growing global trade in agricultural products increases resilience to supply shocks affecting particular geographical areas and allows for a more efficient global food supply chain. However, reliance on the global trading system increases vulnerability to events which disrupt to this system, such as trade restrictions. The COVID-19 pandemic caused some disruption to supply chains but global trade in products is expected to continue in the long term.

Context and Rationale

Global trade in agricultural and food products plays an essential role in providing food security for the UK, but also for the world. Trade allows for a more efficient global food system where products can move from regions with more suitable conditions and resources for production to countries with less ideal conditions or higher demand for food than can be met by domestic production. A functional trading system also allows to spread the risks of supply shortages or price spikes if a country can import agricultural and food products from multiple supply sources.

Thinly traded commodity markets can reflect substantial trade protectionism, an increase in bilateral land deals, but also the costs of transporting goods between countries. If some type of shock occurs in such a market, the impacts on the availability and affordability of the commodity will be greater than in a more active market.

In the last few decades, international trade in agricultural and food products has more than doubled in real terms due to technical and economic trade barriers having been lowered or removed. Developing countries are increasingly participating in global markets, and their exports make up more than one‑third of global agri‑food trade.

Increasing or stable trends in the percentage of commodities internationally traded would be desirable in order to strengthen the resilience of the global commodity markets and the UK’s food security.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Share of global production internationally traded

Source: FAO

Figure 1.2.3a: Percentage of global production internationally traded

Assessment

Since the early 2000s, growth in agricultural trade has been facilitated by a lowering of agri-food tariffs, reforms to trade-distorting producer support, and the signing of multiple trade agreements. Agricultural trade has also been supported by strong economic growth in emerging countries, particularly in China, and by growing demand for biofuels as countries seek to reduce their CO₂ emissions and their dependence on fossil fuels. This expansion in trade has contributed to a more efficient allocation of agricultural production across countries and regions.

The percentage of global commodity trade has remained relatively constant since 2010/2011. Palm oil has been the most volatile commodity, falling to 66.4% in 2019/2020 from 78.3% in 2009/2010. Soybeans remain the second highest commodity traded globally by percentage at 48.6% in 2020/2021.

Trends

Overall, trade in terms of value has been increasing over the last twenty years. High-income and upper-income countries account for the highest increase in global agri-food exports, having grown their exports from about 25% in 2001 to 36% in 2018. Lower-middle income and low-income countries export and import fewer agricultural and food products in comparison, although notable exceptions are Vietnam, Nepal, and Uganda, which have managed to slowly increase their exports over this time period.^{[footnote 43]}

Primary production, processing, trade, logistics (both domestic and international), and final demand have been affected by COVID-19 measures. Nevertheless, global food markets remained well balanced over the last year.

The FAO expects that trade will increasingly reflect diverging demand and supply developments among trading partners over the next ten years. Some regions are projected to experience large population or income-driven increases in food demand but do not necessarily have the resources for a corresponding increase in agricultural output. Moreover, socio-cultural and lifestyle-driven changes in consumption patterns are transforming the profile of demand in most regions. Agricultural trade will therefore play an increasing role in ensuring global food security and nutrition over the next decade, by connecting producers to diversified consumer demand around the world.

Divergent productivity growth, climate change impacts on production, the outdoor workforce, food safety, as well as transport being affected by extreme weather events such as storm surges, heat and flooding, and developments in crop and animal diseases may all pose a risk to food supply.

Globally, about 17% of cereal production is traded internationally, with shares for single commodities ranging from 9% for rice to 25% for wheat. The share for total cereals is projected to increase to 18% by 2030, largely due to increased trade in rice. Rice will nevertheless remain a thinly traded commodity. India, Vietnam, and Thailand will continue to lead global rice trade, but Cambodia and Myanmar are expected to play an increasingly important role in global rice exports. Russia surpassed the European Union in 2016 to become the largest wheat exporter and is expected to increase its lead throughout the next ten years, accounting for 22% of global exports by 2030. Concerning maize, the United States will remain the leading exporter, followed by Brazil, Ukraine, Argentina, and Russia. The European Union, Australia, and the Black Sea region are expected to continue to be the main exporters of other coarse grains.^{[footnote 44]}

Risk: Restrictions and barriers to trade

Global markets and trade play an important role in managing disruptions to food supply. Some countries may respond to supply disruption by reducing or banning exports to shore up domestic supplies. This can reduce the availability of global commodities and drive prices up, which may cause further shocks to markets. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the International Food Policy Research Institute tracked the number of food export restrictions imposed by countries. In 2020, a total of 19 countries imposed temporary export bans on certain agricultural goods, all of which were lifted within the same year.^{[footnote 45]} None of these restrictions had a significant impact on UK food supply.

Question 17

Indicator 1.2.4 Concentration in world agricultural commodity markets

Accepted Answer

Headline

The concentration in world agricultural commodity markets shows how diversely traded a commodity is. A strong concentration for a particular commodity in a few countries could have negative impacts on price, supply, and food security. No major changes are expected for the concentration in world agricultural commodity markets and the top exporting countries of these commodities. This stability means that there are no concerns in relation to the UK’s ability to access global food supply.

Context and Rationale

The concentration of production and market power over a commodity in a particular country or region can have harmful effects both in terms of price, supply, and overall food security. If production is heavily concentrated, overall markets are vulnerable to localised supply shocks including those from weather and climate change. They are also vulnerable to economically or politically motivated national actions.

Greater diversity in countries supplying some of the main agricultural and food commodities provides a higher level of food security. Attempts by individual countries to restrict export supplies, for whatever reason, would not result in any substantial, sustained increase in prices or actual shortages.

Data and Assessment

Indicator: Herfindahl index of exporter concentration for various commodities / Share of top 3 leading exporting countries^{[footnote 46]}

Source: USDA PSD

Figure 1.2.4a: Herfindahl indices of export concentration

Figure 1.2.4b: Table on shares of the leading supplier countries (*data from 2018)

Commodity	2010/2011		2020/2021
	Top 3 Exporters	Share of global trade	Top 3 Exporters	Share of global trade
Beef	Brazil	20.4%	Brazil	22.4%
	Australia	17.7%	Australia	13.0%
	USA	9.9%	USA	11.8%
Maize	USA	50.8%	USA	39.3%
	Argentina	17.9%	Brazil	21.1%
	Brazil	9.2%	Ukraine	13.4%
Palm oil	Malaysia	45.9%	Indonesia	56.0%
	Indonesia	44.0%	Malaysia	32.9%
	Papua New Guinea	1.5%	Guatemala	1.7%
Rice	Thailand	30.2%	India	40.7%
	Vietnam	19.9%	Vietnam	12.6%
	USA	10.0%	Thailand	11.%
Soybeans	USA	44.7%	Brazil	49.5%
	Brazil	32.7%	USA	37.4%
	Argentina	10.1%	Paraguay	1.5%
Wheat	USA	26.4%	Russia	19.1%
	EU	17.4%	EU	14.8%
	Australia	14.0%	USA	13.4%

Assessment

The overall trade picture remains stable. There has been considerable diversification in Maize supplies in recent years, as is indicated by the HI falling by 0.492 to 0.206. Maize HI has fallen 0.1 since 2010. Oilseed showed a small upward trend rising from 0.322 in 2010/2011 to 0.400 in 2020/2021. Other products have remained relatively constant. The main countries of export are remaining relatively static with two out of three remaining in the top three in 2019 compared to 2009.

Trends

The FAO expects no change in the top three exporting countries for wheat, maize, and rice over the next ten years. While normal growing conditions are expected to lead to positive production prospects for the main grain-producing regions, inter annual climate variability and extreme weather events accentuated by climate change may cause higher volatility in cereal yields, thereby affecting global supplies and prices. Wheat and maize yields are particularly volatile in some large exporting countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, and Argentina, compared to Canada, the United States, and the European Union.

Meat exports, including beef, sheep, pork, and poultry, are concentrated, and the combined share of the three largest meat exporting countries, Brazil, the European Union, and the United States. These are projected to remain stable and account for around 60% of global world meat exports over the next ten years. In Latin America, traditional exporting countries are expected to retain a high share of the global meat trade, benefiting from the depreciation of their currencies and surplus feed grain production.

Regarding exports of soybeans, Brazil has taken over the role of main exporting country with steady growth in its export capacity and is projected to account for 50% of total global exports of soybean over the next ten years.

Indonesia and Malaysia are expected to continue to account for 60% of total vegetable oil exports, mainly palm oil, during the next decade. However, the share of exports in production is projected to contract slightly in these countries as domestic demand for food, oleochemicals, and, especially, biodiesel uses is expected to grow.^{[footnote 47]}

Question 18

About the UK Food Security Report

Accepted Answer

The UK Food Security Report sets out an analysis of statistical data relating to food security, examining past, current, and predicted trends relevant to food security to present the best available understanding of food security. It fulfils a duty under Part 2, Chapter 1 (Section 19) of the Agriculture Act 2020 to prepare and lay before Parliament “a report containing an analysis on statistical data relating to food security in the United Kingdom”. The first report must be published before Christmas Recess 2021, and subsequent reports must be published at least once every three years thereafter.

It contains statistics for different time periods, but always using latest available data at the time of release. Data comes from surveys run by Defra and from a wide range of other sources including government departments, agencies and commercial organisations, in the UK and internationally.

Associated datasets from this publication are also available. Data are a mixture of National Statistics, Official Statistics and unofficial statistics. Unofficial statistics are used where there are gaps in the evidence base. Further information on National Statistics can be found on the Office for Statistics Regulation website.

Contact and feedback

Enquiries to: foodsecurityreport@defra.gov.uk

You can also contact us via Twitter: @DefraStats

We want to understand the uses that readers make of this new report. To help us ensure that future versions of this report are better for you, please answer our short questionnaire to send us feedback.

Production team: Michael Archer, Matt Bardrick, Jasmin Eng, Ros Finney, Luke Hamilton, Jenny Kemp, David Lee, Jeremy Levett, Will Norman, Maria Prokopiou, Andrew Scaife, Chris Silwood, Jonathan Smith, Beth White, Isabella Worth.

We are extremely grateful to the following for their expert contributions and guidance throughout the synthesis of this Report, helping to ensure it delivers a thorough analysis of a robust evidence base:

Professor Tim Benton, Chatham House
Dr Tom Breeze, University of Reading
Professor Bob Doherty, University of York and FixOurFood
Selvarani Elahi MBE, UK Deputy Government Chemist, LGC
Dr Pete Falloon, Met Office, Climate Service Lead - Food Farming & Natural Environment
Alan Hayes, Food Systems and Sustainability Advisor
Dr John Ingram, University of Oxford
Professor Peter Jackson, Institute for Sustainable Food, University of Sheffield
Dr Ian Noble, Mondelez International
Dr Bill Parker, Head of Technical Programmes, AHDB
Dr Maddy Power, Wellcome Trust

Continue to Theme 2: UK Food Supply Sources

Appendix

Return to Contents Page

Return to the United Kingdom Food Security 2021 home page to download the data for charts

UN, ‘World Population Prospects 2019: Data Booklet’, https://population.un.org/wpp/. ↩
UNCTAD, ‘Goal 12: Responsible consumption and production’, https://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2016/planet/goal12/index.html. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
Action against Hunger. ‘World Hunger: Key Facts and Statistics 2021’, https://www.actionagainsthunger.org/world-hunger-facts-statistics. ↩
FAO, ‘World Agriculture towards 2030/2050: The 2012 revision’, https://www.fao.org/global-perspectives-studies/resources/detail/en/c/411108/. ↩
FAO, ‘World Food and Agriculture: Statistical Yearbook 2020’, https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1316738/. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
UK Flour Millers, ‘Information Centre: Statistics’, https://www.ukflourmillers.org/statistics. ↩
International Development Research Centre, ‘Facts and Figures on Food and Biodiversity 2010’, https://www.idrc.ca/en/research-in-action/facts-figures-food-and-biodiversity. ↩
FAO, ‘Plant pests and diseases’, https://www.fao.org/emergencies/emergency-types/plant-pests-and-diseases/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘International Year of Plant Health 2020’, https://www.fao.org/plant-health-2020/about/en/. ↩
Luo, Y., D.O. TeBeest, P.S. Teng, and N.G. Fabellar, Simulation studies on risk analysis of rice blast epidemics associated with global climate change in several Asian countries, Journal of Biogeography 22 (1995), pages 673 to 678; Luo, Y., P.S. Teng, N.G. Fabellar, and D.O. TeBeest, ‘The effects of global temperature change on rice leaf blast epidemics: a simulation study in three agroecological zones’, Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 68 (1998), pages 187 to 196. ↩
FAO, ‘Scientific review of the impact of climate change on plant pests – A global challenge to prevent and mitigate plant pest risks in agriculture, forestry and ecosystems’ (2021), https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb4769en. ↩
FAO, ‘Desert Locust’, https://www.fao.org/locusts/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘Strengthening capacities and promoting collaboration to prevent wheat rust epidemics’ (2014), https://www.fao.org/food-chain-crisis/resources/news/detail/en/c/234243/. ↩
FAO, ‘NSP-FAO Wheat Rust Disease Global Programme’, https://www.fao.org/agriculture/crops/thematic-sitemap/theme/pests/wrdgp/en/. ↩
Safe Food, ‘The Impact of Plant Diseases’, https://www.safefood.net/food-safety/news/impact-plant-diseases. ↩
Our World in Data, ‘Real commodity price index, food products’, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/real-commodity-price-index-food-products?country=~OWID_WRL. ↩
FAO, ‘World Food and Agriculture: Statistical Yearbook 2020’, https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1316738/. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020’, https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/ca9229en. ↩
Defra, ‘Food Statistics in your pocket: Global and UK supply’, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/food-statistics-pocketbook/food-statistics-in-your-pocket-global-and-uk-supply. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
Our World in Data, ‘Meat and Dairy Production’, https://ourworldindata.org/meat-production. ↩
Defra, ‘Avian influenza (bird flu) in Europe, Russia and in the UK’, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/avian-influenza-bird-flu-in-europe. ↩
Environment Agency, ‘2021 river basin management plans: Invasive non-native species challenge’ (2019), https://consult.environment-agency.gov.uk/++preview++/environment-and-business/challenges-and-choices/user_uploads/inns-challenge-rbmp-2021-1.pdf. ↩
UK Climate Risk Independent Assessment, ‘Technical Report: Chapter 3: Natural Environment and Assets’, https://www.ukclimaterisk.org/independent-assessment-ccra3/technical-report/, page 160. ↩
FAO, ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2020’, https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/ca9229en. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
UK Climate Risk Independent Assessment, ‘Technical Report: Chapter 7: Natural Environment and Assets’, https://www.ukclimaterisk.org/independent-assessment-ccra3/technical-report/; FAO, ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2016’, https://www.fao.org/publications/sofia/2018/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘World Food and Agriculture: Statistical Yearbook 2020’, https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1316738/. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
IPBES, ‘Summary for policymakers of the global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services’, https://zenodo.org/record/3553579#.Ya-Mzk7P2Uk, page 12. ↩
OECD, ‘Biodiversity: Finance and the Economic and Business Case for Action’ (2019), https://www.oecd.org/env/resources/biodiversity/biodiversity-finance-and-the-economic-and-business-case-for-action.htm. ↩
UN, ‘Sustainable Development Goal 15’, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/goal-15/. ↩
The US Geological Survey (USGS) defines global reserves as Reserves, referring to the world supply, which can be profitably extracted with present technology and prices, and Base Reserves, which is the total quantity of known phosphate rock deposits, regardless of whether it can be profitably extracted at present. However, there is no accepted worldwide system for classifying phosphate rock reserves and resources, so those summarised here should not be taken as definitive. Apart from the Reserves and Base Reserves distinction, data does not differentiate reserves according to cost-effectiveness of extraction. The higher the price of phosphate, the more economical it becomes to invest in extracting less accessible reserves, https://www.usgs.gov/centres/nmic/phosphate-rock-statistics-and-information. ↩
USGS, ‘Mineral Commodity Summaries 2021’, https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2021. ↩
FAO, ‘The State of Food and Agriculture: Overcoming Water Challenges in Agriculture’ (2020), https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb1447en, pages 28, 40 and 41. ↩
IOM UN Migration, ‘COVID-19: Policies and Impact on Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ (2020), https://www.iom.int/resources/covid-19-policies-and-impact-seasonal-agricultural-workers. ↩
FAO, ‘World Food and Agriculture: Statistical Yearbook 2020’, https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/en/c/1316738/. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘The future of food and agriculture: Alternative pathways to 2050’ (2018), https://www.fao.org/global-perspectives-studies/resources/detail/en/c/1157074/. ↩
FAO, ‘The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2020’, https://www.fao.org/publications/soco/en/. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021 to 2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩
IFPRI, ‘COVID-19 Food Trade Policy Tracker’ (2020), https://www.ifpri.org/project/covid-19-food-trade-policy-tracker. ↩
The Herfindahl Index (HI) measure of market concentration is often used by competition authorities, but it also provides a measure of export market concentration. The HI is a sum of the squares each market share has, this gives larger market share a stronger influence on the results or heavier weighting. Thus, a market completely dominated by one country would give a HI of 1.0. If all top 20 suppliers had equal shares, the index would be 1/20 =0.05. This is considered a better measure than the concentration ratio (CR) of the top 3 or 5 suppliers because it accounts for the shares of all suppliers, and it is affected by the split of the market between the largest suppliers. For example, if a country had 50% of the export market and the remaining 50% of market was equally divided between 10 countries. The Herfindahl Index would account for all 11 countries. The 3 suppliers CR would be 60% and 5 suppliers CR 70% whereas the HI would be 0.3. Market concentration here is defined in terms of exporting countries rather than firms. ↩
FAO, ‘OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2021-2030’, https://www.fao.org/publications/oecd-fao-agricultural-outlook/2021-2030/en/. ↩

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Key messages

Balance of Global Food Production and Consumption

Agricultural inputs

Global commodity markets

Indicator 1.1.1 Global output per capita

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.1.2 Cereal yield growth rates by region

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Risk: Global dimensions of climate variability and change

Case Study 1.1 Plant diseases and pests

Overview

Background

Discussion

Indicator 1.1.3 Real agricultural commodity prices

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.1.4 Stock to consumption ratios

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.1.5 Global livestock and dairy production

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Risk: Impact of animal disease on meat production

Case Study 1.2 African Swine Fever

Overview

Background

Discussion

Indicator 1.1.6 Global fish stocks

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Risk: Rising temperatures and ocean acidification

Indicator 1.1.7 Global land use change

Headlines

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Risk: Land degradation and biodiversity loss

Indicator 1.1.8 Phosphate rock reserves

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.1.9 Water withdrawn for agriculture

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural labour force capacity

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.2.2 Components of global food demand growth

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Trends

Indicator 1.2.3 Share of global production internationally traded

Headline

Context and Rationale

Data and Assessment

Assessment

Trends

Risk: Restrictions and barriers to trade