Official Statistics

United Kingdom Food Security Report 2024: Theme 1: Global Food Availability

Published 11 December 2024

Part of the United Kingdom Food Security Report 2024

Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 19 of the Agriculture Act 2020

© Crown copyright 2024

ISBN 978-1-5286-5232-2

Introduction

Theme definition

Theme 1 encompasses issues related to global food supply and the sustainability of global food production, on which UK food supply depends. Food security in this theme means stable or improving trends in the ability of global food production and trading system, to meet global (including the UK’s) requirements for food now and over the long term and to provide a healthy diet. This includes sustainable practices that ensure that key resources in nature are not depleted and risks to ecosystem health are mitigated. It takes into account equity in access to food globally and whether the global food system delivers for all who need it.

Some of the key variables affecting these components of food security include agricultural practices, economic stability, geopolitical circumstances, supply chains, and the climate. These factors interact to shape the global food system and have important implications for the UK, both its food imports and domestic production, which are covered in more detail in Theme 2.

This theme assesses 5 areas of global food availability in the following order: global production considered against factors of demand (Sub-theme 1); productivity and key inputs to agriculture (land, fertiliser, water) (Sub-theme 2); reliability of the global trading system (Sub-theme 3); global access to food and nutrition (Sub-theme 4); and impacts over the longer-term of global food production on the environment and biodiversity (Sub-theme 5). This edition of the UKFSR includes new indicators looking at global food and nutrition insecurity, additional commodity groups and sustainability.

Availability is a key dimension of food security in this theme with most indicators assessing trends in the production, distribution and exchange of food at the global level (see definition of terms in Annex II). This complements the analysis of UK food availability in Theme 2 UK Food Supply Sources given the reliance of UK supply on global markets. The stability and sustainability dimensions of food security are also assessed in large parts of the theme, with consideration of existing and potential future risks embedded into the supporting evidence, to provide an overall view of food security at the global level.

Accessibility and utilisation of food are covered by measuring trends in the affordability, nutritional value and safety of food where relevant to the discussion of global food availability.

Overall findings

• Food production has continued to grow and keep up with population growth. This means there is enough food in the world in terms of volume and dietary energy supply to meet global population needs. Supply-chain disruptions from geopolitical and climate events have led to some shocks to prices and distribution networks.

  Key statistic: There have been moderate increases in global food production per capita for most food groups between 2019 and 2022: meat (+3.78%), roots and tubers (+2.02%), milk (+1.53%), fruit and vegetables (+1.29%), eggs (+0.71%), and cereals (+0.46%) (see Indicator 1.1.1 Global food production). Total food supply available for human consumption was 2,985 kilocalories per person per day in 2022, increasing by 38 calories from 2019 (see Indicator 1.1.1 Global food production).

• The global trading system remains stable and robust and is a reliable source of UK food supply despite new geopolitical stress.

  Key statistic: The percentage of key global cereals, soybeans and meats traded by volume remains broadly stable with minimal fluctuations between 2021/22 and 2024/25, with the largest changes a 2.4 percentage point (pp) decrease in pigmeat, 1.3pp decrease in maize and 1.7pp increase in the share of beef and veal production traded across this period (see Indicator 1.3.3 Global production internationally traded).

• The number of undernourished people around the world is increasing due to poverty, conflict, climate change as well as issues in food distribution, other growing uses for commodities, and caloric efficiency. This continues a recent trend running counter to a longer-term decrease from 2005 to 2017. Meanwhile obesity rates have continued their rapid increase globally since the 1990s. These trends indicate a general increase in diet-related ill health and that the global food system has failed to adapt to address the continuing challenge from global inequality.

  Key statistic: The number of people facing undernourishment has increased since 2017, from 541 million to 733 million in 2023, while rates of obesity have doubled between 1990 and 2022 reaching around 16% of the adult world population (see Indicator 1.4.1 Global food and nutrition security).

• The average rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth of agriculture has fallen. Future outlooks suggest that the world will need to reverse this trend and improve its productivity if it is to maintain current rates of production per capita over the longer term, while enabling the restoration of nature needed for productivity.

  Key statistic: While global agricultural TFP grew at an average annual rate of 1.68% from 2003 to 2012, this figure fell to 0.68% for the period between 2013 and 2022, TFP growth has fallen across all country income groups (see Indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity).

• Water and land, important agricultural inputs, are under increasing human and geopolitical competition and are being used at an unsustainable rate. The food system’s essential natural resources continue to be depleted without being recovered for future use. Global demand for both is projected to outstrip supply unless there are transformations in modes of use and demand. Agriculture plays a disproportionate role as the largest single source of land and environmental degradation, and the largest source of freshwater pollution. Climate change exacerbates these system stressors including weak productivity growth by driving volatility and system instability. It also compounds with geopolitical events meaning that they have more significant effect on the food system than their effects in isolation (as an example see case study on export restrictions).

  Key statistic: Between 2015 and 2019 the amount of land globally which was reported as being degraded increased by 4.2 pp, from 11.3% to 15.5% (see Indicator 1.5.1 Global land degradation).

Cross-theme links

The UK food system (covered in themes 2 to 5) is highly connected to the global food system and many of the strengths and challenges of the UK system are also international strengths and challenges. Stable trade and production trends internationally support stable UK supply with the UK relying on trade for around 42% of its supply and on global markets for key inputs to its domestic production of food. This means that the risks over the longer term internationally are risks to UK food security. Theme 2 shows that risks from climate change, nature loss and weak productivity growth seen globally in Theme 1 are also manifest in the UK.

While the UK is a high-income country, Theme 4 Food Security at Household Level shows that there are millions of people in the UK with inadequate access to a healthy diet and that this number is increasing.

Themes 3 Food Supply Chain Resilience and 4 show that shocks to the supply of inputs including energy and fertiliser at the global level were the most disruptive factors for UK food security in the last 3 years. They caused price volatility in input costs which fed into the period of exceptionally high food price and wider inflation between 2022 and 2023 in the UK. While the UK experienced the shock on the level of prices, some parts of the world dependent on Russia and Ukraine for cereals experienced challenges with food supply following changes to levels of production, depreciations in currencies and increases in import prices.

Sub-theme 1: Production

1.1.1 Global food production

Rationale

This indicator describes global food production, a fundamental indicator of global food availability within the global food system, within which the UK food system sits. ‘Food production’ refers to all agricultural production that can be used for food, the final end product of which may be used for a range of purposes, including human consumption, animal feed and biofuels production.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.1a: World food production by main food groups (in grams per capita per day), 1960 to 2022  

Source: FAOSTAT Crops and livestock products, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2024

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Note: Calculated using population data from the (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2024) and divided by the number of days in the year to give a daily per capita amount.

Overall, global food production per capita has continued its upward trend over the last 3 years, with moderate increases reported for most food groups between 2019 and 2022 (Figure 1.1.1b below). This means that, despite challenges such as rising geopolitical tensions, adverse weather conditions, and supply-chain disruptions, global food production has more than kept pace with population growth. However, while the rate of food production per capita continues to rise, there are an increasing number of risks such as continued population growth, decreasing total factor productivity (TFP), unequal access to water resources, and greater competition for land which mean that the future trend is uncertain.

Figure 1.1.1b: World food production by main food groups (in grams per capita per day; 2019 and 2022).

Source: FAOSTAT, 2024

Food Type	2019	2022	Percentage Difference 2019-2022
Cereals	1044.8	1049.6	0.46%
Eggs	31.7	32.0	0.71%
Meat	119.2	123.7	3.78%
Milk	314.3	319.1	1.53%
Roots and Tubers	304.9	311.1	2.02%
Fruit and Vegetables including Citrus Fruit	769.6	779.6	1.29%
Oilseeds	393.7	392.2	-0.39%
Pulses	29.9	32.9	10.13%

Note: Calculated using population data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) population projections (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), 2024) and divided by the number of days in the year to give a daily per capita amount.

Indicators 1.1.3 to 1.1.6 provide a more detailed description of production trends for individual food groups, including cereals, livestock, fruit and vegetables, and fish and seafood.

Supporting evidence

Global food production trends 

The past few decades have been characterised by substantial increases in global food production per capita. Since 1961 production per capita of all food groups has risen, except in roots and tubers, which experienced a decrease during the 1970s and 1980s due to urban populations consuming more cereals (FAO, 2024), but has remained broadly stable since. Production per capita of cereals increased by 33.5% between 1961 and 2022, spurred primarily by yield growth (see Indicator 1.1.3 Global cereals production for further information on drivers of growth in cereals production). Over the same period, production per capita of eggs, fruit and vegetables, meat and milk, increased by 135.9%, 105.8%, 93.3% and 3.4% respectively.

Global food supply available for human consumption

Figure 1.1.1c: Dietary energy supply (in calories per capita per day) by region, 1961 to 2022

Source: FAOSTAT, 2024

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Note: Dotted line signifies a change in methodology in 2010.

The increases in food production over the past decades have contributed to a substantial rise in food supply available for human consumption, which reached 2,985 kilocalories per person per day in 2022 (FAOSTAT,2024), an increase of 38 calories from 2019. Therefore, there are currently enough calories available globally to feed the current world population given that the current calories available per person exceeds the recommended average of 2500 kilocalories for men and 2000 kilocalories for women (NHS, 2023). Despite marked differences in dietary energy supply across global regions (Figure 1.1.1c), there are, in principle, sufficient calories available to meet the energy needs of populations in all individual regions.

However, reported values of energy supply available for human consumption do not take into account the effect of consumer food waste on the actual amount of food consumed and should therefore not be mistaken for estimates of the actual energy intake of the population (FBS methodology). Further detail on food waste is provided in Indicator 1.1.2 Global food loss and waste. Furthermore, sufficient food supply available for human consumption at the global or regional level does not guarantee sufficient availability at the national, household, or individual level, and does not ensure access to different population groups. Indicator 1.4.1 on Global food and nutrition insecurity provides information on food access and utilisation at the global level.

In addition, having sufficient calories available for human consumption at global and regional levels does not necessarily correspond to the availability of a healthy diet. For instance, too few wholegrains, fruit and vegetables, and legumes are consumed at the global level, while consumption of red and processed meat, starchy vegetables and free or added sugar is deemed excessive compared to NHS dietary guidelines, which would also enable adequate intake of most micronutrients (The Eatwell Guide - NHS). The leading dietary risk factors for mortality globally are diets high in sodium, low in whole grains, low in fruit, low in nuts and seeds, low in vegetables, and low in omega-3 fatty acids (Lancet, 2019). Further information on the cost of a healthy diet is covered in Indicator 1.4.1 on Global food and nutrition insecurity.

Production for purposes other than human consumption

Beyond human consumption, global food production is also used for other purposes, including industrial uses, seed and feed.

Figure 1.1.1d: Share of global production used for biofuels (selected commodities, 2000 to 2024), unit percentage

Source: Agricultural Outlook Database, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

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Among industrial uses, production of biofuels has gained prominence during the last decades (Figure 1.1.1d). Biofuels are fuels made from crops such as maize, sugar cane and vegetable oils and can be considered as a renewable source of energy that can contribute to reducing carbon emissions (DOE Office of Science, 2024). However, biofuel production can also represent a food use that competes with other uses including human consumption and can generate increased pressures to enhance agricultural land use (Searchinger and Heimlich, 2015).

From 2000 to 2023, the proportion of food production used for biofuels has increased, particularly during the first decade of the century (Figure 1.1.1d). Between 2000 and 2023, the proportion of sugarcane production used for biofuels rose from 11.6% to 23.2%, of maize from 3.4% to 15.7%, and of vegetable oils from 0.8% to 16.4% (OECD, 2024). Production has been mostly concentrated in the Americas. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2023 to 2032 indicates that around double the global average of biofuels are produced in Latin America and quadruple in North America (OECD-FAO, 2023).

There has been a steady increase in food production used for animal feed since 2010 driven by increases in the number of animals as well as intensification of production (FAOSTAT, 2024). Growth in feed use has been driven by increased global demand for meat, particularly in Southeast Asia where the increases in production have been driving demand for animal feed (OECD-FAO, 2024). Aquaculture, which currently relies largely on fishmeal and fish oil as feeds, has also been a key area of growth across all world bank country income classes (Hamadeh, Van Rompaey and Metreau ,2023) (FAO, 2023).

Forward look

The majority of growth in production is expected from middle- and low-income countries including China, India and other Asian countries (OECD-FAO, 2024). Asia is expected to make a significant contribution to food supply in the next decade, contributing to approximately 50% of global crop production, 50% of global livestock production and 75% of global fish production (including aquaculture)( OECD-FAO, 2023).

Figure 1.1.1e: Predicted average annual growth in demand for key commodity groups, 2013 to 2022 and 2023 to 2032

Source: Agricultural Outlook 2023-2032, OECD-FAO

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Although there is growing competition between food production for various uses, such as feed, food and biofuels, demand growth for these uses over the next decade is projected to slow down compared to the last 10 years (Figure 1.1.1e). This will be driven by weaker projected expansions in feed demand and biofuels and direct per capita consumption of most cereals reaching saturation levels in middle- and high-income countries (OECD-FAO, 2024).

1.1.2 Global food loss and waste

Rationale

Food loss and waste reduces the availability of food and represents a significant environmental loss within the food system. ‘Food loss’ refers to the decrease in edible food mass at the production, post-harvest and processing stages of the food chain as defined in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12.3. ‘Food waste’ refers to the discarding of foods at the retail, food service provider and consumer levels (United Nations Environment Programme, 2024).

Using estimates from the United Nations Environment Programme Food Waste Index, this indicator measures how much food is lost and wasted at a global and regional level.

The relationship between food loss and waste and food security is not straightforward. Food loss and waste reduction in high-income countries is unlikely to have a significant effect on global food security. In low-income countries, a reduction of on-farm losses is likely to improve the food security status of subsistence and semi-subsistence farmers as they consume all or a significant part of their own production. Meanwhile, a reduction in losses of food sold commercially improves the availability of food beyond farming households (FAO, 2019). Studies have shown that while reducing food loss and waste can improve food security, other measures such as increased agricultural research and development spending or enhanced irrigation efficiency may prove more cost-effective (FAO, 2019).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.2a: UN SDG 12.3.1a Food Loss Percentage – post-harvest on farm and at the transport, storage and processing stages, 2021

Source: FAOSTAT, 2021

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Average global food loss in 2021 stood at 13.2% of food lost after harvest on farm and at the transport, storage and processing stages. This is similar to previous estimates of 13.3% and 13% in 2020 and 2016 respectively. However, given the difficulties in collecting and reporting of food loss data, care should be taken in interpreting such minimal changes. It is not currently possible to tell if there is a clear or significant trend in the data. The lowest rate of food loss was seen in Eastern Europe at 5.0%, followed by Micronesia at 7.3%, and the highest was in Sub-Saharan Africa at 20.0%, followed by Northern Africa at 16.1%.

Figure 1.1.2b: Household Food Waste (million tonnes) 2022

Source: Food Waste Index 2024, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

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Note: Regions may not include all countries and confidence in the data varies between countries

In 2022, global food waste was estimated to be 132 kg per capita per year or 1.05 billion tonnes, equivalent to 19% of global food supply (UNEP, 2024). Household food waste constitutes the largest component at 79 kg/capita per year, followed by food service at 36 kg/capita per year and retail at 17kg/capita per year. Household food waste is higher in Southern (100 kg/ per capita per year) and Eastern Asia (70 kg/per capita per year) than it is in North America (76 kg/per capita per year) and Europe (53-80 kg/capita per year). As Southern and Eastern Asia also have larger populations, total household food waste is also higher in these regions. On average, levels of household food waste per capita (the total of edible and inedible parts) are estimated to be similar for high-income, upper-middle income and lower-middle income countries, though there is greater variation at lower income levels (UNEP, 2024).

Care is needed in interpreting these figures, given the limited data available on food loss and waste and reliance on estimates. For more information on the methodology for the Global Food Loss Index and Food Waste Index, see the FAO and UNEP respectively. While there have been changes to the reported level of global food waste between 2019 and 2022, a lack of systematic monitoring means data is not of a quality necessary to understand if food loss and waste is increasing or decreasing. Only high-confidence estimates are likely to be suitable for tracking national levels of food waste over time, whereas medium-confidence estimates may be used to identify large changes in food waste, but are not geographically representative (UNEP, 2024). Low and very low confidence estimates may be useful to inform food waste strategies. A lack of domestic monitoring by countries also means it is difficult to understand where exactly in the food system the loss and waste is occurring and how this varies depending on the region, product and supply chain. Nevertheless, reported changes may reflect greater data coverage and a more accurate representation of current food waste levels.

What has been included in this indicator represents the best available current estimates, although large gaps in the data still exist.

Supporting evidence

Figure 1.1.2c: Shares of food loss and waste by commodity, 2021 to 2023

Source: Agricultural Outlook 2024-2033, OECD-FAO

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While in terms of volume most food losses and waste occurs in fruit and vegetables, in terms of calories the greatest food losses and waste comes from cereals (Figure 1.1.2c). The loss and waste of fruit and vegetables in some parts of the world may lead to an insufficient supply of fruit and vegetables being available to ensure a healthy diet can be maintained. Research indicates that following similar historic socioeconomic and waste trends, by 2050 the number of people living in countries with insufficient supply of fruits and vegetables will be 1.5 billion more compared with a zero-waste scenario.

Causes of food loss and food waste

Food loss and waste occurs for a variety of reasons which are context dependent. Supply chain issues, conflicting agendas between smallholder farmers and other stakeholders, power-holding, and climate change all affect food loss and management practices at the global level (World Resources Institute (WRI), 2019). Food loss and waste patterns vary across developing and developed countries. In developing countries, waste occurs mainly in the post-harvest and processing stage. This is caused by factors such as poor practices, technical and technological limitations, labour and financial restrictions and a lack of proper infrastructure for transportation and storage (Ishangulyyev, Kim, Lee, 2019). In comparison, the retail and consumption stages are typical loss points in high-income countries. This is important to understand when deciding on actions to reduce food loss and waste, as the optimal entry point for intervention depends on the context (The State of Food and Agriculture 2019).

Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

Estimates of GHG emissions from food loss and waste vary vastly from 3.3 Gigatons of CO₂-equivalent to 9.3 Gigatons of CO₂-eqivalent per year depending on what factors are included. The type of food wasted has a significant effect on the amount of GHG emitted with meat and dairy being the most significant. Food loss and waste is thought to account for up to half of all GHG emissions from the food system. According to the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024-2032, halving global food loss and waste by 2030 has the potential to reduce global agricultural GHG emissions by 4% and the number of undernourished people by 153 million. This is because natural resources will be used more efficiently and GHG emissions per unit of food consumed will be reduced. However, this outcome is uncertain, and the extent to which resource use and GHGs are reduced will depend on how prices change as a result of the reduction in food loss and waste and how suppliers and consumers react to those price changes (FAO, 2019).

Actions being taken to reduce food loss and waste

There is increasing evidence of initiatives to reduce food loss and waste, such as those detailed in Champions 12.3. For instance, companies are developing active programmes to reduce food loss and waste in both their operations and increasingly in their supply chains. By the end of 2021, 29 of the world’s 50 largest food companies (by revenue) had active programs targeting the reduction of food loss and waste. Additionally, in 2023 Ingka Group (IKEA) became the first company to achieve over 50% reduction in food loss and waste across all its operations (Lipinski, 2022).

In developing countries, most losses occur post-harvest and in the processing stage. Actions aimed at reducing food losses are therefore likely to be a more effective means of improving food security than actions to reduce food waste. Similarly, in developed countries, overall food insecurity is associated with poverty, so the recovery and redistribution of food may therefore help to alleviate food insecurity. Theme 2 Indicator 2.2.2 Food waste explores the redistribution of food in the UK.

Trade-off

The effects of efforts to reduce food loss and waste can be complex. For instance, in 2013 Northern Africa and the Near East engaged in efforts to reduce the amount of food lost by primary procedures. This increased efficiency in production led to a fall in domestic prices, enabling households to buy more food. However, increased efficiency meant that less labour was needed to produce the same output, which caused a fall in employment and nominal wages. The overall net effect was improved household food security and a decrease in rural poverty. The effect of efforts to reduce food loss and waste on farmers, processors, distributors, retailers and consumers will depend on how the effects of prices are transferred throughout the food chain. Some may do well while others may lose (FAO, 2019).

1.1.3 Global cereals production

Rationale

Crops serve as the main food source for humans and animals, and are essential for a healthy balanced diet, providing a broad range of nutrients including carbohydrates, protein and fibre and a range of vitamins and minerals (FAO, 1997). Their consistent availability is a precondition for accessibility and affordability, especially in areas where other food sources might be scarce. Figure 1.1.3a shows the evolution of the production of staple cereals such as rice, wheat, and maize, in million tonnes. Directly consumed as carbohydrates, cereals provide the largest part of the human caloric intake, while as animal feed they underpin the global supply of animal products. In developing countries, maize, rice, and wheat provide 43% of total calories and 36% of total protein (FAO, 2024).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.3a: Total cereal production by region, 1970 to 2022 (Million Tonnes)

Source: FAO

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Note: ‘Cereals, primary’ is defined as class 011 in the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) Central Product Classification and includes wheat, maize, rice, sorghum, barley, rye, oats, millet, and other miscellaneous grains.

Despite considerable external shocks during the recent past, including geopolitical tensions, adverse weather conditions, and supply-chain disruptions, global cereal production, driven by growth in yields, continues to grow at a stable rate. In 2020, cereal production reached just over 3 billion tonnes, with wheat, maize and rice being the primary contributors. The trend continued upwards in 2022, with production surpassing 3.06 billion tonnes (FAO, 2024). This marks an increase of approximately 56 million tonnes or 2% over the 3-year period, with maize, rice, and wheat remaining the most prominent grains. These production figures are likely to differ from other reputable sources such as the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), the International Grains Council (IGC) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) as a result of methodological differences and variation in cereal aggregations.

While global cereal production remains stable, disruptions to trade flows from key exporters, such as India and Ukraine, led to an increase in volatility in global markets. While macroeconomic factors, such as high inflation and a strong dollar, led to variable localised effects over the last 3 years. This has left certain countries with a considerable increase in their import bills for staples.

Supporting evidence

Selection of commodities

These commodities have been selected due to their crucial role in diets and contributing to international food security. Cereals, two thirds of which are made up of rice, wheat, and maize (IAEA,2012), represent approximately 45% of global calorie consumption (OECD-FAO, 2024). Over the last decade, demand for cereals has grown with populations in low- and lower-middle-income countries. Going forward, increased demand for wheat and rice is expected from growing Asian populations (OECD-FAO, 2024). Maize is also considered a staple food in Mexico, Central America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 60% of global maize production is for inputs into animal feed, which is important for food security (OECD-FAO, 2024).

Regional variation

Global cereal production is concentrated in a few important regions reflecting climatic conditions and agricultural investments. The United States of America (USA), China, and India remain dominant players, collectively contributing to 30.0%, 17.0% and 25.3% of the world’s output of maize, wheat, and rice respectively (FAO, 2024). Other notable contributors include the European Union (EU) and Brazil, which have expanded their coarse grain and maize outputs. Over the last 3 years, Asia’s share in global wheat production declined slightly by 1.6% to 42.4% (FAO, 2024) and the share increased for Europe and Oceania which saw an expansion from 33.7% to 35% and 2% to 4.5% respectively.

Looking across a longer time span shows that there have been shifts in global production patterns. Since the mid-1990s, both the per annum growth rate and the aggregate production of cereals have been at a similar level in Europe and North America with the two regions accounting for 16% to 22% of global output. However, there has been a reversal in this trend over the last decade and the annual growth rate of production has been higher in Europe than in North America. This has been driven by a decline in wheat production in the USA and an expansion in Russia.

Notable shifts in the cereal markets include the emergence of China as a major wheat producer during the 1980s, subsequently surpassing Europe, and the increasing importance of South America as a soybean and maize producer. Agricultural reforms in Brazil during the early 2000s led to a rapid expansion of soybean and maize production.

These shifts in the importance of countries in global cereal markets have implications for considering the effects of both short-term factors, such as harvest failures, and long-term factors, such as climate change, on global markets and food security. More information on the geopolitical implications of the shifts in the importance of major cereal exporters is covered in Indicator 1.3.3 Global production internationally traded.

Impact on livestock production

The availability of cereals also has an impact on livestock production as maize and wheat are widely used as feed to rear livestock (AMIS). A greater availability of cereal stocks allows for a steadier supply of cereals, which ensures greater stability in cereal and livestock markets due to greater certainty in pricing, as well as input costs for pastoral farming. Further information on changes to global livestock production is covered in Indicator 1.1.4 Production of global livestock products.

Key drivers of production

Yield growth rates and volatility are important indicators for evaluating global food supply as they represent how much food is being produced on the same amount of land. Historically, the increase in cereal production has been driven by yield growth rather than expansion in the area used for planting crops. Increasing productivity over time can be attributed to more efficient input use, seed varieties and more advanced agricultural techniques. While overall food production is projected to increase, as outlined in Indicator 1.1.1 Global food production and Indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity, per annum growth rates in cereal yields are slowing (1.8% and 1.3% in the 1970s and 2010s respectively) while cropland expansion has accelerated since the early 2000s (as shown in Indicator 1.2.2 Global land use change).

Figure 1.1.3b: Cereal yields by region, 1970 to 2022

Source: FAO, 2024

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Between 2020 and 2022, cereal yields increased by approximately 2.0% from 4.1 to 4.2 tonnes per hectare. However, yields vary significantly by region, with high-income countries generally experiencing higher yields than low-income ones due to differences in technology adoption and infrastructure (Figure 1.1.3b). Despite productivity improvements expected in the latter group, a considerable productivity gap is projected to persist over the next decade which is challenging for farm incomes and domestic food security and may increase some countries’ dependence on imports (OECD-FAO, 2024).

Crop yield volatility

The degree of crop yield volatility is subject to factors such as extreme weather events, climate change impacts and planting decisions; and varies considerably by region (Ray et al., 2015). Over the past decade, crop yields have not been particularly volatile, especially when compared to previous decades. The magnitude of wheat, maize and rice yield volatility (standard deviation of the log first difference) has diminished over time.

Price volatility does not seem to directly affect crop yield volatility, which has not been significantly affected by periods of crisis, except during the 1970s’ food crisis. Over the coming decades, crop yields may become more volatile as producers face the effects of the increased likelihood of extreme weather events.

Global cereal prices

Despite challenges, such as disruptions to shipping, there has been a considerable year-on-year decline in most grain prices and cereal markets exhibited less volatility over the last year during the 2023 to 2024 season. While wheat and maize prices continued their downward trend from the record levels reached in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 2023 prices reached their lowest levels since 2021 driven by ample supplies and strong competition among exporters. In contrast, rice markets were dominated by uncertainty on the impact of El Niño on production and export restrictions by India leading to international rice prices reaching their highest level in 15 years (in nominal terms) in 2023. Indicator 1.1.10 Global real prices covers in further detail the causes of elevated cereal prices.

Emissions and waste from cereal production

Of the 34% of global land area used by agriculture, one third is under crop cultivation (OECD-FAO, 2024). Historically, the principal indirect GHG emission’s source has been land conversion from natural ecosystems to agriculture. However, historically the increase in crop production has been dominated by yield growth and productivity increases on existing land rather than an expansion in the area used for crop cultivation, though in the last couple of decades the relative contribution of yield growth has been lower than in the second half of the 20th century (government analysis of USDA PSD data). With yields projected to continue to be more important than land use expansion, the contribution of the growth in crop production to the projected increase in direct GHG emissions is expected to be limited (OECD-FAO, 2024). Among cereals, rice production is the main source of direct GHG emissions as irrigated paddy fields emit considerable quantities of methane.

Cereals not only represent a large proportion of global consumption but they account for over 50% of calories lost and wasted which are estimated to be approximately 5% of current global production (OECD-FAO, 2024). Reducing the calories lost and wasted can contribute to both reducing GHG emissions and the number of people suffering from undernourishment (OECD-FAO, 2024). Further information on global rates of food loss and waste is covered in Indicator 1.1.2 Global food loss and waste.

Forward look

Global cereal production is projected to rise from 2.9 to 3.2 billion tonnes by 2033, mainly due to increases in maize and wheat production driven by Asian countries (OECD-FAO, 2024. India is set to remain the leading rice producer and Africa and South America are expected to contribute more to cereal production growth than in the previous decade.

Going forward, this increase in the global production of cereals over the medium term is expected to follow the trend of growth driven by improvements in technology and cultivation practices led by middle-income countries in particular (OECD-FAO, 2024. With high-income countries approaching the production frontier, regional disparities are projected to remain important, in addition to growth driven by low-, and middle-income countries in Asia. Global growth in yields are projected to increase by 8% for wheat, 9% for maize, and 10% for rice by 2033 (OECD-FAO, 2024.

These medium-term projections, which give a broadly favourable picture for the global production of staples, assume normal climatic conditions. However, the impacts of climate change, such as the increasing frequency of extreme weather events, could have an effect on yields, output, and prices especially in light of the relatively high market concentration for exports.

The effects of climate change on yields are projected to strengthen over time due to the increasing variability of temperatures and rainfall, and frequency and severity of extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods. For instance, between 1971 and 1980 and between 2011 and 2020, on average, the number of droughts and severe storms has doubled and tripled, respectively (OECD, 2023). Climate change will likely have a differential regional impact with some areas benefitting from longer growing periods, while others face increasingly unsuitable growing conditions.

Furthermore, as evidenced in recent years, trade disruptions due to geopolitical tensions, domestic decisions about controlling inflation, and wider macroeconomic factors can have a significant effect on future cereal markets. Disruptions in transport and the importance of choke points, as apparent from recent events, can also affect the shorter-term trajectory of cereal output (see case study on the role of maritime trade chokepoints in global food security for more information).

Climate impacts

Figure 1.1.3c: Projected relative change in crop yield (%) for 2041 to 2070 compared to 1983 to 2013 reference period

Evidence from the Global Gridded Crop Model Intercomparison project (set of simulations from multiple crop and climate model combinations) show different projected trends in cereal yields across regions over the next decades (Figure 1.1.3c). These results are based on assumptions including: land-use, fertilizer application, growing seasons, crop cultivars, NO₃ and NH₄ deposition rates are kept constant (based on 2015), no pest and disease damage, physical cropland extent based on the MIRCA2000 (Monthly Irrigated and Rainfed Crop Areas around the year 2000) reference dataset, and no changes in management/adaptation. More research is needed to better understand potential consequences of following different adaptation strategies such as changing where crops are grown in order to mitigate the impacts of a changing climate.

Projections of yield responses to modelled climate scenarios reveal a mixed picture. Projected changes are dependent on crop, scenario and the climate and crop models used, as well as exhibiting spatial variation. Global mean yield projections between 1983 to 2013 and between 2041to 2070 indicate decreases for maize and increases for wheat and rice.

Projections show widespread maize yield decreases between 1983 and 2013 and between 2041 and 2070 (Jägermeyr and others, 2021), with the majority of models projecting decreases in global mean yield by approximately 3% under the SSP1-2.6 scenario and 10% under the SSP5-8.5 scenario by mid-century. Large reductions are projected in North America, Asia and West Africa. Projections for European maize yields are mixed with models typically indicating reductions in southern Europe and increases in northern Europe. Reductions in maize yield are driven in many cases by areas already being close to optimum temperature ranges for the crop.

There is good model agreement for increases in global mean wheat yield by the 2050s for both SSP126 and SSP585 scenarios. However, there are strong spatial patterns in the projected direction of change. Higher wheat yields are projected for Oceania, the Middle East, China and many of the northern hemisphere temperate regions, whereas reductions are projected for spring wheat growing areas in the southern USA and Mexico, parts of southern Asia and South America (Figure 1.1.3c). The projected increase in wheat yield in the outlined regions is driven by increases in temperature and CO₂, whereas areas with projected reductions in yield are regions where temperatures are already nearly optimum.

Based on the model median, global mean rice yield is projected to increase by approximately 5% under the SSP126 scenario and 7% under the SSP585 scenario by mid-century. Major declines in rice yields are projected in Central Asia, with increases projected in South Asia, northeastern China, West Africa and South America. It is important to note that there is a broad range in projections across the set of crop models.

There is large spread in model projections of global mean soybean yields by the 2050s for SSP126 and SSP585 scenarios, with more than 75% of the models projecting increases. Model projections for soybean yields predominantly show increases at higher latitudes (Jägermeyr and others, 2021); China, Eurasia, some areas of South America and southern Africa. Reductions are projected for major producing regions including the USA, parts of Brazil and Southeast Asia.

There are indications that climate change may result in substantial changes to yield variability (Liu and others, 2021). The projected changes discussed in this section are for long-term average yields, and do not consider year-to-year yield variability. More research is needed to quantify the relative influence of changes in year-to-year variability compared to the effect of the long-term trends. Managing climate-driven yield variability is likely to be a significant challenge of climate change for food prices and security. Aspects of the global food system, including food price fluctuations, are influenced by yield variability, which may arise, in part, due to climate extremes. Larger impacts are expected when yields in major production regions are affected. Several significant and prolonged shifts in food prices have been linked to food production extremes, including extreme weather impacts (Malesios and others, 2020), such as Russian wheat yield losses in 2010 (associated with drought) were a significant factor in the imposition of an export ban and rapid rise in global wheat prices (Hunt and others, 2021).

1.1.4 Production of global livestock products

Rationale

This indicator measures the numbers of animals slaughtered for meat in million tonnes to monitor trends in this important food group. Meat, eggs and milk are an important source of macronutrients, such as protein, fats and carbohydrates, and micronutrients, such as iron, zinc and vitamin A, for a large part of the world population. They together provide 33.6% of total protein and 13.4% of total calories (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.4a: Global meat production, tonnes, 1961 to 2022

Source: FAO FAOSTAT Crops and livestock products

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In 2022, over 341 million tonnes of meat was produced, an increase of 6.9% or 22 million tonnes higher than 2019. This was driven by a rebound in pigmeat production, which saw negligible growth over the last decade (2013 to 2022), following the recovery from African Swine Fever in Asia. Over the past decade, however, poultry meat saw the greatest growth at 26.4%, equivalent to over 29 million tonnes, and a share of 64.3% of the total meat production growth. The production of poultry meat surpassed pigmeat in 2016 globally to become the most produced source of meat; it is followed by pigmeat, beef and veal.

While global livestock production has been stable and is projected to grow by 12% over the next decade, this is almost half the rate of the previous decade. This is expected to originate mainly in middle-income countries and be largely made up of poultry meat, driven by accelerating demand for poultry globally, particularly in Asia, but also in the USA and Brazil. The environmental effects of expanding livestock production remain a risk in a context of feeding a growing population and maintaining global food security.

Supporting evidence

Trends in global meat production

Figure 1.1.4b: Global regional meat production, tonnes, 1961 to 2022

Source: FAO FAOSTAT Crops and livestock products

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Asia remains the largest region for the production of meat, with a growth rate of 11.9% between 2019 and 2022 reaching 155.2 million tonnes in 2022 (Figure 1.1.4b) (FAOSTAT, 2024). Over the same period, production in Africa rose by 7.9% to 22.7 million tonnes, and in South America it increased by 5.8% to 48 million tonnes. Europe and North America recorded slight falls of 0.4% to 64.2 million tonnes and 0.9% to 52.7 million tonnes respectively. Australia and New Zealand recorded a larger fall of 7.2% to 5.9 million tonnes.

China remains the biggest single market for meat, and the recovery of its pigmeat production, following a significant outbreak of African Swine Fever between 2018 and 2021 (OECD-FAO, 2024), is one of two major contributors to this wider global growth (OECD-FAO, 2024). The other is India’s increased dairy production.

The price of cereals greatly affects the cost of livestock production, particularly related to soy, which is mainly used as animal feed. This is covered in further detail in Indicator 1.1.3 Global cereals production. Although recent rises in feed costs have abated, the costs of other inputs such as labour continue to be compounded due to an increase in regulation in many areas of the world leading to higher production costs (OECD-FAO, 2024).

Impacts associated with global meat production

Meat production has a range of impacts including land use change, land degradation and elevated GHG emissions compared to non-meat alternatives, with implications for the sustainability of global food security.

Meat production drives land use change in two ways: an increased need for pastureland for extensive production and an increase in cropland to grow feed ingredients such as soybeans for more intensive production. Land use change is discussed in more detail in Indicator 1.2.2 Global land use change.

Livestock grazing is also a principal source of land degradation, and is especially problematic in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 2021). Livestock production is projected to increase by 26.5% by net value over the next decade in Sub Saharan Africa, with negative possible implications for further degradation of pastures in the region (OECD-FAO, 2024). Land degradation is covered further in Indicator 1.5.1 Global land degradation.

Livestock also contributes to a high proportion of global GHGs: in 2021, livestock agrifood systems made up around 8% of all anthropogenic GHG emissions and about 54% of total emissions from the farm gate (FAO, 2021). Contribution to GHG emissions vary by livestock type. Ruminants such as cattle and sheep are associated with higher levels because they release higher rates of methane emissions. Beef (28.3 kg CO₂-eq/kg) and lamb (24.5 kg CO₂-eq/kg) produce much higher GHGs than pork (1.7 kg CO₂-eq/kg) and chicken (0.54 kg CO₂-eq/kg) (FAOSTAT, 2024).

These effects are worth considering in tandem with the other outcomes linked to meat production. The calorific efficiency of various meats varies significantly: milk (24%) and eggs (19%) are significantly more efficient than meat (Poultry 13%, Pork 8.6%, Lamb 4.4% and Beef 1.6%) in terms of converting input calories from feed into output (food) calories (Alexander and others, 2016).

Other livestock products

Global milk production remains stable and overall shows an increase, most notably in Asia. Global milk production grew by 4.3% between 2019 and 2022 and by 50.9% between 2003 and 2022 to 930 million tonnes. The yield of 1.1 tonnes per animal has also risen, by 3.9% between 2019 and 2022 and by 17.3% between 2003 and 2022 (FAOSTAT, 2024). Milk production remains much higher in Asia than it does in the rest of the world, and this is predicted to continue, driven mostly by India and Pakistan (with almost all of the product consumed domestically). Milk production in Asia overtook milk production in Europe in 2005. GHG emissions for dairy products are generally lower than for meat in the range of 1.29 kg CO₂-eq/kg for whole milk and 9.25 kg CO₂-eq/kg for butter (Clune, Crossin and Verghese, 2017). Estimates from FAOSTAT suggest a lower amount for raw cows’ milk (0.97 kg CO₂-eq/kg).

Global egg production grew by 3.5% between 2019 and 2022 and by 58.7% between 2003 and 2022. Asia has the highest production of eggs of any region globally at 60.3 million tonnes and overtook Europe in 1985. Global yield rates have also grown by 4.6% between 2019 and 2022 and by 5.8% between 2003 and 2022 (FAOSTAT, 2024). The sources of eggs for the UK market are discussed in Theme 2 Indicator 2.1.3. GHGs associated with egg production are much lower than for livestock in the range of 0.6 kg CO₂-eq/kg (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Forward look

Global livestock production is projected to grow by 12% over the next decade, almost half the rate of the previous decade. Increased global meat production is expected to originate mainly in middle-income countries. This will be supported by global herd and flock expansion and improved per-animal performance through higher feed intensity, and continuous improvement in animal breeding, management, and technology (OECD-FAO, 2024).

Poultry meat is expected to remain the fastest growing meat in the livestock sector and is expected to account for half of the growth in meat production in the next decade. This is being driven by accelerating demand for poultry globally, particularly in Asia, but also in the USA and Brazil. Asia, especially India, will continue to contribute to most of this growth in production, due to better breeding and increased feed intensity. High rates of growth are also forecasted in Africa and the Near East (OECD-FAO, 2024 within middle income countries, due to the relative affordability of poultry compared to other livestock).

Global milk production is projected to grow at 1.6% per annum to reach 1,085 million tonnes in 2033 supported by increased yields per animal. OECD -FAO, 2024).More than half of the growth in production is anticipated to come from India and Pakistan which will jointly account for over 30% of global production in 2033. Projections on global egg production are not covered by the OECD-FAO Outlook.

Despite growth in the meat sector resulting in higher GHG emissions for the sector as a whole, improved breeding and advances in productivity, as well as the increasing dominance of poultry in the meat complex, are expected to reduce the amount of GHG emissions per kilogram of meat produced. The OECD-FAO projects an increase of approximately 2 billion cattle, 1 billion pigs, 32 billion poultry, and 3 billion sheep which, in turn, is expected to lead to a 6% rise in the meat industry’s GHGs. However, lower overall growth in emissions (+6% by 2033) is expected when compared to the expansion in growth in production (+12% by 2033).

At the same time extreme heat stress is projected to become more pervasive with negative impacts for livestock production. Globally, the number of extreme heat stress days per year for cattle, sheep, goats, poultry and pigs is projected to double or more by the 2050s under SSP1-2.6 compared to 2000 (Thornton and others, 2021). Under SSP5-8.5, the proportion of livestock animals affected and the number of extreme heat stress days per year is projected to approximately treble from 2000 levels by the 2050s (Thornton and others, 2021). The largest impacts are expected at lower latitudes, particularly across central Africa, South Asia and America, and could challenge the viability of outdoor livestock keeping. Significant adaptions are likely to be required in some locations, which would be both cost and energy extensive, and make livestock farming unviable.

1.1.5 Global fruits and vegetable production

Rationale

This statistic shows the production of fruits and vegetables in million tonnes to allow tracking of this important food group. Fruits and vegetables play an important role in maintaining a nutritious diet by providing high levels of vitamins, minerals, and fibre (NHS, 2022). They together provide 8.3% of total protein and 7.5% of total calories across the world (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.5a: World fruit and vegetable production, tonnes, 1961 to 2022

Source: FAO FAOSTAT Crops and livestock products

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Global fruit and vegetable production has increased steadily in the last sixty years, being around five to six times its 1960s level by 2020. Over the last decade from 2013 to 2022 the average annual growth rate for vegetables was 1.6% per annum compared to 1.9% per annum for fruits (excluding citrus). Between 2019 and 2022, production increased by 3.3% for vegetables, and 5% for non-citrus fruits.

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends eating at least 400g of fruit and vegetables a day to lower the risk of non-communicable diseases (such as heart disease, stroke and some types of cancer) and ensure an adequate daily intake of dietary fibre (WHO, 2020). The current global average for fruit and vegetable supply for human consumption amounts to 650 g/per day per capita. However, this figure is much lower in South Asia (144 g/per day per capita) and Sub-Saharan Africa (77-143 g/per day per capita) (FAOSTAT, 2024). While there are enough fruits and vegetables produced globally to meet recommended guidance, its availability is unevenly distributed.

Supporting evidence

The shorter shelf life of fruits and vegetables means the supply chain tends to be more localised and dynamic, although this can be extended by canning, drying and freezing. This means that fruits and vegetables are not globally traded to the same extent as other commodities. The effect of global fruit and vegetable production on UK food security is discussed in Indicator 2.1.4 in Theme 2, which tracks the production of fruits and vegetables in countries from which the UK imports its food.

Accessibility to fruits and vegetables varies around the world varies. The 2023 assessment of progress towards health and sustainable development goals (SDGs) by the Food Systems Countdown Initiative found inequalities across countries, with low- and middle-income countries finding the availability and affordability of fruits and vegetables a challenge, compared to high income countries.

Forward look

On the supply side, challenges with the availability of sufficient fruits and vegetables are expected to ease with economic growth but are unlikely to be eliminated entirely (Mason-D’Croz and others, 2019). The amount of supply will also be affected by rates of food loss and waste, which is covered in further detail in Indicator 1.1.2 Global food loss and waste.

Climate change may present a challenge to the continued production of certain fruits and vegetables in regions where they have been traditionally grown. The effect of climate change on regions of the world where the UK predominately sources its fruits and vegetables is covered in Theme 2 Indicator 2.1.4. Analysis on the impact of climate change and plant disease on bananas and international trade is covered in Indicator 1.5.2 Global One Health.

On the consumer side, there is expected to be an increase in the demand for fruits and vegetables with the increasing adult population in developing countries.

1.1.6 Global seafood production

Rationale

Fish and seafood, especially oily fish, play an important role in the diet of many people across the world. It is a major source of protein and of nutrients and vitamins that are important for overall health, such as vitamin A, iron, and omega-3 fatty acids. NHS dietary guidelines suggest aiming for at least two portions (each around 140g) of fish every week, one of which should be oily, such as salmon, sardines or mackerel. Fish and seafood provide 6.1% of total protein and 1.2% of total calories for human consumption across the world (FAOSTAT, 2024).

This statistic (Figure 1.1.6a) shows the raw numbers for production of capture fisheries and aquaculture in million tonnes to monitor trends in this important food group. ‘Biologically sustainable levels’ refers to whether fish stocks are at a level where there are enough fish to maintain the current stock with the present level of fishing.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.1.6a: World capture fisheries and aquaculture production, tonnes, 1950 to 2022

Source: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022 (fao.org)

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In 2022, 185.4 million tonnes of fish were produced, an increase of 4.5% or 8.0 million tonnes since 2019. This increase has been largely driven by increased aquaculture production which increased by 10.9% or 9.3 million tonnes between 2019 and 2022, as opposed to fish landings which marginally decreased by 1.4% or 1.3 million tonnes. These short-term trends mirror longer-term trends; since the early 1990s, fish capture has stagnated while aquaculture production has risen substantially, and in 2023 aquaculture production overtook fish capture for the first time (FishSTAT, 2024).

The percentage of marine fishery stocks within biologically sustainable levels continues a downward trend, having decreased to 62.3% in 2021, 2.3% lower than in 2019 (FAO, 2024). This fraction was 90% in 1974.

Supporting evidence

It is estimated that 19% of protein and 10% of calories in feed inputs to aquaculture species are part of human food supply, with significant variation between species (Fry and others, 2018). Fish is a more important part of the diet in some regions of the world. In Micronesia, for example, fish accounts for 4.2% of the food supply in calories and 21.6% of the protein supply in grams as opposed to 0.2% and 0.3% respectively in Central Asia. It is also an important source of protein in Southeast Asia (15.1%) and Polynesia (12.0%) (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Sustainability

Figure 1.1.6b: Proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels globally, 1974 to 2021

Source: FAO FAOSTAT SDG Indicators 14.4.1

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The proportion of fish stocks within biologically sustainable levels has been on a downward trend since before the turn of the century (Figure 1.1.6b) but the distribution of biologically sustainable fish stocks is uneven. In 2021, the lowest levels of sustainable fish stocks were in the Southeastern Pacific (33.3%) and Mediterranean and Black Sea (37.5%), which were well below the global average of 62.3%. The highest, covering the Northeast Atlantic, and Southwest, Northeast and Eastern Central Pacific, were all over 70% (FAO, 2024). Information on where the UK sources its fish and seafood is covered in Theme 2 Indicator 2.1.5.

Carbon footprint

Fish and seafood have a much smaller carbon footprint than other sources of animal protein. Marine fisheries are typically not included in estimates of GHG emissions from food production. Data from 2011 shows that fishing vessels contribute to between 0.1 and 0.5 % of global CO₂ emissions and represent approximately 4 % of the carbon emissions generated by global food production (Parker and Others, 2018). Aquaculture production was estimated to account for 263 MtCO₂e (covering catch, not population), equivalent to 0.49% of anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2017, the latest estimate available. This is lower than emissions produced by terrestrial animal protein largely due to the absence of enteric CH₄, which is a major factor in the production of beef and lamb. This is aided by high fertility (the ability to reproduce easily) and low feed conversion ratios (using less feed to produce more animal protein) (MacLeod and others, 2020).

Harmful algal blooms

A notable risk to fish stocks is harmful algal blooms. They can be harmful to fish and shellfish, as well as people, marine mammals and birds, making them a threat to productivity. The Harmful Algal Event Database (HAEDAT) is a meta database containing records of harmful algal events. It is difficult to say conclusively if and at what rate harmful algal blooms are increasing as better reporting may be a driver in the increase in reports (Hallegraeff and others, 2021).

Forward look

Aquaculture is expected to drive production growth in fisheries while capture fisheries production remains stable, declining in some regions and recovering in others. Global fish production is expected to rise, reaching 206 Mt by 2033, an increase of 22 Mt from the base period of 2021 to 2023 (OECD-FAO, 2024). This is expected to be driven by the ongoing expansion of aquaculture, particularly in Asia, with global aquaculture production increasing by 17.4% from 96.4kt (2023) to 112.4kt (2033) and capture fisheries increasing 89.3kt (2023) to 93.8 kt (2033) (OECD-FAO, 2024).

Climate impacts

Making robust assessments of the impacts of climate change on the marine environment is challenging because of scarce data availability for complex biological interactions and model limitations at scales incompatible for resolving shelf sea processes, which are the habitats for 99% of the world’s fish (Holmes and others, 2023). In addition, most scientific studies of tolerances have been conducted in a laboratory or modelled rather than within the open marine environment. Therefore, the implications of climate change for global fish stocks remain difficult to quantify. The impacts of climate change alone are projected to result in a 5% loss of mean global marine animal biomass for every 1°C of warming (Lotze and others, 2019).

Figure 1.1.6c: Two maps showing projected multi-model mean changes in sea surface temperature for 2041 to 2070, relative to 1995 to 2014, under the SSP1-2.6 and SSP5-8.5 climate change scenarios.

Source: Iturbide and others, IPCC

Globally, there is medium confidence that climate change will adversely affect fisheries’ yields and aquaculture production (Cooley and others, 2022) but regionally, in the tropics and the higher northern latitudes, impacts are likely to be greater than the global average (Barange and others, 2018). It is almost certain that ocean temperatures will continue to increase out to 2050 (Figure 1.1.6c), with medium confidence that these increases will be associated with further acidification, upper ocean stratification, deoxygenation and marine heatwaves (Bindoff and others, 2019).

Rising sea surface temperatures are an important factor in driving more, long-lasting, and intense marine heatwaves which are very likely to continue to increase in frequency, magnitude, duration and spatial extent and cause more mass mortality events (IPCC, 2019). Such events are projected to result in biomass decreases in more than 75% of fish and invertebrate species by the 2050s (Cheung and others, 2021) and mass mortality events through coral bleaching, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico (Holmes and others, 2023).

As well as risks from temperature increases over long and short timescales, most coral reefs, mangroves and salt marshes will be unable to keep up with projected sea level rise by 2050, even under the lowest SSP1-2.6 climate change scenario (IPCC, 2022). Ocean acidification is projected to worsen across all ocean basins, with the largest projected decreases in pH found in the Arctic and the smallest at the Equator (IPCC, 2023).

More than 90% of global aquaculture production originates in Asia and fish consumption per capita is highest in the Maldives, Seychelles, South-east and Eastern Asia and the Pacific Islands. Current aquaculture losses attributed to climate change have been caused by temperature increases, sea-level rise and associated saltwater intrusion, and from infrastructure damage, droughts and freshwater shortages arising during extreme weather events (Naylor and others, 2021). These are all expected to worsen as the climate continues to change, with additional uncertain indirect effects from pests, predators and pathogens and from harmful algal blooms.

Sub-theme 2: Productivity and inputs

1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity

Rationale

This indicator measures the agricultural productivity of different countries based on TFP data from the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS).

TFP is defined as the amount of agricultural output produced from the combination of land, labour, capital, and material resources employed in farm production and encompasses the average productivity of all of these inputs in the production of agricultural commodities (USDA, 2024).

TFP is an indicator of how efficiently agricultural inputs are converted into food. The more that producers can do with less, the more productive they are and the more they can produce with limited resource. This is critical to increasing production levels to meet growing global population demand. Productivity growth is especially important in a context of increasing competition for resources.

TFP is one key measure of productivity. Other crucial measures of agricultural productivity, such as land productivity (output per unit of land) and labour productivity (output generated by a unit of labour) are briefly discussed in the supporting evidence section below.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.2.1a: TFP growth by country income group, 2003 to 2022

Source: ERS USDA International Agricultural Productivity

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While global TFP grew at an average annual rate of 1.68% from 2003 to 2012, this figure fell to 0.68% for the period between 2013 and 2022 (Figure 1.2.1a). TFP growth has fallen across all income groups. Low-income countries, in particular, have experienced a reduction of 0.47 percentage points (pp) in average annual TFP growth between 2003-2012 and 2013-2022, and continue to lag in TFP growth with 0.12% annual growth in the period 2013-2022 (USDA, 2024). While TFP is not currently stagnating or decreasing, low TFP growth suggests that both the rate of adoption of new technology and innovation has declined globally (Agnew and Hendery, 2023).

Supporting evidence

TFP data for this indicator comes from the Global Agricultural Productivity (GAP) Index, which was established in 2010 to track the growth needed in TFP to sustainably double global agricultural production by 2050. Under the assumption that the world population reaches 10 billion by 2050 (a figure which is slightly higher than the United Nations (UN, 2022) projection of 9.7 billion) and that all other inputs (including land, labour, machinery, materials, feed and livestock) remain static, the index suggests that TFP would need to increase at an average annual rate of 2.03% to reach this goal (2024 GAP Report). Some studies suggest a lower annual rate could be required (van Dijk and others, 2021).

Drivers of agricultural productivity

Figure 1.2.1b: Causes of growth in agricultural output, 1960-1970 to 2011-2022

Source: ERS USDA International Agricultural Productivity, 2024

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In the 1960s and 1970s, agricultural production was largely driven by input intensification which involved an increased use of pesticides and fertilisers, mechanisation as well as planting improved crop varieties. TFP growth became a more important driver in the 1980s until the turn of the 21st century, after which both TFP and agricultural growth have been slowly falling (Figure 1.2.1b). TFP growth remains the largest contributor to agricultural output growth, and historically has been driven by technological innovations. These innovations include: improved genetics; precision agriculture; soil health management; integrated production systems; pest and disease control; mechanisation and automation; and learning and development. Despite this, both TFP growth and annual agriculture growth have slowed in the last decade (Figures 1.2.1a, 1.2.1b). This trend poses potential risk to food availability in the context of the rising global population.

Productivity by region

Trends vary widely by region. Productivity gains remain high in South Asia and China with average annual TFP growth at 1.44% and 1.78% respectively between 2013 and 2022. In South Asia these gains have been driven by technological change, increased mechanisation and labour reallocation. In China TFP growth has been driven by mechanisation and the adoption of policies aimed at reversing unsustainable growth from input intensification (Agnew and Hendery, 2023).

However, gains remain much lower in other areas. Productivity gains have been particularly low in the USA with annual TFP growth at -0.23)%and Sub-Saharan Africa with annual TFP growth at 0.37% (USDA, 2024), which has been driven by a range of different factors. In the USA, investment in public agriculture and food research and development in 2019 was at its lowest levels since the 1970s. This may be a contributory factor to the reduction in growth in TFP. In Sub-Saharan Africa, a lack of investment in agriculture overall, including agricultural research and development, access to improved seed varieties and mechanisation, have all contributed to a lack of growth in TFP (Agnew and Hendery, 2023). Indicator 1.2.3 Global fertiliser production explores this issue in further detail.

Further information on TFP in the UK is covered in Theme 2 Indicator 2.2.3. Productivity of the UK food chain is also covered in Theme 3 Indicator 3.3.3.

Land productivity

Land productivity is a key measure of agricultural productivity. Unlike TFP, land productivity is a partial factor productivity measure that is computed by dividing agricultural output by a single factor of production, land. When expressed in terms of physical output per unit of land, such as kilogrammes or tonnes per hectare, land productivity is typically referred to as ‘yields’ (FAO, 2017). Future trajectories of food security are closely linked to future average crop yields in the major agricultural regions of the world (Lobell, Cassman and Field, 2009). Halting agricultural expansion, closing ‘yield gaps’ on underperforming lands, and increasing cropping efficiency could enable environmentally sustainable increases in food production (Foley and others, 2011).

Regional variation, trends, volatility and projected changes in cereal yields are covered in further detail in Indicator 1.1.3 Global cereals production. The yields of other livestock products are covered in Indicator 1.1.4 Production of global livestock products. More information on trends in land use change are covered in Indicator 1.2.2 Global land use change.

There are indications that climate change may result in substantial changes to yield variability (Liu and others, 2021), with projections of cereal yield responses to modelled climate scenarios revealing a mixed picture. Global mean yield projections between 1983-2013 and 2041-2070 indicate decreases for maize and increases for wheat and rice (see Indicator 1.1.3 Global cereals production for more detail). The impact of climate change on yields is also covered in Indicator 1.1.6 Global seafood production and Indicator 1.5.2 Global One Health. This is expected to affect levels of agricultural productivity and is an important area to monitor for further developments.  

Labour productivity

Labour productivity is another partial factor productivity measure commonly employed in agriculture (FAO, 2017). It can be computed by dividing agricultural value added by the number employed in the sector (World Bank Group (WBG)). In 2022, agricultural value added per worker at the global level was estimated to be $4,042 (in constant $2015), an increase of close to $200 compared to 2019 (WBG). This global value masks substantial differences across countries, with over 30 times higher labour productivity in high income countries compared to low income countries (2022 estimates for these two income groups were $26,547 and $840, respectively) (WBG). Indeed, there is a strong correlation between a country’s income and the value added per agricultural worker. Countries with higher incomes tend to have greater access to technology and a more mechanised agriculture, which allows for an increase in output while reducing in the amount of labour required as an input, resulting in higher labour productivity.

There is high confidence that, without adaptation, the impacts of heat stress on the capacity of the agricultural labour force will increase with climate change (IPCC, 2022). Regions projected to experience the largest reductions in outdoor labour capacity are predominantly at low latitudes: much of South and Southeast Asia, tropical Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Central and South America (IPCC, 2022; Masuda and others, 2024; De Lima and others, 2021). Impacts are expected to be worst in low- and middle-income countries.

1.2.2 Global land use change

Rationale

This breakdown of global land area summarises the amount of land used for agricultural production and different kinds of production within that. As land is an essential resource for food production (excluding seafood), it is useful to track trends in the total area of land used for agricultural production, and particularly how that land is being used. While the area of land used for agriculture is an important indicator of food production or supply, it should be considered in tandem with an understanding of current land productivity and management practices. Agricultural land can be used to grow crops used for non-food uses such as cotton and fibre crops such as sisal.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.2.2a: Global land use for food production

Source: Ritchie and Roser (2019), FAO, and Poore and Nemecek (2018)

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Competition for the world’s finite land resources is intensifying. Around 85% of the world’s usable land — ice-free and non-desert — has already been harvested for wood or converted to agriculture. This has contributed to about a quarter of human-induced (anthropogenic) carbon emissions and is the primary driver of global biodiversity loss (WRI, 2023). Land use change is continuing, and between 2000 and 2018, 88% of forest conversion was for agriculture purposes (50% for crop expansion including palm oil and 38% for livestock grazing. (FAO Remote Sensing Survey, 2020).Globally, around half of the worlds land is used for agriculture (see igure 1.2.2a above), and of that the majority of land is used to raise livestock, although the majority of our calorie supply is from plant-based foods, for example Rice, Maize and Wheat . Some land used for livestock grazing is not suitable for growing crops; this amounted to 40% global of cropland.

Changes in global agricultural land area generally happen over decades (see Figure 1.2.2b below). Since the turn of the century, agricultural land area has been on a downward trend, decreasing by 1.8% between 1999 and 2022. This has been caused by a fall in permanent meadows and pastures of 4.9%. This is despite meat consumption dramatically rising in middle income countries in recent years (see Indicator 1.1.4 Global livestock production), driven by intensively farmed pigs and poultry, which do not require permanent meadows and pastures. Despite the downward trend in agricultural land, cropland has shown an accelerated trajectory of expansion since the early 2000s. In the last two years the expansion has flattened.

Figure 1.2.2b: Global agricultural land by area, 1990 to 2022

Source: FAOSTAT Land Use

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As the world population grows, demand for food is expected to rise (see Indicator 1.1.1 Global food production). A combination of global population growth and income growth in the world’s developing economies is expected to increase total demand for crops by 56% and for animal-source foods by 70% by 2050 (WRI, 2023). This will require an increase in both food production and food availability (see Indicator 1.1.1 Global food production). Historically food production has been increased by agricultural land expansion or by increasing output on existing agricultural land through input intensification or productivity gains through such measures as sustainable intensification (SI) and technological innovation. There are strong limits to the option of land expansion as further land expansion diminishes the world’s natural capital on which food production is dependent (Zabel and Others, 2019). There is also limited land for what would be required: agricultural land would need to expand by over 600 million hectares, equivalent to an area of land nearly twice the size of India, to produce enough food for 2050 based on current dietary trends and at current productivity levels (WRI, 2023).

The long-term trend of decreasing total agricultural use is alongside a long-term trend of increasing food production (see indicator 1.1.1 Global food production), which points to the productivity gains since the 1980s (see indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity). However, the accelerated trajectory of cropland expansion since early 2000 reflects a mixed picture of food production growth by productivity and land use expansion (see Indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity). The cropland expansion is in part driven by the need for feed for increased intensive livestock and biofuel production, with the majority of the expanded cropland being maize and soya beans and driving the above-mentioned conversion of forest in regions such as South East Asia and South America.

Additionally, working towards redistributing food and reducing food loss and waste (see Indicator 1.1.2 Global food loss and waste), could also help meet future demand for food. Other approaches to improving output are covered in indicator 1.2.1 Global agricultural total factor productivity.

Supporting evidence

Changes in agricultural land

Globally there has been less available agricultural land overall, driven by increases in land productivity which has increased consistently since the 1960s, rising by 20% between 2012 and 2022 (FAOSTAT, 2024). Equally, in the next decade the overall area of land used for agriculture is not anticipated to increase, as increases in cropland will be offset by decreases in pasture. However, there is some variance at a regional level. For example, cropland expansion is projected to occur in the global South (primarily Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa). Pasture land in Asia and the Pacific will likely be converted into cropland, in contrast in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa non-agricultural land will likely be converted. Whereas, in the global North (North America and Western Europe) cropland is anticipated to decrease due strict regulations and governance regarding sustainability (OECD, 2024).

Additionally, there is more competition for land to be used for purposes other than primary food production. The increase in intensive livestock production (see Indicator 1.1.4 Global livestock production) has increased the demand for crops for livestock feed. The advent of biofuels around the turn of the 21st century has also led to between 16% and 23% of maize, vegetable oils and sugar cane production being used for fuel. In overall area terms, since 1999 there has been a small increase in the crop area of wheat and rice and a fall in the crop area of barley, while there have been large increases in the crop area of soybeans, maize and sugar cane. Sugar cane now accounts for 86% of crop area of sugar crops, up from 75% in 1999.

The versatility of land means factors such as the price and availability of some raw ingredients and changes to market conditions can lead to substitutions in food production and changes to global food security. For example, when the supply of sunflower oil was affected by the Ukraine war, rapeseed oil was substituted but could not then be used for biofuels.

Environmental impacts associated with land use change

Previous methods of land conversion to accommodate competing demands, including food production, has had a negative effect on the global environment. Data from the FAO shows global agrifood systems (both pre and post farmgate) emissions were 16 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Gt CO2eq) in 2021, an increase of 14% since 2001, and equivalent to 30% of total anthropogenic emissions. The primary environmental impacts linked to land use change include land degradation, deforestation, biodiversity loss and production of GHG emissions. All of these impacts are direct or indirect drivers of the depletion of natural capital and ecosystem services on which agriculture itself relies. Agriculture is the main driver for deforestation with over 75% of land converted to cropland in Africa and Asia and around 75% to livestock grazing in South America (FAO, 2020). Increases in agricultural land use are typically associated with the destruction of biodiverse habitats with rates of deforestation highest in Africa, South East Asia and Latin America at 10.6%, 7.8% and 7.8% between 2002 and 2022 respectively (FAOSTAT, 2024). These changes make the environment less resilient to increasing extreme weather events which in turn further damage natural capital. For example, degraded lands are also often less able to hold onto water, which can worsen flooding.

While land use change makes up 19% of agri-food system emissions (FAOSTAT, 2024), there has been a reduction in GHG emissions from land use change over the last 20 years: GHG emissions were 3.1 Gt CO2e in 2021, marking a decrease of 5.7% over the last 3 years, 15.7% over the last 10 years and 19% over the last 20 years. South America, Africa and South East Asia continue to be the regions of the world with the highest GHG emissions due to land use change accounting for 90% of all global emissions. These have roughly halved in South America and South East Asia but increased by over a fifth in Africa in the last 20 years. While land use change makes up 19% of agri-food system emissions (FAOSTAT, 2024). There is a high degree of uncertainty in GHG emissions from land use change with FAOSTAT and national GHG inventories returning lower estimates of GHG emissions from land use change than modelled estimates (IPCC, 2023).

1.2.3 Global fertiliser production

Rationale

Fertilisers typically consist of 3 main types of nutrients: nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and potassium (K). N, P and K represent the 3 primary nutrients plants need to grow. These nutrients occur naturally in the soil but can also be added in the form of fertilisers, to boost growth rates. In 2022, N fertilisers accounted for 57% of total global consumption, while phosphate (the plant available oxide form of P) and potash (the plant available oxide form of K) fertilisers accounted for 22.3% and 20.7% respectively (FAOSTAT, 2024). The FAOSTAT dataset contains information on the totals in nutrients for production, tracking the changes of each nutrient. These are important chemical fertilisers and inputs for agriculture and any price rise in fertilisers is likely to feed through to food prices.

This indicator focuses on sources of phosphate and potash, which are mined and have experienced disruptions to supply as a result of geopolitical tensions and conflict. In addition to nitrogen, the production of these involve large amounts of energy and has implications for the sustainability of current fertiliser practices.

For countries without domestic production of these nutrients, global availability of these inputs is particularly important for food production and food security. The availability of phosphate and nitrogen plays an especially important role in the UK food security given that the UK has no P rock reserves (main raw material in the production of phosphate fertiliser) and import ammonia (which is the basic source for nitrogen fertiliser). The UK relies on imports to meet its demands, typically importing fertiliser products from more than 60 countries. The UK has one domestic producer of ammonium nitrate (AN), which is produced using imported ammonia. UK fertiliser use and supply is covered in further detail in Theme 3 Indicator 3.1.1 Agricultural inputs.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.2.3a: World fertiliser production, 1961 to 2021

Source: FAOSTAT Land Inputs and Sustainability Inputs Fertilisers by Nutrient, 2024

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Note: Totals in nutrients for Production, Trade and Agriculture Use of inorganic (chemical or mineral) fertilizers, over the time series from 1961 to 2021. The data are provided for the 3 primary plant nutrients: nitrogen (N), phosphorus (expressed as P₂O₅) and potassium (expressed as K₂O). Both straight and compound fertilizers are included.

Phosphate production

Plants cannot absorb elemental phosphorus, so phosphorus fertilisers are usually produced in the oxide form (phosphate or P₂O₅). Typically phosphorus is mined in mineral form from igneous and sedimentary geological deposits. This crushed rock is then combined with sulfuric or phosphoric acids (depending on the type of phosphate fertiliser being produced) to produce fertilisers with higher phosphate contents ready for plant uptake.

While phosphate fertiliser production fell slightly by 1.9% to 46.1 million tonnes between 2019 and 2022, longer-term trends show overall growth. P rock production fell by 20 million tonnes between 2020 and 2023, equivalent to a decrease of 8.3%. China, Morocco and the USA remain the largest producers of P rock, however high rates of growth in production were seen across Togo (87.5%), Senegal (62.5%), Algeria (50%) and Saudi Arabia (45.2%) over the period. P rock production has risen by 36.1% since 2002 (FAOSTAT, 2024). According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), global P rock economic resources amount to more than 300 billion tonnes and there are no imminent shortages of P rockPhosphate Rock Statistics and Information | U.S. Geological Survey (usgs.gov).

Potash production

Plants cannot absorb elemental potassium, so potassium fertilisers are usually produced in the oxide form (potash or K₂O). Typically potassium is mined in mineral form from certain geological deposits (typically potassium salts found in sea beds) and then refined by crushing, resizing or chemical alteration to produce fertilisers ready for plant uptake.

Potash production similarly shows a recovery from any effects following the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and longer-term trends show overall growth. Potash production rose by 2.4% to 42.9 million tonnes between 2019 and 2022 and has risen by 61.2% since 2002 (FAOSTAT, 2024). Potash production increases have been driven by Asia since the 1990s when there was a marked decrease in potash production in Europe.

Known economic reserves of potassium-based minerals have remained reasonably steady between 2019 and 2022, except in Brazil, China and Russia where reserves have decreased by over 90%, 50% and 33% respectively. Overall global production has fallen by 1 million tonnes or 2.4%. This has been driven by the effect of import quotas and economic sanctions on Russia and Belarus (USGA, 2024).

Nitrogen production

While there was a minor reduction in nitrogen (N) production over the last 3 years, longer-term trends show overall production continues to rise. Between 2019 and 2022 N production fell by 3.7% to 118.1 million tonnes (FAOSTAT, 2024). Production of N has risen by 35.2% since 2002 (FAOSTAT, 2024). N production increases have been driven by Asia since the 1990s when there was a marked decrease in N production in Europe.

Supporting evidence

UK dependence on global imports of nitrogen fertiliser

The UK is totally dependent on imports for N fertiliser; while AN is produced domestically, structural change to the domestic production base, with domestic gas no longer being used as feedstock and imported ammonia being used in the production of AN, means the UK now imports around 60% of N fertiliser as has been subject to structural changes. Since 2022, Lithuania and Poland have become large suppliers of Ammonium Nitrate (AN) (Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB), 2024). The UK’s production and consumption of N is covered in further detail in Theme 3 Indicator 3.1.1.

Geopolitical tensions

There have been some disruptions to global fertiliser production because of geopolitical tensions and conflict. Despite fertiliser materials being exempt from sanctions, the Russia-Ukraine war led to the European Union imposing import quotas on Belarus, which had been the third largest producer of K after Canada and Russia. Belarus has managed to export some supply via rail and Russian ports (USGS, no date). The war also prompted some countries to not allow Russian vessels in their ports which has further affected the availability of fertiliser. K has been much more severely affected than P in this regard as Russia responded to these measures by suspending the export of fertiliser products including K on countries it deemed unfriendly. The most significant disruption to P fertilisers followed an export ban from China for diammonium phosphate and monoammonium phosphate to control the domestic fertiliser prices. This removed 5 million tonnes of fertilisers from the global market, equivalent to approximately 10.9% of global supply in 2022, which was not entirely compensated for by other suppliers (USGS, 2023).

Global fertiliser prices

Figure 1.2.3b: IMF Fertiliser Price Index, October 2004 to September 2024

Source: IMF

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While fertiliser prices have stabilised, they remain higher than before the start of the energy crisis in 2021 (Figure 1.2.3b). Fertiliser prices rose dramatically between January 2021 and June 2023 following the energy crisis which led to a rise in gas price, peaking in April 2022 with prices 3.6 times higher than in April 2020. Prices have stabilised since July 2023 but remain 42% higher than prices in January 2021 before the start of the crisis. Fertiliser prices tend to follow energy prices closely as energy (in the form of natural gas) is the key ingredient in producing ammonia, and in a competitive market (see section below) changes in price tend to track production cost. Other factors, such as farmer demand, availability, tariffs and quotas, can also lead to changes in fertiliser prices (Fertilizer Europe, 2018).

Concentration of global fertiliser market

Among the 3 main nutrients, N has persistently been the nutrient with the most diverse sources of supply (in terms of exporters) and its market can thus be considered as relatively less concentrated (FAOSTAT, 2024). Instead, the markets for P and K can be considered as more concentrated. Recent data shows that between 2018 and 2021 the supply of N and P has become more concentrated, while K has become marginally more diverse in supply.

Risks associated with underuse and overuse of fertiliser

There is currently heterogeneity in fertiliser use globally with many countries using too little fertiliser and many countries using too much fertiliser (FAO, 2022).

Underusing fertiliser, linked with insufficient access to fertilisers, is associated with nutrient deficits in croplands and limits food production (Penuelas, Coello and Sardans, 2023). Lack of access to nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers is especially acute in low-income countries (Rockström and others, 2023; Cordell and White, 2014).

Overusing fertiliser can lead to nutrient imbalances in the soil, with wider implications for soil degradation and fertility as well as an overall loss of organic soil matter. The continued intensification of inputs, such as fertiliser, may result in problems with sustaining production at current levels in the medium term. Fertiliser use is also linked to environmental pollution and groundwater leaching (Singh and Craswell, 2021) as well as significant GHG emissions. 0.47 Gt CO₂-eq were emitted from fertiliser production in 2021 (FAOSTAT, 2024), of which NO₂ made up a large proportion: 0.6 Gt NO₂ were emitted from synthetic fertilisers in 2021, which constitutes 26% of all NO₂ emissions and 3.6% of all CO₂-eq emissions from the agri-food system (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Forward look

Global production of fertilisers is predicted to increase. According to a USGS report on P rock, the global capacity of P rock mines is projected to increase from 238 million tonnes in 2020 to 261 million tonnes in 2024. The greatest increases in planned capacity are predicted to be in Africa and the Middle East. Capacity expansion projects are ongoing in Brazil, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa but none are due to completed by 2024. Global consumption of P₂O₅ is also projected to increase from 47 million tonnes in 2020 to 49 million tonnes in 2024.

Similarly world annual K production capacity is projected to increase from 64 million tonnes in 2022 to about 66 million tonnes in 2025 (USGS, no date).

The International Fertilizer Association predicts that nitrogen capacity will increase from 192 million tonnes in 2023 to 207 million tonnes in 2028, with increases in capacity across all global regions except Central Europe (International Fertilizer Association, 2024).

1.2.4 Water availability, usage and quality for global agriculture

Rationale

Water is essential to food production. Agriculture accounts for around 70% of fresh water withdrawn (from rivers, reservoirs, or groundwater extraction) globally (UNESCO, 2024). This indicator measures how rates of agricultural water withdrawal vary by region and have changed over time. The majority of world agriculture currently relies on rainfall; however, irrigated agriculture plays a crucial role in global agricultural output growth and global food production.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.2.4a: World agricultural water withdrawal, by region, 2000 to 2021

Source: FAO AQUASTAT Pressure on Water resources

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The amount of agricultural water withdrawn at the global level has risen noticeably since 2005 from 2,479 billion litres to high points in 2017 and 2019 of 2,893 billion litres, an increase of 16.7%, although the rate of growth has been slowing (AQUASTAT, 2024). Although there has been a small fall in global agricultural water withdrawals from that peak, by 1.3% in 2021 to 2855 trillion litres, it is too early to say if this is the start of a sustained fall in agricultural water use globally.

Important risks to food availability over the longer term are increasing water stress around the globe, catalysed by climate change, combined with increasing demand for fresh water from a range of uses which is projected to outstrip supply by 40% by the end of the decade. The global water withdrawals that UK food relies on through imports are therefore increasingly unsustainable, especially where imports come from countries with lower water security than the UK. See supporting evidence.

Supporting evidence

Water availability

Figure 1.2.4b: Agricultural water withdrawn as a percentage of total internal renewable water resources, 2021

Source: FAO AQUASTAT

‘Total freshwater renewable water resources’ covers the flow of rivers and recharge of aquifers from annual precipitation over land. Figure 1.2.4b above shows the global average percentage of agricultural water withdrawn as a percentage of total internal renewable water resources varies significantly globally, with Northern Africa and most of Asia above the global average

Increasing populations mean reduced natural resources available per capita. The amount of total renewable water resources per capita has fallen between 2018 and 2021 by 158.5 m³ per capita per year to 5,401.7 m³ per capita per year (AQUASTAT, 2024). In sub-Saharan Africa, water availability per capita declined by 40% over the past decade, and agricultural land declined from 0.80 to 0.64 ha/capita between 2000 and 2017. Northern Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa each have less than 1 700 m³/capita, which is considered to be a level at which a nation’s ability to meet water demand for food and from other sectors is compromised. (SOLAW, 2021)

While over 78% of agricultural land is rainfed and the remaining 22% is irrigated (FAO, 2021), food produced on irrigated land makes up roughly 40% of all food produced globally (World Bank, 2022). Irrigated land is roughly twice as productive per land unit than rainfed land which allows for more intensive production and crop diversification (World Bank, 2022).

Figure 1.2.4c: Area equipped for irrigation: actually irrigated, 2000 to 2021

Source: FAO AQUASTAT

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The percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated was 21.18% on average globally in 2021. On a regional basis generally Asia had higher percentages, with Southern and Eastern Asia highest (46% and 59% respectively). Between 2018 and 2021 the largest decrease in percentage of cultivated land that is irrigated was found in Australia and New Zealand. The largest growth was found in Eastern and South Eastern Asia. (AQUASTAT, 2024).

Water quality

While agriculture is the greatest user of freshwater resources (70%), it is also the leading contributor to water pollution, with chemical and organic pollutants contaminating surface water and groundwater resources, with wide scale effects on people and planet (FAO and International Water Management Institute (IWMI), 2023). An estimated 1260 km³ of agricultural drainage effluent is released each year untreated into the environment (Mateo-Sagasta, Zadeh and Turral, 2018), with downstream impacts for irrigated farmland, animal husbandry and aquaculture production. Salinity pollution also plays a critical role, with almost 34 million hectares of irrigated land worldwide affected by salinization resulting in significant yield losses and poorer quality produce (World Water Quality Alliance, 2021).

Water demand

Global water demand is projected to increase significantly over the coming decades as an increasing global population (forecasted to reach 9.7 billion before 2050 (UN DESA, 2024) and increasing global wealth are expected to increase pressure on agricultural food systems. Global demand for freshwater is expected to outstrip available supply by 40% in 2030 (2030 Water Resources Group, 2009), with demand from all sectors increasing by between 25% to 40% and possibly being reallocated from lower to higher productivity activities, particularly in water stressed areas. This is expected to affect agriculture due to its high consumption of water.

It is within this constraint that ever more difficult decisions will be made about where and to whom water should be prioritised with risks for development, geopolitical tensions, conflict, and progress towards the SDGs. The Water, Energy and Food Nexus is a useful framework that highlights the risks, trade-offs and opportunities that will arise because of the excess demand for freshwater resource.

Water stress

Water stress is the ratio between total freshwater withdrawn by all sectors and total renewable freshwater resources, after taking into account environmental flow requirements. Globally water stress has been steadily rising since records began in 2000, only falling significantly between 2007 and 2010. Since 2010 water stress has risen by 0.74 pp from 17.81% to 18.55% in 2021, 0.21 pp of which have been since 2018.

Figure 1.2.4d: Water stress, 2021

Source: FAO AQUASTAT

Water stress varies significantly globally (see Figure 1.2.4c above). It is highest in Central and Southern Asia, Northern Africa and Western Asia. The agricultural sector contribution to water stress globally has risen consistently by 1.6 pp from 11.7% in 2000 to 13.3% in 2021 (AQUASTAT, 2024). Although UK water stress levels remain low at 14% in 2021, UK food supplies rely on food imports from countries with higher water stress and therefore is affected by increasing water stress around the world. This includes a large amount of fruit and vegetables from Spain and Morocco (AQUASTAT, 2024) where water stress levels are at around 40 to 50%. This is covered in further detail in Theme 2 Indicator 2.14 on Fruit and Vegetables.

A report from the Global Commission on the Economics of Water suggests that half the world’s population already faces water scarcity. The number is set to rise with impacts of climate change and nature loss on the global water cycle including on ‘atmospheric water exchange’ dependent on declining vegetation. The global water cycle connects countries, regions and localities through both visible water and atmospheric moisture flows. It is deeply interconnected with climate change and the loss of biodiversity with each effecting on the other; and it underpins virtually all the Sustainable Development Goals.

Water volatility

Water volatility refers to variability in the levels and spatial distribution of precipitation This variability is expected to increase globally with climate change Droughts and flood conditions will increasingly affect rain fed agriculture, which produces 60% of the world’s food on 80% of the world’s cultivated land (FAO, 2021). The nature and magnitude of impact depends largely on the area or region with the risk of flooding likely to increase in wet tropical regions while semi-arid areas are likely to receive even less precipitation, with droughts becoming longer and more pronounced (IPCC, 2018). The effect of climate on global food production is explored further in Indicator 1.3.3.

Sub-theme 3: Stocks, prices and trade

1.3.1 Global stock to consumption ratios

Rationale

This indicator measures changes in the stock to consumption ratios of maize, soybeans, rice and wheat across different groupings of countries. The stock to consumption ratio is a measure for the relative tightness of stocks which is calculated by dividing the ending stocks of a commodity by the corresponding domestic consumption. A stock to consumption ratio of 100% means that total stocks held are equal to one year’s worth of consumption. The stocks data in this section combines publicly and privately held stocks into one national figure; it not only includes government held stocks, but also stocks held by farmers, households, enterprises, or any other agents.

Stock to consumption ratios serve as an indicator of food availability and as an early warning for food security risks including possible shortages and price spikes, which can be indicative of global resilience to such shocks. Major price spikes can be detrimental to global food security, poverty and nutrition levels, particularly in lower income countries (World Bank, 2019). A key characteristic of the staple foods covered here, which makes them particularly important from a food security perspective, is that it is possible and less costly to store them than other food products such as meats and dairy products (AMIS, 2021). During periods of instability, which could be due to geopolitical, weather, or supply-chain disruptions, domestic stocks can ensure the availability of these products at a low and stable price. Crop markets are particularly susceptible to supply shocks, which is why this indicator focusses on cereals and oilseeds (in this instance soybeans).

The ratio can aid in assessing the extent to which there is a ‘buffer’ against supply and demand shocks in the market; however, it is difficult to establish an ideal ratio. Commodities with higher ratios, such as soybeans (see Headline evidence), may be more insulated from potential price spikes and exert more resilience than commodities with lower ratios. Any changes in the ratio require careful interpretation to fully understand the root causes and possible implications.

A benchmark ratio of stock-to-consumption is used to indicate global food security and to interpret this indicator. In the 1970s, a ratio above 17 to 18% was considered sufficient to stabilise global markets. When the ratio fell below this threshold, it indicated a higher risk to the global market. However, this benchmark should be interpreted with caution today, as increased trade liberalisation since then may affect its relevance (AMIS). Over time, there have been shifts in the incentive structure for governments and private agents to hold stocks (USDA, 2008).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.3.1a: Annual stock to consumption ratio, 2004/05 to 2024/25: soybeans, rice, maize, wheat

Source: USDA Production, Supply and Distribution , 2024

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Note: ‘Top exporters’ refers to the eight largest exporters based on a 3-year average between 2021/22 and 2023/24

Global stock to consumption ratios declined over the last 3 years (between 2020/2021 and 2023/24) with the exception of soybeans. While global maize stocks have increased by c17.9 million tonnes over this period, the pace of growth in consumption has been slower than the expansion of production, leading to a very slight increase of 0.1 pp in the stock to consumption ratio which is pegged at 25.8%. Rice stocks have decreased by 0.6% between 2022/23 and 2023/24 with the stock to consumption ratio remaining stable at 34.5% over the same period. Global wheat stocks have declined by 6% over the last 3 years (2022/23 to 2024/25) to c253 million tonnes with the stock to consumption ratio at 32.2% in the 2024/25 marketing year. This contraction has been driven by lower stocks in major exporters, especially the EU, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Soybean stocks have grown by 30.4% since 2022/23 and reached c132 million tonnes in 2024/25. The stock to consumption ratios have been calculated by dividing annual ending stocks by annual consumption.

Supporting evidence

China

The divergence in recent years between ‘World’ and ‘World minus China’ ratios, particularly for maize, rice, and even wheat is substantial. The USDA reports that more than half of wheat stocks are estimated to be held by China, with other major exporters accounting for a further 20% (USDA, 2024). Between 2012 and 2020, China’s wheat stocks increased by over 160% while wheat stocks held by the rest of the world declined by 12% (International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2023). This difference is likely due to extensive Chinese stockholding programmes, though the actual volume of stocks held is uncertain. These are unreported by the Chinese government and mostly isolated from the global market. The uncertainty around Chinese stocks can have food security implications because data can be skewed or incomplete, so any narrative drawn via this data is caveated by such limitations.

On the other hand, the developments of stocks in India, another major staple exporter where public stockholding for rice has increased in recent years (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2024), have implications for food security given the integration of the country to the world rice market. However, given its limited export for other staples, India has not been excluded from the ‘World’ total for this indicator.

Soybeans

In addition to cereals, the importance of which is covered in Indicator 1.1.3 Global cereals production, this indicator tracks changes in soybeans given their crucial role in achieving international food security. Soybeans and their by-products are regarded as one of the most important crop types in the world (Abiodun and Olufunmilola, 2017). A very large proportion of soybeans are processed into animal feed, used to rear animals (OECD-FAO, 2021); they are significant inputs to the meat and dairy sector. Technological advances have unlocked double-cropping practices in Brazil, meaning farmers can grow and harvest both soybeans and maize in one growing season, increasing the total annual yield (DePaula, 2019). This spreads the risk of disruptions across a longer growing period and reduces monoculture farming practices. These practices can cause soil erosion, jeopardising land’s future nutrients and ability to cultivate crops, implicating future food security.

Trends by commodity

The pattern in stock to consumption ratios over the last 20 years varies by staple food commodity:

Maize – In the last 3 years, the maize stock to consumption ratio has remained fairly stable after a decline from the peak in the 2016/17 ratio. When China is excluded, the major divergence from the world ratio that first materialised in 2010 remains apparent and a similar size divergence has been maintained since 2016/17. Stock to consumption ratios for both ‘world excluding China’ and ‘top exporters’ is lower than 20 years ago, though the ‘world’ stock is much greater, suggesting that growth has been driven by growing Chinese stocks.

Soybeans – The 20-year trend of stock to consumption ratio is volatile and the ratio has consistently remained higher for top exporting countries than that of the world. This may have positive implications for international food security, as the soybeans are more likely to enter the global supply, maintaining the availability of this staple at a low price. The last 3 years seemingly feed into a successive peak in ratio, though this is difficult to predict.

Rice – There has been an upward trend in rice stock to consumption ratios in the last 20 years. This is a stronger trend for the ‘world’ and ‘top exporting countries’ than the ‘world excluding China.’ Despite this, the last 3 years have seen a slight decline in ratios for all 3 lines which could be driven by a fall in stock levels, or an increase in consumption.

Wheat – Prior to the 2012/13 season, the stock to consumption ratios for wheat were volatile. Low stocks during the 2007 to 2008 price spike stimulated a reactive increase in stock levels following this. The price spike caused by Russian wheat export ban in 2010, combined with other countries’ protectionist policies, was met with low levels of global stocks, stimulating another increase in the stock to consumption ratio. ‘World’ ratio rose steadily until 2020/21 but has since declined, although the less volatile ‘world excluding China’ ratio suggests that this major, more volatile increase has been driven by China. ‘Top exporters’ have followed a similar trend as the other categories, but with a greater degree of volatility.

Data limitations

The data on stocks suffers from a number of limitations. The low accuracy of stocks data means future forecasts tend to project ahead for only one marketing year. This is partially due to a lack of consistent, government-reported stocks data which causes low reliability across data sources for global stocks.

Stocks are rarely measured by countries themselves, instead, they are calculated based on estimates from one period to the next. It is possible that inconsistencies are carried over from the past, leading to a further source of unreliability (AMIS, 2017). Therefore, while this indicator is crucial for assessing the resilience of agricultural markets, it should not be treated as the sole measure for food security and agricultural market dynamics.

Forward look

The USDA (2024) projected the combined world ending stocks (products wheat, milled rice, and soybean for close of seasons in 2025 to come to 572 million tonnes. This is a 2.5% increase from the predicted ending stocks for 2024 of the same product group. Global wheat ending stocks are projected to decline by 3.3% compared to 2023/24 and world rice ending stocks to grow by 1.9% across the same period (USDA, 2024). A 17.2% increase in world soybean ending stocks is forecasted between the 2023/24 and 2024/25 seasons. Some countries have expressed their intent to build up cereal stocks, and wheat stocks are increasing. However, this is not the same for all staple cereals and unreliable data discourages long-term projections of global stocks (OECD-FAO, 2023).

1.3.2 Global real prices

Rationale

This indicator tracks changes in the real commodity prices for rice, soybeans, wheat, maize, beef and chicken, which represent a considerable proportion of global energy consumption across the world. It shows the real price trends, recent and historic, of these agricultural commodities and how they are driven by market fundamentals of supply and demand, and exchange rate dynamics.

This indicator broadly reflects the global availability of agricultural commodities and signals whether the global market is over or undersupplied. Falling prices signal improved supply, while higher prices indicate relative shortages.

Prices also represent a crucial measure of food security as higher prices can support the sustainability of agricultural production for producers. At the same time, the higher prices are, the less affordable food becomes for consumers, directly affecting the accessibility of a secure supply of food. The effect of changing food prices in the UK for consumers is covered in Theme 4 Indicator 4.1.3 Price changes of main food groups. Where people are both producers and consumers, which is more common in low-income countries, the effect of prices on food security is less clear (FAO, 2014).

Headline evidence

Figure 1.3.2a: World Bank monthly real commodity prices for palm oil, soybeans, maize, rice and wheat 1960 to 2024, (2023=100)

Source: World Bank Pink Sheet and deflated by US Producer Price Index (PPI)

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Since the 1970s, real agricultural commodity prices have trended downwards as global supply capacity has outpaced global demand, but since 2000 the downward trend has somewhat levelled off. Please see the real prices explainer at the end of this section for the rationale for using real prices.

Real commodity prices for cereals have experienced large fluctuations between 2021 and 2024. Increased uncertainty, higher energy prices and the imposition of export restrictions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributed to increased levels of price volatility, particularly for wheat which reached a decade-long peak in May 2022. These price spikes remain smaller in magnitude compared to historic episodes of elevated prices during the food crises of the 1970s, 2007 to 2008 and 2010 to 2012 (Figure 1.3.2a).

Since 2021, the price of wheat, maize and soybeans increased as a result of higher demand for livestock feed as well as a strong cycle of stocking which boosted Chinese imports. On the supply side, wheat production was hit by droughts in the USA, Canada, the EU and Turkey, leading to lower output levels (IFPRI, 2019). Meanwhile, droughts in Brazil in 2021 affected maize crops leading to a rise in maize futures prices to their highest in several years by mid-May (United States International Trade Commission, 2021). Export restrictions such as those imposed by Russia on limiting wheat exports, further contributed to the shrinking of the global supply of commodities, and therefore, price increases.

More widely, rising agricultural commodity prices from mid-2020 were part of a rebound in prices from the multi-year low seen during Spring 2020. Numerous factors contributed to the upward pressure on prices in 2021, including a recovery in global demand, elevated input and transportation costs, the depreciation of the US dollar, and adverse weather conditions affecting supply (United States International Trade Commission, 2021).

Overall, however, agricultural markets for staple foods have been resilient, global supplies remained adequate, and logistical challenges proved short-lived (IFPRI, 2022).

Real prices explainer

Real prices account for changes in the price level over time, which means changes in commodity prices can be evaluated at constant prices and they more accurately represent purchasing power at any point in time.

Prices are deflated using the US Producer Price Index (PPI) series, which, unlike other deflators, measures the prices received by producers and represents a reliable measure of wholesale inflation.

The base year for deflating prices that all subsequent calculations are based on is the most recent full year of data, i.e., 2023.

Supporting evidence

Prices for chicken and beef

Figure 1.3.2b: World Bank monthly real commodity prices for chicken and beef, 1960 to 2024

Source: World Bank Pink Sheet and deflated by US Producer Price Index (PPI)

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Between 2021 and 2024 there have been spikes in the real prices of beef and chicken due to factors such as high feed costs and growing consumer demand (Figure 1.3.2b). Beef prices have trended downward over the past few years but increased by 16% between January and May 2024. This is due to supply pressures arising from shrinking herd numbers across Europe and North America.

Longer-term trends

Between 2021 and 2024 real commodity prices experienced some level of volatility and, as briefly discussed under ‘headline evidence,’ these fluctuations are not without historical precedent. From 2007 to 2008, commodity prices (such as wheat, rice and soybeans) increased sharply followed by sizeable falls in the second half of 2008. However, even at their 2008 peak, prices in real terms stayed well below their peaks during the 1970s food crisis.

Moreover, the combination of inelastic supply and demand, in the short term, means that the global agricultural market is inherently vulnerable to price volatility (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, 2012). Higher agricultural commodity prices, however, pose risks to food security, particularly in low-income food deficit countries whose means to cope with high global agricultural commodity prices are more constrained.

Many factors can affect commodity prices, including favourable or poor harvests, input costs, the market structure, and external factors, such as macroeconomic conditions and population growth. While temporary supply shocks, such as harvest failures, can lead to a short-term spike in prices, a permanent increase in input costs, such as energy and fertilisers, can cause a medium-term increase in price levels. Historically, stocks have been an important tool in managing food price volatility and spikes, private stocks in particular. They also act well in absorbing unexpected variation in supply and demand (AMIS, 2021). This topic is covered in more detail in Indicator 1.3.1 Global stock to consumption ratios.

The impact of global prices on country-level food security across countries

Global agricultural commodity prices are transmitted to domestic markets through trade; however, the effect of increases on domestic food prices, energy and fertiliser prices and, in turn, food security is heterogeneous across countries. The speed and level of passthrough (price transmission) and a country’s capacity to respond to worsening conditions are influenced by multiple factors including underlying vulnerabilities and socio-economic conditions. In the current context, factors such as dependency on the Black Sea region and domestic stock levels determine countries’ ability to absorb trade shocks. Moreover, worsening financial conditions including the depletion of foreign exchange reserves and high debt levels may limit countries’ room for manoeuvre when faced with shocks. Acute food insecurity, therefore, tends to be accompanied by causes other than elevated global food prices, with conflict and economic instability such as income and exchange rate shocks being important contributors in many countries (World Bank, 2024).

From a UK food security perspective, assuming international price shocks are transitory, UK consumer food prices could rise depending on the size, breadth and the duration of the shock in international food prices. However, a permanent increase in international food prices could see more substantial increases in consumer prices. Illustratively, previous evidence based on modelling commissioned by Defra shows that a permanent 10% increase in international food prices will eventually lead to an approximate 2.5% increase in the UK food Consumer Prices Index (CPI). This will have a greater impact on the poorest in the UK who spend a greater proportion of their income on food, resulting in poorer dietary quality rather than insufficient energy (Defra, 2016).

Price volatility

Real commodity prices have exhibited volatility over the past few years but overall, there has been no systemic or general rise in international price volatility between 2021 and 2024 relative to the past 60 years. Some degree of agricultural price volatility is an entirely normal characteristic of the market, with sharp spikes in volatility seen during the food crisis of the 1970s, and periods from 2007 to 2008 and from 2010 to 2011. While grain price volatility recently is slightly higher than in the 1980s and 1990s, it is lower than in some decades of the past, such as the 1970s. This holds for the majority of commodities considered.

Low-income countries are hit harder by price volatility due to diets of people being more dependent on staple commodities and the associated difficulties in substitution to meet nutrition and energy needs. This is primarily due to low incomes and concentrated import sources which leaves these countries more exposed to sudden price fluctuations. Equally, periods of volatility and high prices are of a lower concern for countries such as the UK. Food expenditure represents a smaller proportion of household spending in advanced economies and consumers can substitute food more easily, leaving them less exposed to supply-chain disruptions and price spikes.

As well as the staple commodities discussed, prices of soft commodities have seen sharp rises over the past few years. For instance, the real price of cocoa peaked at a 45 year high in April 2024 at $295 per kg, equivalent to 116% growth in the first 5 months of 2024 from January. The real price of olive oil grew by 124% between January 2021 and December 2023, while year on year growth in Arabica coffee prices has been fluctuating between 2021 and 2024, growing at 15% during 2021 but decreasing by 17% in 2023.

The role of exchange rates

Most agri-food products are quoted in US dollars as it is the world’s preeminent currency of international trade. The value of the US dollar has an impact via the prices paid by importers, and the international prices of agricultural commodities. The import price paid by countries is dependent on the domestic exchange rate, meaning depreciation in the domestic currency drives up the import price and vice versa (Davies, 2023).

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a strong dollar coupled with high commodity prices prevailed throughout 2022. This differs relative to the exchange rate relationship of the food price crises from 2007 to 2008 and from 2010 to 2012 during which the US dollar and international commodity prices were characterised by an inverse relationship. The current dollar-commodity price relationship implies that net food-importing developing countries were faced with the double burden of higher import bills and additional price hikes driven by the depreciation of their domestic currencies. Countries such as Thailand, Ethiopia, and Egypt were hardest hit due to their heavily depreciating domestic currencies. The case of Egypt is explored further in the case study on the role of exchange rates on food prices in Egypt.

Impacts of changes in freight prices

Increases in freight prices can raise food prices for consumers who pay more for their imports as costs such as higher insurance premiums and shipping rates are passed onto them. Countries that are net food importers are hardest hit, particularly net food-importing developing countries that are dependent on container shipping to support food supply. Higher food prices driven by increased import bills coupled with other economic concerns such as exchange rate fluctuations put pressure on food security. Investment in infrastructure and logistics to better integrate countries into the global shipping network could help reduce the burden on food import bills (FAO Food Outlook, 2024).

Forward look

In the medium-term, international prices of agricultural commodities will depend on the balance between supply and demand; primarily whether productivity growth keeps pace with the growth in demand. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook projects that over the next few years prices will reflect the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and weather conditions in key producing regions. However, the Outlook projects that these factors underpinning elevated prices will subside and prices of agricultural commodities will resume to their long-term trend over the next decade. It is important to note that these price projections are sensitive to deviations in the difference between productivity and demand growth.

Moreover, the Outlook assumes normal weather, macroeconomic and policy conditions. However, there is an inherent risk that the uncertainties faced by agricultural production systems, such as weather events, animal diseases and further macroeconomic shocks, will lead to deviations from the medium-term projections. Projected lower international real prices are expected to put pressure on farmers’ incomes but will be beneficial to consumers. However, since the reference prices used in the Outlook reflect global markets, domestic impacts are dependent on trade policies, exchange rate fluctuations, transport costs and integration of domestic markets into the global trading system. These factors can all influence whether and to what extent international price signals are transmitted to domestic markets.

Case study 1: The role of exchange rates on food prices in Egypt

Egypt is one of the largest importers of wheat and has experienced a sharp currency depreciation, affecting the price of wheat paid by consumers. Figure 1.3.2c depicts the changes in international wheat prices in US dollars and Egyptian pounds over time. Prices increased by around 40% from January to May 2022 but have been decreasing since. Yet given the devaluation in the Egyptian pound, this decline is not reflected in domestic wheat prices. The effect on wheat prices in Egypt since August 2022 following its currency devaluation has been larger than price changes following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022.

Figure 1.3.2c: Changes in the price of wheat in US Dollar and Egyptian Pound terms relative to 2019 to 2024

Source: World Bank Pink Sheet and Bank of Egypt, 2024

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These factors mean Egypt has seen an increase of over 100% in wheat prices between 2020 and 2022. Around 87% of this came from changes in international prices and 16% from the devaluation in the Egyptian pound relative to the dollar. Egypt imported approximately 12.1 million tonnes of wheat in 2020, equivalent to around one-fifth of the country’s food import bill. To import the same amount in 2022, Egypt would have had to pay an additional $2.5 billion given the changes in international prices.

1.3.3 Global production internationally traded

Rationale

A well-functioning trading system insulates markets from vulnerability caused by supply-chain disruptions as domestic shortages can be supplemented with imports (FAO, 2023). International trade is crucial to food security and nutrition as it allows countries to meet food requirements above what domestic production could independently sustain. Without trade, food availability would be more inconsistent across regions, diets would be less diverse, and food would cost more (OECD-FAO, 2023). Overall, approximately one quarter of the world’s food supply is internationally traded (FAO, 2022).

This indicator assesses, first, the aggregate extent of trade, measured by the traded share of global production of major food groups. Evidence is then presented on recent events that have caused disruptions to trade, which can pose a risk to global food security given the global reliance on imports, and the concentration of exports in world agricultural commodity markets. Global reliance on imports is measured by countries’ food import dependency ratio and the concentration of exports is tracked by the export shares of leading agricultural commodity supplying countries.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.3.3a: Share of production internationally traded (by volume), Market Year (MYE) 2004/5 to Market Year 2024/25

Source: USDA Production, Supply and Distribution

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Notes: Data for the year 2024 to 2025 represent estimated projections. Cereals are covered due to the importance of traded cereals for world food supply and soybeans represent an important source of animal feed. Meats are primary agricultural commodities which represent an important source of nutrition, providing 21% of total protein and 7% of total calories in 2022 (FAOSTAT).

The percentage of key global cereals, soybeans and meats traded by volume has increased steadily over the last two decades (Figure 1.3.3a) and has remained broadly stable with minimal fluctuations across these commodities (excluding wheat and soybeans) between 2021/22 and 2024/25 (Figure 1.3.3b). Over the last 4 years, the largest changes in share of production internationally traded were a 2.4 pp decrease in pigmeat and 1.4pp decrease in maize production traded across this period. There was a 1.7pp increase in the share of beef and veal production internationally traded over the same period. For the other commodities presented above, there were no difference exceeding 1.0pp between 2021/22 and 2024/25.

Considerable proportions of maize, wheat and soybeans are traded internationally and the share of traded production has increased steadily over the last two decades (Figure 1.3.3a). The international rice market is thin and therefore more vulnerable to disruptions in individual exporting countries. The share of primary meat products traded is lower than cereals but is increasing. Beef and veal saw the largest changes during this period with the traded share of production roughly doubling. For meats, however, a considerable proportion of trade is in semi-processed and processed goods, which makes it more difficult to construct a robust indicator than it is for cereals. These increases in the proportion of food traded internationally have been driven by better international integration and increased exports from low- and middle-income countries (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2021). Overall, approximately one quarter of the world’s food supply is internationally traded (FAO, 2022).

Figure 1.3.3b: Share of production internationally traded (by volume), 2021/22, 2024/25

Source: USDA Production, Supply and Distribution

Food Type	2021/22 (%)	2024/25 (%)	Percentage Difference 2021/2022 to 2024/2025 (pp)
Beef and veal	19.5	21.1	+1.7
Chicken	13.1	13.2	+0.1
Pigmeat	11.3	8.9	-2.4
Maize	16.9	15.7	-1.3
Rice	11.3	10.7	-0.6
Soybeans	42.9	42.7	-0.2
Wheat	26.1	27.0	+0.9

Note: Data points for the 2024/25 season are estimated and subject to change. This data has been used as it is the most up to date (estimated) data for this indicator. All figures are rounded to one decimal place which may affect the percentage point difference which has been calculated.

Supporting evidence

Trade disruptions

During times of uncertainty, international trade flows have been found to decrease (Matzner, 2023). Trade disruptions are more damaging when a commodity market is ‘thin’, that is, there are few major exporters, given trade shocks are less easily dissipated. A reliance on a small number of trading partners can lead to vulnerability to such shocks for all countries involved (OECD-FAO, 2023). Few countries source a large variety of commodities from a wide range of exporters, meaning lots of countries are at risk. There is a case for further trade liberalisation to ‘thicken’ international markets to ensure greater food security. The last couple of years has seen a number of major shocks which tested the resilience of the international trading system.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting global recession were accompanied by reduced food trade flows, driven in part by labour market disruptions and exacerbated by 14 countries suspending or banning grain exports (Springmann et Al.(2021)) (although these were short lived and transitory (OECD-FAO, 2023)). The swift rebound of trade following the COVID-19 shock highlights the resilience of the global trading system.

Following this shock, increasing geopolitical instability due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused supply-chain disruptions for some staple crops and cereals. Ukraine is a major producer of wheat and exported approximately 11% of global wheat exports in the 2019/2020 season. This has since fallen to 8% of global wheat exports for the 2023/2024 season (USDA). A reduction in Ukrainian exports of these staples has caused a global reduction in supply, which has put temporary upward pressure on global prices, reducing the affordability of these commodities. The impact of the war on food prices is covered in further detail in the case study on the role of maritime trade chokepoints in global food security.

India announced large-scale bans on rice exports in August 2022 in an attempt to shelter its domestic market from the increase in global rice prices. This is covered in greater detail in the case study on export restrictions.

Global reliance on imports

Figure 1.3.3c: IFPRI Food Import Dependence Ratio (%) for all 3 staple foods (Wheat, Rice, Maize), 2020

Source: IFPRI

Figure 1.3.3c depicts countries’ reliance on food imports. Globally, 44 countries have a food import dependence ratio above 80%, meaning their food supply is at least 80% reliant on food imports. This is much greater than the 50% threshold for ‘Very High’ import dependence. The countries are distributed unevenly across the world, with a larger proportion in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East. Conversely, countries in North America, Asia, and most of Europe tend to have ‘Very Low’ to ’Self-sufficient’ statuses (5% to 19% and -5% to 5%, respectively) for their food import dependence, though this is not universal. The UK’s net trade of wheat is covered in further detail in Theme 3 Indicator 3.1.2.

A large proportion of countries in Northern Africa, Southern Africa, the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia source at least 40% of their calories from the three main staples (wheat, rice and maize). The United States, Canada, and much of Europe consume less than 30% of their calories from the main 3 staples (IFPRI). In lower-income countries, cereals account for a larger proportion of calories consumed because as income rises, people tend to substitute some of their cereal consumption for higher value food products (USDA). This suggests that trade in cereals is more significant for the food security of lower-income net food importing countries, because they make up a larger proportion of their calorie intake and they rely on cereal imports to meet domestic demand. It also means that shocks in the supply of these foods, for example from the Russian invasion of Ukraine on global wheat supply, and from export restrictions can have a disproportionate impact in these areas. During the peak of recent export restrictive measures, for instance, 100% of the calories consumed through food imports in the Western Sahara were subject to restrictions. Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan faced over 50% of their imported calorific intake under restriction, followed by Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Egypt with restrictions imposed on over 40% of their imported calories. As of August 2024, 8% of globally traded supply of calories (excluding intra-EU trade) is subject to restrictions (IFPRI). The wider implications of export restrictions are explored further in the case study on export restrictions below which looks at the impact of India’s export restrictions on rice.

Market concentration by exporting country

Market power in any market can have economically harmful effects on prices and supplies. If exports of agricultural commodities are heavily concentrated in one or two countries, overall market supplies could be vulnerable to country specific supply shocks. They are also vulnerable to economically or politically motivated national actions such as export restrictive measures, creating large price spikes or shortages.

Having a more diverse supply from a variety of countries is generally associated with higher levels of food security as diversity of supply spreads the risk of supply chain disruptions. However, factors such as changes to agricultural trade policy, regional weather events, and the political economic situation of leading suppliers also pose risks to supply.

Figure 1.3.3d illustrates the top three exporting countries by volume and export share for key agricultural commodities in selected time periods. These top 3 countries cumulatively made up 91% of soybean, 79% of pork, 70% of maize, 65% of rice, 48% wheat and 47% of beef exports between 2021 and 2023.

Figure 1.3.3d: Top 3 global export shares for selected commodities, MYE 2002-2004 and MYE 2021-2023

Source: USDA PSD

	2002 - 2004			2021 – 2023
Commodity	Country	Annual Average Exports (million tonnes)	Global Export Share	Country	Annual Average Exports (million tonnes)	Global Export Share
Maize	United States	44.9	58.2%	United States	58.3	30.7%
	Argentina	12.2	15.9%	Brazil	41.2	21.7%
	China	10.1	13.1%	Argentina	33.6	17.7%
	Total	67.3	87.2%	Total	133.1	70.0%
Beef and veal	Australia	1.3	20.1%	Brazil	2.6	22.5%
	Brazil	1.2	18.5%	United States	1.5	13.1%
	United States	0.8	12.5%	India	1.4	12.0%
	Total	3.4	51.1%	Total	5.5	47.5%
Pigmeat	European Union	1.1	26.5%	European Union	4.8	40.1%
	Canada	0.9	22.4%	United States	3.1	26.2%
	United States	0.8	19.9%	Canada	1.5	12.4%
	Total	2.9	68.7%	Total	9.4	78.8%
Soybean	United States	27.5	45.3%	Brazil	85.4	52.1%
	Brazil	20.1	33.1%	United States	58.0	35.4%
	Argentina	8.3	13.7%	Paraguay	5.0	3.1%
	Total	55.8	92.1%	Total	148.5	90.7%
Milled rice	Thailand	8.3	29.5%	India	20.8	38.1%
	Vietnam	4.4	15.7%	Thailand	7.6	13.8%
	India	4.4	15.5%	Vietnam	7.2	13.2%
	Total	17.1	60.7%	Total	35.6	64.8%
Wheat	United States	27.9	25.7%	Russia	40.0	19.4%
	European Union	14.3	13.2%	European Union	32.2	15.4%
	Australia	14.0	12.9%	Australia	27.7	13.2%
	Total	56.1	51.8%	Total	100.6	48.0%

Note: MYE market(ing) years

Figure 1.3.3d above shows that soybean exports are more concentrated than other listed commodities, with the top 3 countries making up 91% of soybean exports on average over MYE 2021 to 2023. This is partly due to countries like Brazil and the US having a competitive advantage over other exporters. Higher concentration is generally viewed as presenting a greater risk to global food security, however, there are factors, such as the substitutability of the commodity which also impact the overall risk. For example, while soybeans have fewer exporters, soybean oil can be replaced by other alternatives, such as rapeseed and palm oil, which reduces the global food security risk of having a more concentrated market. Wheat on the other hand has a lower export concentration; however, it has limited alternatives, which makes its exports more sensitive to shocks as importers seek alternative suppliers, potentially resulting in sharper price increases. For other commodities the top 3 countries made up versus 79% for pork, 70% for maize, 65% for rice, 48% for wheat and 47% for beef. These percentages are generally similar to the situation twenty years earlier with the exception of maize where three countries accounted for 87%, and pork with 69%.

Over the last 20 years (MYE2002-2004 to MYE2021-2023), maize and soybeans have experienced the largest changes in export concentration between the six listed commodities. Maize exports have become more diverse due to changes in the USA’s biofuels policy which was implemented in 2005 to increase energy security. While the USA continues to export maize, a significant amount is now used for domestic ethanol production. This created export opportunities for other countries, such as Brazil and Argentina. On the other hand, export shares of the two main soybean exporters, the USA and Brazil, have increased considerably. Other commodities have generally remained stable over the same period.

Given the concentration in the grain network, countries are least resilient to disruptions in such commodities (Krakoc and others, 2021). Historically, trade in grain was dominated by the USA, however, production has become more balanced, with growing exporting centres in Russia, India, France, and other countries (Wang and others, 2021). Export restrictions on grain, particularly when imposed by top exporting countries, can therefore be detrimental to food security, especially when imposed on ‘thin’ markets, which means there are few major exporters and trade shocks are less easily dissipated. Rice is relatively ‘thin’ when compared to other grains (IFPRI, 2023) with only around 10% of rice produced being traded internationally. Such restrictions limit the global supply, increasing the world price and price volatility, and reducing the affordability of these commodities. This jeopardises domestic food security, particularly for net food-importing countries. This is explored further in the case study on export restrictions below.

Forward look

Growth of agricultural trade is expected to slow down following major increase in the share of production globally traded across the last two decades. Although continued steady growth is anticipated, this may be at a lower rate than we have seen in recent decades due to the diminishing advances in trade liberalisation (OECD-FAO, 2024).

According to agricultural projections from the OECD-FAO for the period from 2023 to 2032, cereal trade (maize, wheat and rice) country shares are expected to change. Russia, a key wheat exporter, is estimated to account for 23% of global wheat exports (current average 19%) in 2032, with the EU accounting for 17% (currently 15%). Canada’s share of global wheat exports is projected to increase to 13% over the same period. Maize exports are expected to grow, with the projected top five exporters in 2032 (US, Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine and Russia) estimated to account for 88% of the total trade. Asian countries will continue to dominate the rice markets, with India projected to have around 40% of the export share in 2032, Thailand 18% and Vietnam 12%.

As the world experiences the impacts of climate change, extreme weather events, such as extreme heat events, tropical storms, and wildfires, are growing in prevalence. The increased frequency of these events may, in turn, force up the world price of staples (Challinor and Benton, 2021). However, an operational global food trading system helps to maintain food security, mitigating price spikes caused by domestic weather shocks (OECD, 2023). International food security may be hindered because of increasing uncertainty which could reduce countries’ willingness to export (Matzner, Meyer and Oberhofer, 2023). This has implications for countries that are heavily reliant on imports.

Case Study 2: Export restrictions

Introduction

In response to surges in global agricultural commodity prices, some countries may impose export restrictive measures (such as export bans, export quotas, export taxes) on agri-food products with the aim of insulating their respective domestic markets and consumers from the effects of international price spikes and supply-chain disruptions. Export restrictions are imposed in response to supply and price shocks, with recent years seeing the most measures imposed since the 2007 to 2008 food crisis, in response to events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (AMIS Policy Database, 2024). These measures exacerbate volatility in agricultural markets and drive higher global prices with the evidence on the effectiveness of domestic price stabilisation mixed. However, they do leave low-income net food importing developing countries particularly vulnerable to higher food prices (IFPRI, 2024). The restrictions imposed by India on rice exports in 2022 provide a useful case study of highlighting the implications of these measures for food security.

Description and analysis

Export restrictive measures are imposed to limit the volume of goods exported by a country to ensure there is sufficient supply for domestic consumption and to protect domestic markets, shielding consumers from global supply-chain disruptions and price spikes. As domestic production can no longer be exported, in theory, there should be more stable domestic supply, and consumers should benefit from lower prices relative to the global market. However, lower domestic prices can disincentivise production as gains from foreign exchange are no longer possible for domestic producers and millers, affecting their incomes and profitability (Akhter Ali and others, 2024). The WTO operates the global system of trade rules, whereby export restrictive measures are generally prohibited, except in certain circumstances for agri-food products, such as to respond to a critical food shortage (WTO, 2024).

India is among the most competitive white rice suppliers on the global market since 2020 and accounted for 40% of global rice trade in 2022, exporting more than the next four largest exporters combined (USDA, 2023). In August 2022, India banned exports of broken rice and imposed additional duties on the export of non-basmati white rice (excluding parboiled rice). This was followed by a ban on exports of non-basmati rice in July 2023 and further restrictions on basmati rice and parboiled rice in August 2023 (IFPRI, 2024). This was with the aim to stabilise domestic supply and prices but also to protect falling levels of closing public stock holdings, which fell by 8% and 5% in 2022 and 2023, respectively, from 2021 levels (USDA, 2024).

Figure 1.3.3e: Nominal monthly prices of Thai 5% white rice ($/mt), January 2004 to October 2024

Source: World Bank Pink Sheet (2024)

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Note: Areas of grey indicate periods of export restrictions imposed by India. The grey line indicates the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the red line marks the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

India’s export restrictions resulted in its rice exports falling sharply with export quotes rising significantly in response to tightened supply. Indian parboiled 5% rice quotes increased by 42% and 41% in 2022 and 2023 respectively (FAO, 2024). While in August 2023 the benchmark Thai 5% white rice price climbed to its highest level in 15 years ($635/tonne) (IFPRI, 2024) partly in response to the Indian export ban on-basmati white rice; this price level is 30% lower than its 2008 peak (Figure 1.3.3e) (World Bank, 2024).

In response to India’s restrictions, importers responded by switching rice purchases to other large suppliers such as Pakistan, Vietnam, and Thailand. However, this further pushed up prices as demand outstripped the global supply of rice. Moreover, in some cases, other suppliers have struggled to sustain increased demand, putting pressure on production. This has led some smaller exporters, such as Myanmar and the Philippines, imposing their own restrictions on rice exports to mitigate against further price rises.

The sharp rises and variation in India’s rice export quotes have disproportionately affected countries who are either import dependent or lower income. Of the 15 countries that imported more than 100,000 metric tonnes of rice from India in 2022, 7 were Least Developed Countries (IFPRI, 2023). Nepal and Bangladesh were hardest hit by price rises: between May 2023 and May 2024 the price of rice in Nepal rose 29% to 75 Nepalese rupees per kg, and by 10% in Sri Lanka to 210 Sri Lankan Rupees per kg (FAO, 2024). Both countries are heavily dependent on Indian rice imports with high proportions of daily calorie consumption coming from rice. In Sri Lanka, an average of 41% of per capita daily calories comes from rice (IFPRI, 2024).

Supply-side factors, particularly weather events, such as those associated with El Niño and La Niña, have also affected production and planting decisions, though exports from Pakistan, the USA and Myanmar have increased (by approximately 2 million metric tonnes) between June 2023 and May 2024 compared to the previous year over the same period (IFPRI, 2024).

Conclusion

Ensuring stable and predictable agri-food markets, and allowing agri-food trade to flow, plays an important role in global food security.

India’s export restrictions on rice have contributed to a considerable disruption in global rice markets. The benchmark Thai 5% white rice price increased by over 20% by August 2023, in nominal terms, and has since remained at those elevated levels (around $600 per mt). As noted, this has caused particular food security challenges for low-income and import-dependent developing countries.

Following on from report of record-high stock levels, the Indian government lifted the export ban on non-basmati rice and imposed a minimum export price on 28 September 2024, which it subsequently removed (DGTF, 2024). Rice prices hit a one-year low with month-on-month prices in October falling by 11.2% due to limited buying interest ahead of upcoming harvests.

Given the importance of India as a rice producer and exporter, these changes are likely to help to reduce and stabilise global rice prices, in turn easing inflationary pressures on importing countries (IFPRI, 2024).

Case Study 3: The role of maritime trade chokepoints in global food security

Introduction

As around 80% of the volume of global trade is transported through oceans (UNCTAD, 2024), maritime chokepoints play an essential role in facilitating international trade by serving as critical waterways connecting larger areas. Geopolitical tensions and conflict have recently disrupted the flow of goods and services in some of these straits where high volumes of traffic converge, leading to shortages and increases in production costs. The recent events in the Black Sea and Red Sea present illustrative examples of how disruptions at strategic trade chokepoints can lead to different short-term and longer-term impacts on global trade and food security.

Description and Analysis

Black Sea: Restrictions imposed by Russian forces on the Ukrainian fleet from using the Black Sea when the war started in February 2022 led to a fall in traffic through the Turkish Straits and a subsequent rise in global commodity prices, particularly across grains. Before the start of the war, over 20% and 15% of global wheat and maize exports, respectively, used the Turkish Straits (Chatham House, 2024). By April 2022, two months into the war, wheat and maize prices rose by 58% and 38%, respectively (AMIS, 2022).

The significant rise in prices contributed to food inflation, particularly in developing countries which faced a ‘double burden’ after both the US dollar and price of grain rose sharply, leading to significant increases in import prices and inflationary pressure on importing economies (UNCTAD, 2022). The case of Egypt, a major wheat importer, is explored further in the case study on the role of exchange rates on food prices in Egypt. This situation was exacerbated by sharp increases in the price of gas in Europe, where prices reached around $70/ Million Metric British Thermal Units (mmbtu) while US gas prices remained under $10/mmbtu in August 2022 (IEA, 2022). This led to higher fertiliser prices (an 87.7% increase year on year) and overall increases to the cost of grain inputs (AMIS, 2022). Some of the global pressure on price was alleviated by the Black Sea Grain Initiative which allowed nearly 3 million tonnes of commodities, including grain and fertiliser, to be exported to other countries.

However, while restrictions in the Black Sea led to some disruptions to the price of grains, which affected some countries significantly, larger impacts on the price of grains were caused by the conflict between the two major wheat and maize exporters, which affected levels of Ukrainian production and exports. The harvested area in Ukraine for wheat, corn and barley declined by 32%, 23% and 37%, respectively between 2021 to 2022 and 2023 to 2024 (USDA, 2024).

Red Sea:

Figure 1.3.3f: Daily transit trade volume at selected chokepoints, tonnes, January 2023 to June 2024

Source: IMF Portmonitor (2024)

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Note: Dashed line indicates start of Houthi attacks

Deliberate attacks by Houthis on shipping vessels in the Suez Canal in Egypt in November 2023 affected an area responsible for around 12% to 15% of global trade, leading to a number of significant supply-chain disruptions, particularly in the shipping industry (UNCTAD, 2024). Transits originally planned to pass through the conflict zone were diverted to the Cape of Good Hope, which led to higher transportation costs and delays of more than 10 days (Kamali and others, 2024). In the first two months of 2024, the volume of trade passing through the Suez Canal fell by 50%, leading to a 74% increase in the volume of trade passing through the Cape of Good Hope over the same period in comparison to the previous year (Figure 1.3.3f).

The attack and diversion of transits led to a wide range of price increases. Container prices were affected by the attack (see Figure 1.3.2a in Indicator 1.3.2), as were insurance premiums which rose sharply following the increase in risk. The expansion of the Houthi attacks to other areas, such as in the Indian ocean, created additional challenges for the shipping industry, with price implications for rice. As the quotations for Asia – Europe containerised shipping increased by up to six times, large rice exporters including India, Thailand and Vietnam, which use the Red Sea as their main route for exporters saw increases in rice prices, a commodity primarily shipped in containers (AMIS, 2024).

Conclusion

Recent events in the Black Sea and Red Sea show the role of maritime chokepoints in catalysing global supply chain disruptions. While these examples outline some of the short-term disruptions to global trade following these incidents, they also highlight the overall resilience of the global trading system, which has found alternatives. It is worth noting that these issues have been exacerbated by recent weather events and climate change, which have affected other important maritime chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and Rhine River. However, the UK is expected to only be significantly negatively affected by chokepoints where the disruption affects products where Europe is a net importer. The prospect of multiple chokepoints facing difficulties, remains a scenario to be monitored for its exact effect on food security.

Sub-theme 4: Global food and nutrition insecurity

1.4.1 Global food and nutrition insecurity

Rationale

The following indicators provide some measure of the ‘access’ and ‘utilisation’ dimensions of global food security to complement the preceding analysis primarily focused on global food availability. By considering these in tandem with each other, and with the understanding that they only present part of global food accessibility and utilisation, they highlight ongoing issues in the distribution of global food production.

The headline data set shows the prevalence of undernourishment across the world, which is most prevalent in low-income countries, and is a useful indicator of global food insecurity. Here ‘undernourishment’ means that a person’s regular food consumption over a year was insufficient to maintain a normal, active and healthy life. It provides an indication of how global and national food production is distributed and the extent to which populations can access food.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.4.1a: Number of undernourished people, World, 2000 to 2023

Source: FAOSTAT, 2023 (SDG2.1.1)

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It is estimated that there were 733 million people in the world living with undernourishment in 2023, equivalent to 152 million people more than in 2019. By region, Asia is home to more than half of the world’s population with undernourishment (384.5 million). In Africa, 298.4 million people may have faced hunger in 2023.

The prevalence of undernourishment (PoU), a measure of hunger used to assess progress towards SDG Target 2.1, decreased between 2005 and 2017. However, since 2018 levels have been increasing. A substantial rise in global PoU occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. The proportion of people with chronic undernourishment in the world rose from 7.5% in 2019 to an estimated 9% in 2021. Subsequently the global PoU has remained relatively static, with the most recent estimates showing a PoU of 9.1% in 2023, which is indicative of a lack of progress in recent years towards achieving SDG 2 ‘Zero Hunger’. Africa is the region with the largest PoU (20.4%). In comparison 8.1% in Asia, 6.2% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 7.3% of people in Oceania were PoU (FAO; IFAD; The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF); WFP ;WHO, 2024).

While there has been some progress, improvements have been uneven. From 2021 to 2023, progress was made towards reducing hunger in Latin America and the Caribbean and is relatively unchanged in Asia. However, hunger has been on the rise in Africa between 2015 and 2023. In all regions, the prevalence of undernourishment is still above pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. High and persistent inequalities continue to drive hunger around the world.

Supporting evidence

Moderate or severe food insecurity

Figure 1.4.1b: Number of moderately or severely food insecure people, World, 2014 to 2023

Source: FAO, 2023 (SDG 2.1.2)

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The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), is the second indicator of food access used to measure global food insecurity and track progress towards the realisation of SDG target 2.1. People experiencing moderate food insecurity have reduced the quality and/ or quantity of their food and are uncertain about their ability to obtain food due to lack of money or other resources. People experiencing severe food insecurity have run out of food and, at the most extreme, have gone days without eating (FAO).

In 2023, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population was estimated at 28.9% (FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2024). In other words, in 2023 there were an estimated 2.326 billion people in the world without access to adequate food (Figure 1.4.1b). The number of people experiencing moderate or severe food insecurity has been rising since 2014, with a notable rise occurring in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when an additional 317 million were found to be facing moderate or severe food insecurity compared to 2019. Since then, the number of moderately or severely food insecure people in the world has increased by close to 66 million, while the prevalence has remained broadly stable owing to population growth (FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2024).

Breaking this down by region, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in Africa was 58.0%. This was nearly double the global average. In Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Oceania, the prevalence is closer to the global average estimate. The prevalence remained virtually unchanged between 2022 and 2023 in Africa, Asia, and Northern America and Europe, and worsened in Oceania. However notable progress was made in Latin America.

Acute food insecurity

While the previous two indicators are considered as measures of chronic food insecurity, acute food insecurity can be regarded as a more transitory manifestation of food insecurity (that is reflecting a shorter-term or more temporary inability to meet dietary energy requirements), but that is of a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both (Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024; FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2023). While the indicators of chronic food insecurity described above are available at the global level, data on acute food insecurity reported in the Global Report on Food Crisis (GRFC) is only provided for a limited number of countries and territories that are identified as being in food crisis (Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024; see also FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2023: box 1. Also see boxes 2 and 8 for further details on conceptual, geographical and methodological differences between measures of chronic food insecurity and acute food insecurity as well as brief analyses).

Figure 1.4.1c: Number of people and share of analysed population in GRFC countries/territories facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016 to 2024 

Source: IPC/CH, FEWSNET and WFP – Food Security Information Network

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The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification provides a classification of 5 levels of food insecurity, where levels 3 and above (‘3 Crisis,’ ‘4 Emergency’ and ‘5 Catastrophe/Famine’) indicate a high level of acute food insecurity. ‘Crisis’ is defined as experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity requiring urgent food and livelihood assistance. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has steadily risen between 2018 and 2023 (Figure 1.4.1c). In 2023, 281.6 million people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity, close to 2.5 times more than in 2018 (Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024).

The 2024 GRFC identified 59 food-crisis countries and territories in 2023, of which 36 were classified as protracted food crises as they required emergency assistance and had evidence of populations facing acute food insecurity in all editions of the GRFC, which has been published since 2016 (Global Network Against Food Crises, 2024). In 2023, the prevalence of high acute food insecurity was 21.5% of the analysed population, representing a slight decrease compared to the peak of 22.7% recorded in 2022 (in 58 countries and territories). However, this was a 5 pp increase compared to pre-COVID- 19 pandemic levels and over 10 pp above the prevalence recorded in 2016 (when 48 countries were analysed).

The GRFC data and analysis highlights how economic shocks, conflict and weather extremes are the primary drivers of high acute food insecurity. In 2023, economic shocks were found to be the primary driver of high acute food insecurity for 21 of the 59 countries analysed (affecting 75.2 million people). Conflict and insecurity were the primary drivers identified for 20 countries (affecting 134.5 million people). Finally, weather and extreme events was the primary driver in 18 countries (affecting 71.9 million people). These events are driving an increase in the number of displaced people in countries experiencing food crises: 90.2 million people were displaced across the 59 countries covered by the GRFC in 2023, an increase of 13.6 million people since 2021.

Further information on the data underpinning the GRFC can be found here: GRFC Technical Notes.

Child malnutrition

Malnutrition refers to deficiencies, excesses, or imbalances in a person’s intake of energy and/ or nutrients (WHO, 2024).The three main indicators of child malnutrition, tracked by the Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates, 2023, are stunting (too short for one’s age), wasting (too thin for one’s height) and living with overweight (too heavy for one’s height). These remain an ongoing issue for children around the world.

The prevalence of children under 5 years of age affected by stunting has fallen since 2000 (from 33.0% to 22.3% in 2022), with a decrease of 0.4 pp between 2020 and 2022. However, there were still over 148 million children under 5 in the world that were affected by stunting in 2022. Stunting is regionally concentrated, with Asia (52%) and Africa (43%) making up 95% of total global cases.

The prevalence of children under 5 experiencing wasting has also fallen between 2000 and 2022, albeit at a slower pace (1.9 pp reduction over the period and virtually no change since 2020). In 2022, 45 million children under 5 were affected by wasting, corresponding to 6.8% of the under 5 population in the world. Most children under 5 who experience wasting live in either Asia (70%) or Africa (27%). Child malnutrition is directly affected by maternal nutrition, with long-term health consequences including higher risks of children being wasted, stunted, or both.

In addition, the number of children who are living with overweight under the age of 5 continues to increase. The prevalence of children under 5 who are living with overweight has increased by 0.3 pp to 5.6% between 2000 and 2022. While the large majority of the children under 5 affected by overweight live in Asia (48% of the global under 5 population living with overweight) and Africa (28%), the highest rates of prevalence are found in Australia and New Zealand at 19.3% in 2022.

Adults and children living with obesity

Obesity is another component of malnutrition and can negatively affect a person’s health. It is important to track given the continuation of a longer term rapidly rising trend in global rates of people living with obesity. Adult obesity rates more than doubled between 1990 and 2022 reaching around 16% of the adult world population. Over this period adolescent obesity quadrupled. In 1990, 2% of children and adolescents aged 5 – 19 were living with obesity. By 2022, 8% of children and adolescents were living with obesity (160 million). In most cases obesity is caused by environmental factors, such as limited availability of healthy sustainable food at locally affordable prices, lack of safe and easy physical mobility into daily life, and absence of adequate legal and regulatory environment. See Theme 4 (Indicator 4.3.2 Healthy diet) for analysis of the number of people who are living with obesity on the UK level. The global food system therefore exhibits negative trends on both ends of the spectrum, underconsumption and overconsumption.

Affordability of a healthy diet

Figure 1.4.1d: Percentage of the population unable to afford a healthy diet, 2017 to 2022

Source: CoAHD, FAO and World Bank, 2024

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Between 2019 and 2022, the percentage of the global population that was unable to afford a healthy diet fell from 36.4% to 35.4% (Figure 1.4.1d), where ‘healthy diet’ is defined using a global standard Healthy Diet Basket (HDB). The HDB is based on 10 regional food based dietary guidelines (FBDG), in themselves summaries of national FBDGs that countries have developed to reflect their locally available foods and cultural context. The HDB is designed to meet a dietary intake of 2330 kcal per day (FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2024, annex 1B). In 2022, the highest proportions were found in Africa (64.8%), Asia (35.1%) and Latin America and the Caribbean (27.7%), The lowest proportions were found in the developed economies of North America and Europe (4.8%) and Australia and New Zealand (3.2%). It was 2.5% in the UK in 2022 (FAOSTAT, 2024).

Forward look

Projections from the 2024 SOFI report show that the global aim of eradicating hunger by 2030 is unlikely to be achieved (FAO ; IFAD ; UNICEF ; WFP ; WHO, 2024). By 2030, it is projected there will be 582 million people with chronic undernourishment (6.8% of the global population). Among regions with a PoU above 2.5%, Asia is projected to see a drop in the number of people with undernourishment during the second half of the decade, and in Latin America and the Caribbean the number of people with undernourishment are expected to continue to reduce but at a much slower pace. In Africa, the number of people living with undernourishment is projected to reach 308.1 million by 2030, rendering it the region with the highest number of people with undernourishment in the world.

In terms of the indicators used to track progress towards global nutrition targets for children under 5 years of age, stunting and wasting prevalence are projected to continue to decline, but at a pace insufficient to meet the 2030 targets, and the prevalence of overweight children under the age of 5 is projected to remain broadly stable reaching 5.7% by 2030, which is close to double the 3% target (Figure 10-SOFI, 2024). Underlying this, more countries are off-track than on-track to meet the 2030 stunting and overweight targets. For instance, according to the Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates, 2023, less than one-third of countries (29%) are on track to reach the SDG target of halving the rate of stunting. The annual average rate of reduction (AARR) would need to increase from the current 1.65% AARR (based on the 2012-2022 period) to 6.08% AARR between 2022 and 2030 to achieve the target of 13.5% of children under 5 affected by stunting. While a larger number of countries among those assessed are considered on-track (68 countries) than off-track (55 countries) to meet the wasting target, the majority of children under 5 years of age live in the latter group of countries (Figure 11-SOFI, 2024).

OECD-FAO project the daily per capita calorie intake (consumption net of household waste) to have the largest rise in developing and emerging economies between 2024 and 2033 (OECD-FAO, 2024 Figure 1.8). They correlate this with a modest increase in food intake in low-income countries (positive economic growth will be accompanied with ever growing population sizes). However, global diversification of diets remains slow due to income constraints and cultural preferences. In the same period, the share of dietary energy from nutrient-rich animal products, fruits and vegetables in middle-income countries is projected to increase by around 1%. This share is projected to be unchanged for low-income countries meaning the bulk of calories (71%) would continue to be provided through staple foods.

Sub-theme 5: Sustainability

1.5.1 Global land degradation

Rationale

This indicator shows the proportion of land which is degraded by region. Land degradation is defined as ‘the reduction or loss of the biological or economic productivity and complexity of rain fed cropland, irrigated cropland, or range, pasture, forest and woodlands resulting from a combination of pressures, including land use and management practices’ (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD, 1994). Given the dependence of food production and crop yield growth on productive land, land degradation has a direct implication for food security.

Headline evidence

Figure 1.5.1a: Proportion of land that is degraded over total land area in 2015 to 2019

Source: UN SDG 15.3.1

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Data note: based on 115 country-generated data values and 52 estimates generated by the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Data is missing for some countries, including the United States of America and Russia.

Between 2015 and 2019 the amount of land globally which was reported as being degraded increased by 4.2 pp, from 11.3% to 15.5% (see Figure 1.5.1a). All regions saw an increase in land degradation between 2015 and 2019. In 2019, the region with the largest proportion of degraded land was Eastern Asia (26.3%), while Northern Africa remained the region with the lowest share of degraded land (4.6%). The biggest increases occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa (from 6.7% in 2015 to 14.6% in 2019), Western Asia (from 4.7% to 11.7%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (15.7% to 21.9%).

Supporting evidence

Figure 1.5.1b: Global area of agricultural land degraded, deteriorating and at risk, 2021

Source: FAO State of Land and Water report in 2021

Crop		Degraded		Deteriorated		At Risk
	Total (Mha)	Area (Mha)	%	Area (Mha)	%	Area (Mha)	%
Cropland	1527	479	31%	268	18%	472	31%
of which:
Rainfed	1212	340	28%	212	17%	322	27%
Irrigated	315	139	44%	57	18%	151	48%
Grassland	1910	246	13%	642	34%	660	35%

Available evidence suggests that land is currently degrading faster than it can be restored, and agriculture plays a disproportionate role as the largest single source of land and environmental degradation. Food systems are responsible for 80% of land conversion (UNCCD, 2022). The FAO State of Land and Water report (SOLAW) in 2021 assessed land degradation by combining data across four categories (soil, water, vegetation and demography) and found that 43% of land globally was affected by a deterioration of status and 13% of land degradation was human-induced based on a 2015 assessment. The report also found that almost all inhabited parts of the world were subject to some form of human-induced land degradation, with areas affected by human-induced land degradation covering 1,660 Mha (million hectares), of which 850 Mha was moderately to severely degraded and 810 Mha slightly degraded. Grazing occurred in 75% of the identified regions, followed by accessibility; where human-induced land degradation has occurred due to proximity to an urban area (71%) and agricultural expansion (64%) (Figure 7, FAO, 2021). Figure 1.5.1b (see above) shows that 80% of cropland and 82% of grassland was degraded, deteriorating or at risk of doing so. Across cropland, the percentage of irrigated cropland that is degraded was nearly 60% greater (44% or 57Mha) than that of rainfed cropland (28% or 212 Mha), generally due to good accessibility and high grazing density exerting significant pressures on irrigated fields.

Agricultural land degradation undermines global food security. Agriculture is the leading cause of soil degradation, which forms an important component of land degradation. Healthy soils are essential for long-term sustainable agricultural productivity, food and nutrition security, yet one third of soil globally is already degraded, reducing the quality and quantity of crops and food produced (FAO).The leading causes of soil degradation are agricultural intensification through excessive and mis-use of chemical inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides, antibiotics and lime, the negative effects of which are discussed in Indicator 1.2.3 Global fertiliser production. Monoculture production systems, repeat soil disturbance, deforestation, of which agriculture is the leading driver, and climate change also drive soil degradation. Agricultural land degradation is also associated with pollinator decline (Dicks and others, 2021; Potts and others, 2010; UNEP, 2010) and water-related issues, which are covered in further detail in Indicators 1.2.4 Water availability, usage and quality for global agriculture and 1.5.2 Global One Health respectively. A further consideration regarding land degradation is the impact of land use change, covered in Indicator 1.2.2 Global land use change.

Land restoration

Restoring land is associated with greater food security, as land becomes more productive and able to provide for growth in global food demand, while reducing GHG emissions and environmental impacts, in addition to economic benefits (WRI, 2023; UNCCD, 2022). The United Nations SDG 15.3.1 tracks progress towards achieving land degradation neutrality (LDN), “a state whereby the amount and quality of land resources necessary to support ecosystem functions and services to enhance food security remain stable, or increase, within specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems.” 196 countries are aiming to achieve LDN by 2030 (UNCCD, 2024), which, if current trends continue, would require 1.5 billion hectares of degraded land to be restored by 2030 to achieve land degradation neutrality around the globe (UNCCD, 2024).

Some countries have had success in restoring their land. The Dominican Republic and Botswana saw the proportion of degraded land decrease from 49% to 31% and from 36% to 17%, respectively, between 2015 and 2019 (UNCCD,2024). Similarly, over the period from 2011 to 2020 Costa Rica made around 48% progress towards reaching its national goal of restoring 1 million hectares by 2030 (Nello, Rivera and Putzeys, 2023).

1.5.2 Global One Health

Rationale

This indicator tracks risks to global One Health. The One Health approach recognises that the health of humans, domestic and wild animals, plants, and the wider environment (including ecosystems) are closely linked and interdependent (WHO).

Traditionally, plant and animal health risks have been analysed in isolation. Taking a One Health approach means that animal or plant pests and diseases can be assessed holistically. For example, the 2014-2016 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa (CDC, 2024) would have had a higher effect on the overall food security in West Africa (FAO, 2016) than Foot and Mouth Disease which is endemic in the region. Similarly, other risks such as natural hazards, and water supply and safety could affect the health of workers in the food supply chain which in turn could affect food security.

Common One Health issues threatening people, animal and the environment include endemic zoonotic diseases, vector-borne diseases, antimicrobial resistance, food safety, environmental contamination and climate change. This indicator focuses on animal and plant health, antimicrobial resistance, and the health of ecosystems (assessed through biodiversity) (CDC, 2024). The Global One Health Index Food Security (GOHI-FS) is then used to assess current global One Health status. Other aspects of One Health are covered elsewhere in this report, for instance in Indicator 1.2.4 Water availability, usage and quality for global agriculture, and Theme 5 Food Safety and Consumer Confidence.

Pests and disease cause food production losses around the world, with potential for outbreaks to limit the availability of important crops. Measuring the global impact of crop disease is complex and beyond the scope of this report. However, the effect of individual pests and disease on crop production is well documented. This indicator covers two significant global plant pest and diseases threatening food security according to the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). Banana Fusarium Tropical Race 4 (TR4) threatens bananas while Fall Armyworm (FAW) threatens maize.

Headline evidence

Fusarium Wilt of Banana

Figure 1.5.2a: Global banana production, tonnes, 1961 to 2022

Source: FAOSTAT Crops and livestock production, 2024

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Note: The grey shaded area indicates period of reduced growth in banana production.

Bananas are among the most produced, traded and consumed fruits in the world and are particularly important to some of the least developed, food deficit countries, where they contribute to both household food security and income generation (FAO, 2024). In the UK, households purchased more bananas than any other type of fresh fruit in 2021 and 2022 (Defra, 2024). Details of UK banana imports can be found in Theme 2 (Indicator 2.1.4 Fruits and vegetables).

Fusarium wilt of banana (FWB) is a disease that has previously posed a significant risk to banana production. FWB is very difficult to control and caused the collapse of the banana industry in the mid-twentieth century, when production was based on the Gros Michel cultivar. Gros Michel was replaced with a resistant cultivar, Cavendish, which is now the most prevalent commercial banana and commonly grown in large monocultures. However, a new strain of FWB called TR4 affects the Cavendish varieties and can result in the loss of the entire crop on plantations. Its effect on global banana production is visible in the limited growth in banana production between 2011 and 2019 (Figure 1.5.2a) (rising by only 6.8%). Growth in banana production has returned and increased by 15% between 2017 and 2022. However, TR4 still represents a significant risk to food and income security in communities where bananas are grown. The IPPC Secretariat has been coordinating global efforts to prevent the spread and impact of TR4. The three main control strategies are to use varieties with disease resistance and consumer acceptance, maintain good soil health management practices, and use agronomic practices (CGIAR). Banana growers are increasingly managing TR4 by applying beneficial microorganisms and organic fertilisers in combination with resistant varieties.

Fall Armyworm (FAW)

FAW is a notable plant pest that feeds mainly on maize, as well as 80 other crops. FAW has the potential to spread rapidly worldwide and is a threat to global food security, affecting over 70 countries and regions. Based on FAO estimates from 12 African countries, up to 17.7 million tonnes of maize could be lost annually due to FAW, equivalent to USD 2.5 to 6.2 billion, and enough to feed tens of millions of people. Once established in a new territory, FAW is impossible to eradicate. The IPPC are coordinating global efforts to control its spread (IPCC). A map of the spread of FAW between 2016 and July 2024 can be found here (FAO).

Animal diseases

Animal diseases carry a potential threat to the supply of meat and livestock related foods. Several animal diseases directly result in the animal’s death, or the animal being culled for the purpose of disease control. Moreover, animal diseases carry additional risks in terms of zoonotic diseases which have the potential to transmit to the human population.

Animal diseases are also associated with significant reduction in global livestock productivity. Industry groups estimate that in 2018 animal diseases caused global poultry production to fall by 2.8 million tonnes, and in low-income countries poultry production levels were likely reduced by up to 22%. Similarly, global egg production was likely reduced by 3 million tonnes, equivalent to losses worth 5.6 billion US dollars, a figure which is four times the size of the UK egg market in 2018 (Health for Animals, 2023).

Disease outbreaks can have a marked effect on the animal population of individual countries. For instance, an outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF) in Southeast Asia and China between 2018 and 2020 resulted in a 238 million decrease in the pig population in China. Despite this the UK has not experienced significant effects on its meat supply in recent years (this is explored further in Theme 2 (Indicator 2.1.3 Livestock and poultry products (meat, eggs and dairy)). UK Government regularly monitors outbreaks of animal diseases internationally, to assess whether there is an increased risk to the UK. Risk assessments on the current disease risk can be found here ([APHA, 2024)]. Notable diseases of current interest to the UK include African Swine Fever, Avian Influenza and Bluetongue. The UK adopts a One Health approach to managing zoonotic disease through the Human Animal Infections and Risk Surveillance group (HAIRS).

Overall

Overall, this indicator shows ongoing One Health challenges. Notable cases of pests and diseases pose risks of food production losses on a large scale. The average global population of observed vertebrate species continues to decline, and climate change raises risks to animal and plant health (see supporting evidence).

Supporting evidence

Antimicrobial Usage

Antimicrobials (AMR) are key to treating diseases in food-producing animals and plants. The use of antimicrobials helps to maintain food production by limiting the spread of disease. However, an overuse of antimicrobials can lead to antimicrobial resistance, which is a growing issue. The recommended strategy by the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) is to prevent disease and use antimicrobials responsibly.

WOAH estimates that AMR Usage could have been as high as 88,927 tonnes in 2021. It is estimated that there was an overall global increase of 2% in mg/kg, moving from 107.3 mg/kg in 2019 to 109.7 mg/kg in 2021. While a decreased usage was observed in the Americas (−9%), Europe (−6%) and Asia and the Pacific (−0.7%), there was a sharp rise in reported usage in Africa (+179%) (WOAH, 2024).

Some classes of antimicrobial reported larger rises than others. For instance, between 2019 and 2021 it was estimated there was a 10% increase in tetracyclines (the most used antimicrobial class in animal health), a 12% increase in penicillin, and a 19% increase in macrolides). Tetracyclines and penicillin are part of the Veterinary Critically Important Antimicrobial (VCIA) classes in WOAH’s List of Antimicrobials of Veterinary Importance and represent 36% and 13% of global antimicrobial use in animals respectively, but neither is listed among the highest priority critically important antimicrobial agents for human health, by WHO. Antibiotics on the WHO critically important list account for under 4% of antibiotic usage in animals (WOAH, 2024).

In the eighth round of WOAH Antimicrobial Usage Report (AMU), 24% of respondents said they were using antimicrobials for growth promotion. This does not represent responsible use. The highest proportion of participants using antimicrobials as growth promoters was in the Americas (WOAH, 2024). It is important to maintain antimicrobials as an effective disease control measure to maintain food security.

Fungicides and pesticides are widely used in crop production. These are applied directly to the environment and if overused can lead to the development of resistant microbes. Fungicide use has increased globally since 1990, rising by 75% between 1990 and 2022. The global estimate (self-reported by countries) of pesticides used in agriculture was 3,690,935 tonnes, of which 793,923 tonnes (21.5%) were fungicides and bactericides in 2022 (FAOSTAT, 2024).

The emergence of novel pathogens presents a challenge to food security. For instance, cultivars still have no natural immunity to a strain of stem rust that emerged in Uganda (Ug99) in 1998 (Lidwell-Durnin and Lapthorn, 2020). There will be further challenges should new strains of disease emerge faster than crops can be bred to develop immunity.

Health of the Ecosystem

Biodiversity is the range and variety of Earth’s plants, animals and micro-organisms and is integral to the health of the ecosystem and to global food security. Forests, grasslands, inland wetlands, and marine and coastal ecosystems can all provide a range of services to food production and agriculture. Benefits include regulating the flow of water, improving air quality, binding carbon, and therefore helping to reduce the threat posed by climate change, and providing protection against extreme events, such as storms and floods. Equally, they provide a habitat for species that contribute to food supplies. Countless species of invertebrates and micro-organisms are essential to the fertility of soils upon which crops and livestock depend. Similarly, a variety of different species help to control pests and parasites that threaten food-producing plants and animals.

Pollinators support the yields of 75% of the world’s food crops, and 35% of food production by weight (heavier staple crops such as cereals do not rely on pollinators to support yields). Most crops do not rely on pollinators but are aided by them, so the reduction in total food production is estimated to be around 5 to 10%, with cocoa beans, Brazil nuts and kiwi fruit among the crops most affected (Ritchie, 2021). However, the health of the ecosystem on which food production depends faces several threats. The three major causes of pollinator loss stem from agriculture, and include a loss of habitat, changes in land management practices (such as use of fertilisers and the increase in growing one type of crop) and pesticide use, notably neonicotinoids. Climate change is the fourth biggest cause, although there is limited data on its effect (Dicks and others, 2021).

Pollinators include vertebrate species such as birds, mammals, and reptiles, and invertebrate species such as bees, butterflies, flies, moths, beetles, ants and wasps. Most pollination is performed by invertebrates. More than 90% of the leading global crop types are visited by bees and around 30% by flies, according to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). The Living Planet Report from the World Wildlife Fund for Nature highlights the average change in observed population sizes of 5,495 vertebrate species. It shows a decline of 73% between 1970 and 2020. The Red List Index of Species of Survival (a UN SDG 15 metric) shows a 12% deterioration between 1993 and 2024, and this was reported at 10% in 2020. Most invertebrate pollinators have not been assessed at a global level (IPBES, 2016). For analysis of the effect of UK consumption on global biodiversity, see Theme 4 (Indicator 4.3.3 Sustainable diet).

The Global One Health Index-Food Security (GOHI-FS)

The Global One Health Index-Food Security (GOHI-FS) examined the close links and inter-dependence of the health of humans, animals and the environment, particularly in the context of the sustainability of food systems. It gave a global overview of food systems from a One Health perspective based on 5 categories: food demand and supply, food safety, nutrition, natural and social circumstances, and government support and response.

GOHI-FS enabled comparisons to be made across countries. Lower scores indicate that food systems are weaker in these countries. It is also possible to consider the long-term effects of food system sustainability in countries that the UK relies on for food imports and consider learning from countries with more sustainable food systems.

There is no historic data available for GOHI-FS as currently it is a one-off piece of analysis, so it does not consider any long-term trends. Most of the data used was from international authoritative agencies but the missing data rate was 19.4%, which may pose a challenge to precisely evaluating the performance of food security in those countries or territories.

The score of GOHI-FS showed high correlations with economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, social development indicators such as the Social Development Index and health indictors, such as health expenditure and life expectancy. North America showed on average better performance than other regions across all five dimensions of the GOHI-FS, while sub-Saharan Africa had a low overall performance across these dimensions. Europe and North America performed better in food supply and demand than other regions. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia had low scores on food safety with a high burden of foodborne illness. Whereas Europe, Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific had higher scores, which could be related to more effective surveillance systems in these regions. However, all regions performed poorly on government support and response relative to the other categories and only 29 out of 147 countries received scores in the top 3 quintiles (index score higher than 40) across all 5 categories.

Climate impacts on animal and plant health

Assessing the impact of climate change on global animal and plant health is challenging because of complex interactions between the pests or diseases and their hosts, predators and environmental conditions. For the UK, the potential climate change-related risks from pests, pathogens and diseases to animal and plant health are high and increasing overall. The risk to agriculture is currently assessed as medium, increasing to high in the future, and scaling with the degree of climate change (Berry and others, 2021).

The lifecycles of most pests, pathogens, and diseases are temperature-dependant. Rising temperatures are expected to lead to earlier and faster development times, more generations per year, and changes in the interactions between hosts and pathogens, likely increasing pressures on the host species. For example, the abundance of fungal soil-borne plant pathogens is likely to increase in most natural ecosystems worldwide (Delgado-Baquerizo and others, 2020), and potential yield gains under future climate change may be offset by increases in disease pressure (Chaloner and others, 2021). For example, Culicoides (biting midges) are a vector for many livestock viruses such as bluetongue (BTV) and epizootic haemorrhagic disease. Their abundance is highly correlated with temperature and the emergence of the BTV in northern Europe has been attributed to climate changes, particularly increasing temperatures (Guis and others, 2012). For England and Wales, continued warming is expected to extend the BTV risk further north, lengthen the transmission season and result in larger outbreaks (Berry and others, 2021). Warmer temperatures are also expected to increase the potential for genetic mutations and increased virulence of pests and pathogens (Berry and others, 2021).

One of the major impacts of projected climate changes is to increase overwintering potential for many pests, pathogens, and diseases, facilitating range expansions, more frequent establishment, and spread into new areas (Szyniszewska and others, 2024). Conversely, for some regions of existing establishment, the temperatures will become so high as to be limiting for the pest, pathogen, or disease (Bradshaw and others, 2019).

Changes in extreme weather events can also affect a species’ ability to thrive. For example, heavy rainfall events have been found to lengthen development times and reduce survival of some caterpillar species (Chen and others, 2019). Heatwave events have also been shown to impact the lifespan, fecundity and oviposition (egg laying) of insects (Sales and others, 2021). Where increases in average wind speed and extreme wind events are projected, the transport of pathogens and infected vectors may increase in frequency (Hroššo and others, 2020) and may cover increasingly large distances (Hudson and others, 2023).

About the UK Food Security Report

The UK Food Security Report (UKFSR) sets out an analysis of statistical data relating to food security in the UK. It fulfils a duty under Part 2, Chapter 1 (Section 19) of the Agriculture Act 2020 to prepare and lay before Parliament at least once every three years “a report containing an analysis on statistical data relating to food security in the United Kingdom”.

The UKFSR examines past, current, and future trends relevant to food security to present a full and impartial analysis of UK food security. It draws on a broad range of published data from official, administrative, academic, intergovernmental and wider sources.

The UKFSR is intended as an independent evidence base to inform users rather than a policy or strategy. In practice this means that it provides government, Parliament, food chain stakeholders and the wider public with the data and analysis needed to monitor UK food security and develop effective responses to issues.

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What we will do with this data

Production team: Michael Archer, Lewis Bird, Jess Booth, Jane Brown, Rebecca Clutterbuck, Grant Davies, Simon Dixon, Nikita Driver, Tom George, Gayle Griffiths, Evangeline Hopper, Helen Jamieson, Ronald Kasoka, Matt Keating, Sarath Kizhakkoott, Gurjeevan Landa, Rachel Latham, David Lee, James LePage, Ian Lonsdale, Claire Manley (FSA), Eszter Palotai, Maria Prokopiou, Erica Pufall (FSA), Alexis Rampa, Lewis Ratcliffe, Leigh Riley, Karen Robertson (FSS), Danny Roff, William Ryle-Hodges, Daniel Scott, Chris Silwood, Swati Singh (FSA), Carine Valarche, Maisie Wilson, Isabella Worth

Acknowledgements

We are extremely grateful to the following for their expert contributions and guidance throughout the synthesis of this Report, helping to ensure it delivers a thorough analysis of a robust evidence base:

• Professor Angelina Sanderson Bellamy, University of the West of England Bristol

• Professor Tim Benton, Chatham House

• Dr Tom D. Breeze, University of Reading

• Dr Jonathan Brooks, Honorary Senior Research Fellow, University of Exeter Business School

• Professor Katrina Campbell, Institute for Global Food Security, School of Biological Sciences, Queen’s University Belfast

• Professor Bob Doherty (Dean and Principal Investigator of FixOurFood), School for Business and Society, University of York

• Selvarani Elahi MBE, UK Deputy Government Chemist, LGC

• Dr Pete Falloon, Met Office/University of Bristol

• Professor Lynn Frewer, Centre for Rural Economy, Newcastle University

• Dr Kenisha Garnett, Cranfield University

• Professor Emeritus Peter J. Gregory, School of Agriculture, Policy & Development, University of Reading

• Dr Saher Hasnain, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford

• Alan Hayes, Strategic Advisor, Future Strategy

• Dr John Ingram, Food Systems Transformation Programme, University of Oxford

• Professor Peter Jackson, Institute for Sustainable Food, University of Sheffield

• Professor Alexandra Johnstone, The Rowett Institute, University of Aberdeen

• Dr Hannah Lambie-Mumford, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield

• Dr Marta Lonnie, The Rowett Institute, School of Medicine, Medical Sciences & Nutrition, University of Aberdeen

• Dr Rachel Loopstra, Department of Public Health, Policy and Systems, University of Liverpool

• Dr Katie McDermott, University of Leeds

• Dr Ian Noble, Chair of UK Food Sector Advisory Group – Innovate UK

• Dr Kelly Parsons, MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge

• Dr Maddy Power (Assistant Professor), Wellcome Trust Research Fellow, Department of Health Sciences, University of York

• Dr Michelle Thomas, University of Reading

• Professor Carol Wagstaff, University of Reading

Continue to Theme 2: UK Food Supply Sources

Annexes

Glossary and Acronyms

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