A Theory of Change for Violent Political Marketplaces
Argues that theories of change in these contexts need to focus on the logic of transactional politics rather than on formal institutions
Abstract
In political systems that the authors identify as ‘violent political marketplaces’, policy priorities for democracy activists and external actors include ending armed conflict, building governance institutions in a post conflict setting, reforming the security sector, and promoting democracy and/or justice. How can policymakers and activists formulate evidence-based theories of change to help guide them in the pursuit of these goals? This question is the focus of this memorandum.
The obvious point is that these goals are extremely difficult to achieve in the context of violent political marketplaces. These are countries that have been known as ‘fragile states’ but could also (and more accurately) be described as open political systems on the margins of global capitalism. Not all fragile states are political marketplaces; we use the term to refer specifically to countries/contexts where politics is transactional and structured according to the laws of supply and demand rather than regulated by formal institutions (more on this below). Moreover, these political systems are often very violent. Examples include Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and arguably Syria and Iraq.
The authors argue that theories of change in these contexts need to focus on the logic of transactional politics rather than on formal institutions. Further, they need to account for constant turbulence and its counterpart unpredictability, while remaining aware of how external interventions are an integral part of the dynamics of these systems. Following from this – they conclude that 3 broad types of interventions are possible:
- tactically engineering short term outcomes to reduce violence;
- a top-down reconfiguration of the political system; and
- preparing the ground so that domestic actors can take advantage of eventual opportunities for democratic transformation.
These interventions each come with their own risks, operate across variable time-scales, and may be combined; in all cases, however, they need to be tailored to the particularities of the political system in question.
This work is part of the Conflict Research Programme managed by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and funded by the UK Department for International Development
Citation
Alex de Waal, Aditya Sarkar, Sarah Detzner and Ben Spatz (2020) A Theory of Change for Violent Political Marketplaces. Conflict Research Programme Policy Memo. Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Link
A Theory of Change for Violent Political Marketplaces (PDF, 253KB)