Form

Secure Stations Scheme: guidance notes

Updated 9 March 2018

1. Background

1.1 What is the Secure Stations Scheme?

The Secure Stations Scheme is an opportunity for station operators to demonstrate how they are working with partners to reduce crime and play a greater role in safeguarding vulnerable people who might be at stations. Having an accredited station provides reassurance to both passengers and staff that the station is a safe and secure environment.

This national scheme covers all rail networks which are policed by the British Transport Police (BTP). It establishes standards of good practice and accredits individual stations which have worked with the BTP and other local partners to improve safety and security for all.

The scheme recognises that security and safety can be improved through management practices, including placing a firm emphasis on the importance of well-trained frontline staff. Security and safety can also be improved through physical design measures, making improvements and managing the remaining risks.

The design of a new station or a major refurbishment provides an opportunity to incorporate best practice into the station design, and it is advisable that the BTP are consulted on any such plans as this will increase the likelihood of that station successfully gaining secure station accreditation once the works are complete.

1.2 What are the accreditation criteria?

There are 4 accreditation criteria:

• crime statistics for the 12 months prior to the assessment compared to the annual passenger footfall of that station - see chapter 4
• a survey of users taking account of passenger perceptions and the operator response to this - see chapter 5
• the operator’s management practices must promote and conduct crime reduction and prevention measures, ensure appropriate responses to incidents, the safeguarding of vulnerable persons and effective communication with passengers - see chapter 2 and section 1 of the management practices and station design audit form
• the design of the station must conform to standards which prevent and reduce crime and facilitate the safeguarding of vulnerable people, as assessed by the BTP Assessor - see chapter 3 and section 2 of the management practices and station design audit form

Each criteria is assessed in turn by the BTP Assessor, who will only move onto the next stage should the previously assessed stage pass to the required standard. Passing all 4 criteria is required for the station to be overall accredited. In some cases the BTP Assessor may apply discretion and choose to accredit the station overall even though one or more criteria fails assessment. There is no set of pre-defined conditions to identify situations where this may apply, however the BTP Assessor will be required to outline their justification for such a decision in a pro-forma and submit this to their head of department for approval. The justification will be provided to the operator and the Department for Transport (DfT) by BTP. DfT will record the data on its database.

1.3 What are the benefits and costs?

The scheme can:

• reduce crime levels, thus reducing operating expenditure (due to vandalism, graffiti and lost time incidents)
• reduce the risk to vulnerable people at the station, reducing the potential for harm or even suicide
• improve passenger confidence to travel; increasing ridership and revenue
• generate positive publicity for the operator, potentially helping to leverage third party investment

The scheme may:

• identify areas where costs need to be incurred to bring about improvement (although these can be mitigated through early engagement with BTP)
• identify areas which require significant change, which may be outside the sole control of the operator (for example, if Network Rail consent is required)

1.4 What is involved?

Operators should use the management practices and station design audit form to make their own assessment of the station’s performance, and thereafter discuss with their BTP Assessor to prepare for the independent assessment. The BTP Assessor will be able to advise on measures which could be taken to improve the station environment and/or management practices.

Chapter 5 sets out how to find out about passenger perceptions of the station(s).

When you and the BTP Assessor agree that the station may meet the accreditation criteria, the BTP Assessor will formally accredit the station. When successfully accredited, BTP submit relevant documents to DfT, confirming if a station has either passed or failed its accreditation. In appropriate circumstances, BTP will also provide comment.

DfT will confirm your successful accreditation and send you the scheme award, in the form of a certificate signed by the Chief Constable of the BTP, which should be displayed at the station and advertised in your publicity materials and station signage, and a publicity pack.

The certificate is valid for 2 years from the date of issue. A certificate can be withdrawn during this time if there is a clear breach of the standard, or if a substantial change takes place at the station (for example, physical redevelopment). After the 2 years the operator may apply for a new certificate by contacting BTP.

If the BTP Assessor finds that the station does not meet the accreditation standard, they will specify what needs to be done and advise you on the ‘working towards accreditation’ award process. Details of this process can be found in chapter 7. Achieving the ‘working towards accreditation’ award will entitle the station operator to use this in their publicity. Once the local BTP Assessor is satisfied that full accreditation has been achieved within the timescale agreed, BTP have the ability to accredit and will inform DfT for their records.

You may have a station in a high crime and socially excluded area which, despite your efforts to improve the design and management of the station, continues to have a crime rate adversely affected by the neighbourhood it serves. To help you overcome this obstacle and to move to the accreditation standard, chapter 8 provides examples of successful measures to reduce crime and improve personal security that have been introduced at similar stations. You will need to discuss with the BTP Assessor how best to apply these measures to your station.

2. Station management

Safety and security risks at stations can be managed through monitoring the type and scale of incidents, and adopting a proportionate response with appropriately targeted resources.

Management of risk should be integral to the management of the station as a whole and, as such, should be considered in every aspect of the operation. Inspection and cleaning of the waiting areas, selection and training of staff and liaising with other local organisations, are all part of managing the station, and can all have an impact on crime, safety and feelings of personal security.

This chapter identifies the principles for improving personal security for all through management practices, and provides examples of how these principles could be achieved.

2.1 Security: a statement of intent

Your organisation should have a personal security policy which sets out its principles and objectives in relation to personal security. This will underpin all initiatives taken to improve passenger and staff security. It should include a commitment by the organisation, endorsed at Board level. Ideally a senior member of staff or board member should have specific responsibility for this issue, to ensure that the policy is implemented.

For jointly-operated sites (for example, as between a train operator and a community rail partnership), evidence should be provided of good partnership working to ensure that all relevant parties are aware of the relevant station operator’s security strategy.

You should publish a statement of intent, confirming your commitment to setting, monitoring and publicising standards of personal security that individual passengers can reasonably expect, and monitoring passenger satisfaction.

This should be exhibited in prominent positions in the station. The display of your statement of intent may also be used to give passengers a contact name and number for reporting complaints and incidents, showing your commitment to the personal security of your staff, which includes prosecuting those who threaten or assault them, and your policy on providing a reasonable maximum time a passenger would have to wait when summoning help from staff. See section 1.1, questions 1 and 2 of the management practices and station design audit form.

2.2 Safety: suicide prevention and safeguarding

Consistent with provisions in the DfT’s baseline franchise agreement, marks will be awarded for having a suicide prevention strategy consistent with statements and strategies issued by the BTP and cross-industry Suicide Prevention Duty Holders Group. Marks will also be awarded for having a safeguarding policy aimed at protecting other vulnerable people who may be present at the station.

It is the responsibility of the train operating company to ensure these policies apply to any station staff subcontracted through an external organisation.

You should consider making both of these documents available to the general public. See section 1.1, questions 3 and 4 of the management practices and station design audit form.

2.3 Staff deployment and training

Staff play an instrumental role in deterring crime, identifying vulnerable people at stations, preventing suicides and providing reassurance to passengers, many of whom may have additional accessibility requirements. The value of staff presence can be maximised by the sensitive deployment of staff, by increasing their visibility and mobility, and, where appropriate by widening their range of responsibilities. This can be achieved through:

• use of appropriate building and design materials to ensure maximum visibility and sightlines
• cultural embedment of customer service values and the importance of staff proactivity
• use of public address informing passengers of service alterations and responding to incidents
• mobile staff teams deployed on stations and at times that are identified as being when passengers feel most at risk
• making existing staff multi-functional to improve the service to the passenger and to create the impression of a service that takes care of its passengers
• using the public address system to direct information to passengers at specific locations, which gives confidence to people on isolated platforms that they are under staff surveillance

The presence of security staff who also have a responsibility to protect passengers enhances their actual and perceived level of security. Operators who contract a security company must ensure that the company they use is a bona fide organisation whose staff have been vetted and trained to a high standard, and conform to the Security Industry Authority’s (SIA) regulations.

Station staff should be selected and trained to deal with the public on a regular basis, and in circumstances where there may be anxiety, conflict, or aggression. Consideration should be given to providing new staff with an opportunity to spend time with experienced staff as part of their induction training before they are required to work alone.

Should the role of station staff be sub-contracted out to an external organisation, it is the responsibility of the train operating company to ensure these staff are trained to the same standards as their own employees, in particular with regards to the safeguarding of vulnerable people and suicide prevention. Agency staff who are new to a particular station should also be made aware of any ‘local’ issues that may impact on their safety or the safety of other staff and passengers.

2.4 Staff security

Staff security is vital to passenger security. Staff who do not feel secure are unlikely to make themselves visible and available to passengers, and are unlikely to respond effectively to situations where there is potential or actual conflict or aggression. Staff security is achieved through a combination of measures, including the provision of safe facilities, and through management and training. The appropriate level of measures in individual cases should be based on a risk assessment of each job.

Examples of good practice include:

• training for staff to deal with conflict and aggression
• high physical security in the booking office, with alarms for staff to summon rapid assistance in the event of a robbery
• personal alarms for staff for their use around the station and when leaving, preferably those which are linked to a source of assistance
• CCTV surveillance of staff on duty; and
• a staff rest room for when they are not on duty

Should the role of station staff be sub-contracted out to an external organisation, it is the responsibility of the train operating company to ensure these staff are trained to the same standards as their own employees,

See sections 1.3 and 2.5 of the management practices and station design audit form.

2.5 Securing passenger property

Knowing that their property is secure can contribute towards a passenger’s overall sense of personal security. Examples of good practice include:

• secure car parking, such that it conforms to the safer parking scheme
• sufficient and convenient bicycle parking places under the surveillance of station staff, CCTV or other surveillance
• the provision of left luggage facilities

Installation of new cycle storage facilities should be consistent with the security considerations set out in the Rail Delivery Group’s cycle-rail toolkit (PDF, 4MB).

Notices which seek to limit legal liability for loss of or damage to property, by, for example, saying that it is left `at the owner’s risk’ are unlikely to be perceived by passengers to be reassuring. See section 1.4 of the management practices and station design audit form.

3. Station design and facilities

Good design of the station environment can reduce the opportunities for crime and make it easier to spot people who may require assistance. Good physical design and maintenance can also improve passenger perceptions – e.g. through ensuring that the station is well lit, in a good state of repair and clean and tidy. See section 2.1 of the management practices and station design audit form.

As well as consulting BTP on any new station (re)design, plans should also incorporate the design standards for accessible railway stations.

This chapter sets out some general principles for station design and facilities, but is not intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive. For further advice, speak to your BTP Assessor.

3.1 Visibility and layout

Visibility is a key requirement of design, and plays a significant role in reducing and deterring crime, providing opportunities to observe and be observed, and in informing passenger perceptions of a station.

Lighting should be uniform in coverage and intensity, well-maintained, and of sufficient brightness to allow signage and information to be easily read (including by those who may have a visual impairment) both in daylight where appropriate and in darkness.

As far as reasonably practicable, the built environment should be conducive to ensuring maximum sightlines (natural e.g. through appropriate maintenance of flora or extended e.g. through the use of mirrors or glazing). Where possible, this should be reflected in the overall design (e.g. avoiding corners, wide pillars and recesses).

Physical barriers, particularly those on the perimeter of the station, should be constructed in such a way as to prevent as far as possible opportunities for climbing to enter or exit the station, and to prevent opportunities for trespass onto the station or the operational line. Station furniture such as benches and waiting shelters should also be placed in a manner that does not allow them to be used as a way of scaling walls or other barriers. See section 2.2 of the management practices and station design audit form.

3.2 Passenger information and signage

Confident station navigation plays a key role in increasing passenger confidence, which in turn will reduce the opportunity for criminal activity. Current safeguarding initiatives are also designed to help vulnerable people feel more safe and secure and feel confident about asking for assistance if required.

The station should contain appropriate navigation and wayfinding signage which is also accessible to those with additional permanent or temporary needs in respect of cognitive, mental or physical impairment. Crime prevention advice and contact information for safeguarding organisations such as the Samaritans should also be provided.

Systems for the delivery of information should be in working order and communicating accurate and timely information in an intelligible manner. Passengers should also have the means to call for assistance (either for information or in an emergency) at all times – such assistance to be relevant, timely and accurate.

Station staff should be a visible, helpful and reassuring presence, particularly in times of disruption and during hours of darkness. As part of their training, staff should be discouraged from remaining in areas that are not accessible, or less visible to, station users. See sections 2.3 and 2.5 of the management practices and station design audit form.

3.3 Surveillance

CCTV systems must be registered with the Information Commissioner’s Office and consistency with the BTP CCTV output document and RDG National Rail and Underground CCTV guidance is highly recommended. CCTV should be sited to maximise coverage and visibility of the station.

Opportunities for informal surveillance should be sought through using ‘open’ fencing and barriers, ensuring a maximised presence of staff (who may be non-TOC staff) at the station and using transparent surfaces over opaque ones. See section 2.4 of the management practices and station design audit form.

Construction

If the station being accredited has extensive building works ongoing, the BTP Assessor Accreditor may decline to carry out the inspection until those works are complete, unless those works are all behind a properly hoarded area. Any delay to inspection due to works would not count against the station operator, unless the works are carried on for an extensive period and that the Assessor concerned sees granting the award as inappropriate.

4. Recording, monitoring and responding to incidents

Recording and monitoring of all types of incidents is essential in ensuring that resources are directed in the best way possible. Passengers and staff must be encouraged to report all types of incidents in order to build up a full picture of crime at the station. This should include instances of crime (e.g. vandalism), non-criminal incidents (e.g. drunk behaviour) and the presence at the station of vulnerable individuals. Crimes and the presence of vulnerable individuals should be reported immediately to the BTP.

Incidents should be recorded in a uniform way, with as much detail as possible. The information collected should be monitored regularly to identify trends and develop long-term preventative measures. The BTP can assist with this. Regular liaison with BTP is vital in ensuring a coordinated response and presents the opportunity to consider a variety of solutions to a particular issue.

Every reported incident should receive an appropriate response in an appropriate communication format. Passengers should be aware of the response they can expect (which may depend on the type of incident), with mandatory training given to staff on the appropriate response, whether the incident is related to criminal activity or the presence of a vulnerable person at the station. Staff training should also cover providing an understanding of what information might be useful to the police, including the legal requirements related to suspect descriptions and witness details. Information should be provided to passengers on helping to avoid the risk of crime at stations.

See section 1.5 of the management practices and station design audit form.

5. Passenger perceptions

Passenger perceptions of the safety and security of a station are an important part of the accreditation process. It is crucial to the credibility of the scheme that stations given accreditation are perceived by passengers to be secure.

In order to facilitate the process of gauging passenger perceptions, the scheme will make use of existing data obtained by the National Rail Passenger Survey (NRPS). The results of the NRPS for previous years are available online, with more granular details of specific stations available directly from Transport Focus. Where there is an insufficient sample size from the NRPS data, operators will need to commission their own survey, using the same passenger perception question as contained in the NRPS. This can be administered face-to-face, at the station, or draw from existing in-house customer satisfaction data. The cost of this is met by the operator.

This question is:

“How do you rate the station in terms of your personal security while using it: Very good, fairly good, neither good nor poor, fairly poor, very poor, no opinion”.

6. End to end journeys

If any part of your station is managed by another transport operator, or other transport operators’ staff are based at the station, you will need to ensure that you work with them to improve security and safety for all staff and members of the public at the station.

The journey to or from the stop or station often provokes more anxiety than the time spent waiting. The passenger may feel quite secure while on the train and on arrival at the station, but may find the walk home or wait at the bus stop a threatening experience. The impact of the ‘whole journey’ — for example, the local street lighting, car parking facilities, the availability of bus timetables and information, and telephone numbers and accessibility of local taxi services -may make all the difference to the passenger’s perception of the rail journey. In practice, operators should work with the wider community — other transport operators, Network Rail, the UTG (where applicable), local authorities, healthcare trusts, safeguarding and wellbeing organisations, local police services, crime and disorder reduction partnerships, local businesses and voluntary/community organisations —to improve perceptions of the station and surrounding area.

7. Working towards accreditation and losing accreditation

Working towards accreditation

Accreditors have the option to award a ‘working towards accreditation’, with the aim of:

• providing an incentive to station operators who believe that few or none of their stations would gain full accreditation, in order to engage them in the scheme
• recognising the efforts of station operators that are working to get their stations to an acceptable standard in the context of run-down infrastructure and limited resources, or a crime rate that is higher than the permitted threshold for the scheme
• providing station operators with guidance and support towards attaining full accreditation at such stations;
• taking account of major disruption (such as an ongoing physical rebuild at the station) which may make full accreditation inappropriate
• taking account of where an operator has lost accreditation due to a breach of the incident threshold recorded in the franchise agreement

Stations that could be considered by a station operator for the ‘working towards accreditation’ category are those which: fail at the outset because of their high number of crimes or those which have a low enough crime rate to pass the threshold, but fail full accreditation because of the scoring of the management practices and station design audit.

Once a station has failed, the operator and local BTP Assessor should meet with a view to developing an action plan. This action plan will form the basis for the ‘working towards accreditation’ award.

The action plan should be based on the weaknesses revealed by the available data, and the management practices and station design scoring. It is important to undertake an analysis of the crime problem, so that preventive measures can be targeted appropriately. It is essential for those stations that failed on the crime rate to go through the design and management checklist. The Action Plan should be tailored so that it requires enough of the station operator that if they follow it, they can be confident of full accreditation, but not so demanding that it is not achievable.

The action plan should be: Specific Measurable Achievable Realistic Time limited.

The timescale for the ‘working towards accreditation’ will depend on the nature of the improvements required, but should be realistic. The action plan itself should set its own timescales, within these parameters.

All action plans will be assured by the British Transport Police Independent Accreditor, in order to ensure that a consistent standard is being applied nationally.

Once an action plan is signed off by the station operator and BTP, BTP will send a ‘working towards accreditation’ award to the station operator. Progress towards achieving full accreditation will be monitored by a Secure Stations Scheme steering group to ensure the progress of the station operator and oversee that they complete accreditation.

As with full accreditation, the steering group reserves the right to withdraw the ‘working towards accreditation’ award in the case of a serious breach. Unless there are exceptional extenuating circumstances, an operator that fails to deliver the action plan for the station within the specified time period, will have the award withdrawn. It will then be for the station operator to reapply to the steering group for ‘working towards accreditation’ status.

Losing accreditation

If a station requiring accreditation for the first time or reaccreditation fails to secure it, this will be reported by BTP to the Department for Transport and may constitute a breach of the station operator’s franchise agreement. If a station fails its annual passenger/crime review (in between biennial reaccreditations, this may also constitute a breach of the franchise agreement.

8. Tackling incidents at stations

This chapter provides information on measures which have previously assisted in tackling crime and non-crime incidents. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list; operators should not feel discouraged from attempting an initiative just because it does not appear in this document. Further guidance can be provided by the BTP.

8.1 Key principles

• a holistic approach to addressing alcohol and drug misuse, antisocial behaviour, negative perceptions (of both staff and the public) should be taken
• the cooperation of key partners (including but not limited to those listed in chapter 6) is essential for initiatives to be successful
• sound and up to date analysis and evidence is needed to effectively target initiatives in terms of geographical location and/or types of incident to be prevented or reduced — systems need to be flexible enough to respond to changes and to meet new challenges presented at the station
• crime prevention measures need to be sustained and the level of activity maintained. For example, analysis of crime and disorder in deprived neighbourhoods has revealed that many of the problems are entrenched and require sustained activity to be effectively tackled — one-off attempts to solve problems rarely work
• equally, where trends show that instances of suicide or of vulnerable people presenting at stations are increasing, concerted steps should be taken to address this
• achieving long term changes to the incident profile of a station often requires changing the behaviour of those using the station — these are usually longer term solutions that need to go hand in hand with shorter term measures that reduce the opportunities for incidents to occur through situational prevention and support measures
• the regular monitoring and evaluation of incident reduction measures is necessary to ensure they are being delivered in a way that best achieves their objectives and provides good value for money, Examples of good practice identified that having the following in place can contribute significantly to improved partnership working, data collection and analysis. Some examples are set out below.

8.2 Partnership working

• a partnership approach involving local communities, services and businesses is often essential because the incidents which affect rail stations may mirror those in the wider community
• a close working relationship between the BTP, transport providers and local crime and disorder reduction partnership is important for ensuring public transport related incidents are on the agenda, with tackling such incidents forming an integral part of the partnership’s strategy
• a good working relationship between operational staff, the BTP and private security officers can help develop a seamless approach to safeguarding the public on stations and trains
• although their responsibilities may be similar, local authorities often work very differently and time must be allowed for the BTP and operators to understand their processes and requirements, for example with greater time required for officer recommendations to be agreed by local authority committees
• the operator/Network Rail partnership is crucial for taking forward initiatives — other agencies sometimes find it difficult to understand who is responsible for what, and operators and Network Rail should consider identifying someone with sufficient seniority and expertise to take the lead, involving local staff as appropriate
• a recognisable relationship should exist between the station and local Samaritans branch to allow the support of the latter to be called upon following fatality events

8.3 Data collection and analysis

• the systematic collection of data on crime and disorder should be a common starting point for the identification and subsequent monitoring of the effectiveness of measures
• stations that are located at the convergence of local authorities and different policing districts will benefit from a mechanism that enables crime data for the whole area to be gathered and analysed
• data and other information on neighbourhood and station issues, can help develop an understanding of the issues and help to target a partnership approach to incident reduction measures
• qualitative information from passengers, staff and other residents is an important and often unused source for identifying problems at the station and the neighbourhood, helping to correct to some extent under-reporting of incidents
• results from data gathering and analysis should be made available widely, including to operational/frontline staff to ensure that everyone is aware of hotspots and the times when incidents typically occur

8.4 Specific initiatives

• BTP base at the stations to enhance visibility (examples include use of Police Community Support Officers and Special Constables)
• targeted BTP policing operations (examples include addressing carrying of offensive weapons, trackside vandalism and alertness to vulnerable individuals)
• establishing a priority policing area that includes a rail station alternative security and safety presence such as private security patrols
• travel support officers, rail enforcement officers, retail security patrols and street and neighbourhood wardens
• an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance (IPNA) and Section 30 dispersal orders extending to the station premises as well as operating in the town centres
• enforcement under railway byelaws and withdrawal of implied permission
• use of ‘restorative justice’ where applicable
• specific measures taken especially through local youth workers and schools to inform young people of the existence of a dispersal order
• raising awareness amongst magistrates on the seriousness of public transport related crimes and anti-social behaviour
• alcohol exclusion zones operating in the locality that includes the rail station or operating network wide on all stations and trains.
• joint visits to stations with outreach teams to assist vulnerable people who may be in need of support
• working with children and young people to deter their involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour on the public transport network and in the wider neighbourhood, and to raise awareness of mental health and safeguarding issues
• working with other at-risk groups to reduce stress and anxiety both generally and in a railway context

9. Appeal process

A station operator may disagree with the BTP assessor as to why a station has been failed. In those circumstances the operator has the right to appeal against the decision. The operator should address their appeal to the BTP Head of Crime Reduction (via [email protected]) , setting out their reasons for appeal. The head of department should ask the BTP assessor concerned the grounds for the station concerned failing the accreditation. They should then ask a suitable departmental supervisor to conduct a station inspection independently, which may include the examination of relevant documents produced as evidence for marking within the scheme. The person making this second inspection should then report back to the head of department with their recommendation as to whether the station should be accredited or not and the reasons for that decision.

This decision will be reviewed at the Quarterly Secure Stations Scheme Steering Group (which has representatives from BTP, DfT and RDG), and the steering group will make the final decision on whether or not the station will gain accreditation.